Trade relations after the war
Notwithstanding the hopes of some worker-optimists and the fears of some capitalists, capitalism will not disappear after and as a consequence of the war. It will change some of its features but it cannot disappear until such time as the working class of the world is ready to establish Socialism, and that cannot be until much more has been done to propagate Socialist ideas.
Nevertheless there wilt be changes, if only because the war will leave behind it a different relationship between the Powers, large and small. It is a fairly safe assumption that there will be re-grouping and that in place of the present multiplicity of States the world will be effectively controlled by a smaller number of large Empires and Federations. Beyond that it is difficult to go because there are no simple over-riding factors which will determine the grouping. Much depends, of course, on the degree of defeat and exhaustion suffered by the respective warring States. Within limits, therefore, it is true to say, as does the Times City Editor, that “we do not know . . . what sort of world the post-war world is going to be” (January 19th, 1942).
There are, however, two things that we can see clearly enough, first the continuance ol the main capitalist rivalries in international trade, and secondly the ideas which will guide the efforts at reform on the part of various interested parties.
Let us first dispose of the idea that the acceptance of the Atlantic Charter, with its broad generalisations about international co-operation and care for the welfare of the population, settles the problem of capitalist profit-seeking and consequent international rivalries. What hope is there that the Allied “New Order” will bring to an end what Major-General Fuller describes as “the now century and a half old competitive economic struggle between the nations, which undoubtedly has in the past led to revolution within them and wars between them”? (Evening Standard, January 5th, 1942.) Will the Governments be able to agree, or even want to agree, to do away with the various practices, backed up by armed force, through which they have in the past sought to further the trading interests of the capitalist class? Most of the comments on the Atlantic Charter made by the Press have shown that even the question of Anglo-American relationship bristles with difficulties.
The Charter demands a gradual return to the long ago abandoned system of free trade, but “with due regard to existing obligations.” Some important existing obligations are the Ottawa agreements on the side of the British Empire and the United States import tariff and trade agreements with various countries. Sir Patrick Harmon, M.P., a representative of British capitalism, speaking on the question recently “expressed vigorous criticism of the trade policy of the United States” and declared that the Atlantic Charter can hardly be applied in the presence of those American trade agreements (Manchester Guardian, December 19th, 1941). The Manchester Guardian, while traditionally in favour of free trade, points out other obstacles, and is unable to go further than to suggest that concessions by Britain be made dependent on a change of attitude by U.S.A.
“What Americans strongly oppose . . . is a continuation after the war of the Empire preferences and the sterling area of exchange control. It ought to be made plain that the removal of these unwanted safeguards will depend on a much greater degree of American co-operation than has yet been envisaged.”— (“Manchester Ouardian,” December 19th. 1941.)
The “Round Table” which represents influential British financial and industrial views, published in its December issue an article on Anglo-American co-operation and stressed the same difficulties of reconciling American and British standpoints. While the United States will expect the most favourable terms of trade from Britain and will want to export to this country large quantities of American goods, the capitalists of this country, owing to a greatly weakened financial position, will want preference to be given to those countries which buy British exports. This, says the “Round Table,” is a situation full of possible mischief unless the two Governments can reach understanding. An extreme view was expressed in a speech a year ago bv Mr. Virgil Jordan, president of an American employers’ organisation, the National Industrial Conference Board. According to a report of his speech published by the New York Herald Tribune (quoted in Labour Research Department Fact Service, January 28th, 1941) he said: —
“If Fngland should emerge from the struggle without defeat . . . she will be so impoverished economically and crippled in prestige that it is improbable she will be able to resume or maintain the dominant position in world affairs which she has occupied so long. At best . . . England will become a junior partner in a new Anglo-Saxon imperialism, in which the economic resources and the military and naval strength of the United States will be the centre of gravity.”
Mr. Jordan may well prove to be largely mistaken as were his forerunners who were making similar prophecies after the last war, but what is relevant here is the fact that he and his fellow capitalists in America, seeking to further their own interests through U.S.A. foreign policy, will be tempted to bring about the condition he envisages, while his opposite numbers in this country will be seeking to defend their interests through British foreign policy. In the resulting struggle the pious hopes of the Charter are likely to be soon forgotten.
A similar field for conflict will exist in the problem of reconstructing the industry of Central Europe. Some interests here and in America will see the prospect of profitable activity for themselves in helping to carry out that reconstruction, and Mr. Leonard Behrens, speaking at the Manchester branch of the Institute of Export, affirms that “after the war we must re-establish in Europe industries which would compete with ours. He believed the hope of our exporting industries lay not in any policy of exclusion but in encouraging increased consumption” (Manchester Guardian, December 10th, 1941). But what will be the view of the British capitalists who see themselves adversely affected by this competition from Central Europe? They will naturally ask tor subsidies or tariffs or some other form of protection without giving another thought to the Atlantic Charter.
One aspect of the drive for trade after the war will be the demand for protection for British agriculture. While the present Minister of Agriculture has declared that agriculture must be protected against the importation of cheap food, industrial capitalists will have opposite views, as also will the wheat producing countries. According to the Daily Express (January 22nd, 1942), the glut of wheat in Canada, U.S.A., Australia and Argentina has now reached the “staggering total” of 1,750-million bushels, or much more than double the pre-war average.
Then there is the growing tendency of Governments themselves to conduct bulk trading operations because of the stronger bargaining position this gives them as compared with individual capitalist trading. Russia and Germany are among the countries which had carried this practice far in the years before the present war. Following their example, the British Government in 1940 set up the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation, financed with Government money, with the object of carrying on “a general trading business … as merchants, concessionaires, and financiers … in any part of the world.” In an article dealing with the work of the Corporation and its subsidiaries, the Economist (January 17th, 1942) sees the likelihood that it will have to be retained after the war—”There may be a good case for its continued handling of such trade (i.e., trade in raw materials with Russia) which even under normal peace conditions will have to be conducted with a Government monopoly on the other side of the counter.”
It will be noticed that all of the above mentioned planners of post-war international trade take for granted the continuance of the capitalist trading system with its necessary acceptance of the desire to realise profit out of the export of goods on the most favourable terms. In other words, they all accept the continuance of the economic struggle which has had such disastrous results in the past.
The other side of the New Order is the insistence on the desirability of raising the standard of living of the world’s population. Here you find the Conservative Times and the Labour leader, Mr. Herbert Morrison, agreeing about the form of words to be used. The Times (October 4th, 1941) says that the old conception of “Wealth of Nations” is “finding more positive expression in ‘the welfare of nations,'” and Mr. Morrison suggests “the conception of human welfare as the avowed aim and object of international post-war policy” (Times, June 7th, 1941). But the magic word “welfare” and the seeming agreement get us nowhere. Before human welfare can be the aim and object of international policy that aim and that object have got to be adopted by those who control the Government and that cannot be while capitalism is the established order of society. The aim of the capitalist, whether individually or through capitalist trading and industrial associations or through Governments, is and must continue to be the production and sale of goods for profit.
Governments may come under the control of men or parties which profess other aims, but so long as they have the task of administering capitalism it will be the profit motive, not the idealistic aim, that will and must determine their conduct and policy at home and in the international field.
H.
(Socialist Standard, February 1942)