[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LB:I'm afraid, Critical Realism is just a different  version of the same old a priori dogmatic approach to theory I referred to earlier — yet another example of how the ideas of the ruling-class always rule (in this case, they rule another set of Marxist 'intellectuals').

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The mere quantitative addition of ‘Frenchmen’ would not achieve the ‘transformations’ which are described. It is quite clear that even 10,000 Frenchmen, stood as individuals and not in any specific structural relationships, would be defeated by only 1,000 Mamelukes.It is not mere quantitative accretion that produces qualitative change, but the specific structuring of more Frenchmen into an Army. An army is not mere numbers, but specialisation of roles, co-ordination, equipment, training, sub-structures, etc., a structuring which produces properties that don’t exist at the individual level, abilities, efficiencies, ideas, morale, esprit d’corps, a unit that acts as one under a commander. The French Revolutionary armies under Napoleon won battle after battle because their new structures were better than those of the armies opposing them. This was nothing to do with merely increased numbers, as ‘dialectics’ would suggest, but the emergence of new structural properties, as ‘critical realism’ would suggest.

Is this supposed to be an application of Engels's 'Law'?

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The transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa. For our purpose, we could express this by saying that in nature, in a manner exactly fixed for each individual case, qualitative changes can only occur by the quantitative addition or subtraction of matter or motion (so-called energy)…. Hence it is impossible to alter the quality of a body without addition or subtraction of matter or motion, i.e. without quantitative alteration of the body concerned.[Dialectics of Nature. Bold emphasis alone added.]

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This is precisely the Hegelian nodal line of measure relations, in which, at certain definite nodal points, the purely quantitative increase or decrease gives rise to a qualitative leap; for example, in the case of heated or cooled water, where boiling-point and freezing-point are the nodes at which — under normal pressure — the leap to a new state of aggregation takes place, and where consequently quantity is transformed into quality. [Anti-Duhring. Bold emphases added.]

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For the rest, however, the assurance he gives us is only half right unless it is completed by the Hegelian nodal line of measure relations which has already been mentioned. In spite of all gradualness, the transition from one form of motion to another always remains a leap, a decisive change. This is true of the transition from the mechanics of celestial bodies to that of smaller masses on a particular celestial body; it is equally true of the transition from the mechanics of masses to the mechanics of molecules — including the forms of motion investigated in physics proper: heat, light, electricity, magnetism. In the same way, the transition from the physics of molecules to the physics of atoms — chemistry — in turn involves a decided leap; and this is even more clearly the case in the transition from ordinary chemical action to the chemism of albumen which we call life. Then within the sphere of life the leaps become ever more infrequent and imperceptible. — Once again, therefore, it is Hegel who has to correct Herr Dühring.[Ibid. Bold added.]

If so, have taken this 'law' apart here:http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2007.htm

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[Rosa Lichtenstein]

mcolome1:

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It do not have to edit anything, you want to be too bossy. My writting appear at the bottom.

It's all the same to me if you can't quite grasp the posting protocols of this site. So, in future, I won't assume you care whether or not your posts resemble a dog's dinner.

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This is the source who is also shown on the original message published. For you Marx  is a Hegel  free zone, but for me Marx never rejected Hegel completely. This manuscript is from MEGA edition written in 1875

So, you can't, or won't, tell me exatly when the letter was written or to whom it was sent. Fine, no matter; I was still able to show that it makes no difference to the fact that Das Kapital is a Hegel-free zone.

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For you Marx  is a Hegel  free zone, but for me Marx never rejected Hegel completely.

What you or I think is irrelevant, it is what Marx had to say about 'the dialectic method' in a published source that is important. So, and unfortunately for you, Marx disagrees with you, as I have shown.That is, unless you can come up with that missing passage, written and published by Marx after January 1873, that summarises 'the dialectic method' in a way that involves Hegelian concepts/'logic'.Oh wait! There isn't one.

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[Rosa Lichtenstein]

mcolome!:

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I think you do not have any  understanding of Hegel at all, and think that by critiquing the stupidities of what called itself "dialectical materialism" (a term marx never used and which has nothing to do with Hegelian dialecticsor Marx's work) you think you have made some great discovery

Well, what you think and what you can show or prove are two different things —  so, if you think you can show where my demolition of Hegel's core argument goes wrong, let's hear it.Anyway, let's assume that I do not "have any understanding of Hegel", then I'm in  good company, since no one 'understands' Hegel — or, if they do they've kept that secret well hidden for 200 years.It's not possible to 'understand' Hegel's unique brand of gobbledygook, any more than it is possible to 'understand' the Christian Trinity (which, as I have pointed out several times already, originated in the same Neo-Platonic swamp that spawned Hegel's confused musings — I'm rather surprised avowed atheists give Hegel a second thought (apologies if I assume too much about your beliefs)).

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[Rosa Lichtenstein]

mcolome1:

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Why so many peoples are wrong and the only one that is correct is you and you are the only who says that you are correct ?

In fact, my criticisms of Hegel are commonplace among analytic philosophers, but they aren't generally known to most Marxists since they are almost totally ignorant of this current in modern philosophy.But, let us suppose for one moment that I am the only person in the entire history of the planet who has argued this way, what then?Well, someone has to innovate, someone has to point out that this emperor is not only without clothes, he isn't even an emperor!Can you imagine someone saying this of Copernicus ?

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Why so many peoples are wrong and the only one that is correct is you and you are the only who says that you are correct ?

If we all simply believed only what others accept, there'd be no progress, and we'd all still be living in caves.My arguments stand or fall on their own merit, and do not depend for their validity on how many people I upset in the meantime.

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[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Mcolome1, I think you need to edit your last post to make it clear which are your words and which are mine.

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Marx published Capital in 1867; this is  what he wrote in 1875.

In fact, the Postface to the second edition was published in January 1873.But what of the later passage you quoted?

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“In my zealous devotion to the schema of Hegelian logic, I even discovered the Hegelian forms of the syllogism in the process of circulation. My relationship with Hegel is very simple. I am a disciple of Hegel, and the presumptuous chattering of the epigones who think they have buried this great thinker appear frankly ridiculous to me.

I'd appreciate it if you could tell me the exact date of this letter, and to whom it was written, so I can check it in my copy of the complete works.But, let us assume it is 100% genuine; does it prove the things you allege?Not really. As I have pointed out several times: no unpublished source can take precedence over published material when it comes to ascertaining a writer's genuine opinions.But, what does this letter actually tell us?

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I even discovered the Hegelian forms of the syllogism in the process of circulation.

This is on a par with being able to see the face of Jesus Christ in a current bun. I can't see that Marx is being serious here; he is obviously still' coquetting'. 

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My relationship with Hegel is very simple. I am a disciple of Hegel,

Well, I am a disciple of Gottlob Frege, but I disagree with most of what he had to say. Now, we know this was also true of Marx in relation to Hegel, since he published a summary of 'the dialectic method' which contains not one atom of Hegel, but which he still called 'the dialectic method'. If his opinion of Hegel were still as high as some maintain, he wouldn't have done this, or said that. He'd have said something like this:

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Whilst the writer pictures what he takes to be actually my method… what else is he picturing but the dialectic method, providing we incorporate in there some Hegelian logic, but 'the right way up', of course?"

But he didn't; so this published source must take precedence over an unpublished, and ambiguous letter.

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the presumptuous chattering of the epigones who think they have buried this great thinker appear frankly ridiculous to me

I have already covered this point. I think Plato was a 'great thinker' and I am critical of those who would dismiss him with a wave of the hand, but I still disagree with 99.99% of what he had to say.

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This should put to rest the claim that “Marx’s mature work in political economy is not dependent upon Hegel and dialectics.

1) I have never doubted that 'dialectics' was important for Marx, the question has always been what did he (not you, not me, not Engels, not anyone else), what did he think this word meant.Well, we needn't speculate since Marx told us in the Postface to the second edition — and the summary of 'the dialectic method' he quoted and endorsed contains not one milligram of Hegel.2) So, unless you can come up with a comment written and published by Marx, contemporaneous with or subsequent to January 1873, it is settled: Marx's mature work was indeed a Hegel-free zone.

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[Rosa Lichtenstein]

mcolome1:

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http://www.internationalmarxisthumanist.org/articles/hegel-in-10-minutes-by-david-blackThis is an article published by the  International Marxist Humanist Organization about Hegel

And in ten minutes, I take Hegel apart, here: http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/Outline_of_errors_Hegel_committed_01.htmAnd, in much more detail here:http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2008_03.htm

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[Rosa Lichtenstein]

mcolome1:

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Marx's letter to Engels : "My view is that Dietzgen would do best if he condensed his ideas into 2 printed sheets and had them printed in his name as a tanner. If he publishes them at the intended length, he will make a fool of himself because of the lack of dialectical development and the running in circles." As he put it in a later letter (11-8068), "it is his bad luck that it was precisely Hegel that he did not study." It looks like  Marx never abandoned Hegel completely.

I covered this several pages ago, where I pointed out that when it comes to deciding at what a certain author believes, published sources take precedence over unpublished, especially when the published material was written after the unpublished.In this case, the above (unpublished) letter was written several years before Marx's published comments about 'the dialectic method', in the Postface to the second German edition.So, my contention still stands: by the time he came to write Das Kapital, Marx had waved 'goodbye' to that mystical bumbler, Hegel — except for the odd phrase or two with which he merely wished to 'coquette'.

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[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LB:

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More fundamentally, though, I disagree with your idea that thought can't be applied 'aprioristically'. I think that this is exactly what science does, when humans employ an aprioristic theory to select (what they consider relevant, according to the theory) from the 'object'. This selection from the object (an 'abstraction') is then used to build a hypothesis which clearly then must be tested empirically: ie. the unity of theory and practice.

Certainly, scientists might indeed appear to do this, but, as I have pointed out, that is because, even here, the ideas of the ruling-class rule.But it isn't what scientists actually do (as opposed to what they might think they do). As I have explained eslewhere, in response to the objection that my analysis of philosophy (as unmitigated non-sense) self-destructs, since my ideas must be non-sense too![Once again: the links I have used below won't work properly if you are using Internet Explorer 10, unless you switch to 'Compatibility View' (in the Tools Menu).]

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It could be objected that the propositions advanced in this Essay — such as "They (i.e., metaphysical propositions) are non-sensical" — are self-refuting, too, since they aren't empirical and yet they are also supposed to be true. If so, they can't be false, but must be non-sensical themselves.This objection is based on the idea that there are only two uses of the indicative mood: fact-stating and philosophical thesis-mongering. The conclusion seems to be that I am either stating facts — which could thus be false –, or I am advancing a (supposedly true) philosophical thesis of my own about language, etc. If the latter, then what I have to say is no less non-sensical — in which case, I have only succeeded in refuting myself!But, there are other uses of the indicative mood, one of which features in the formulation of scientific theories, which, in general, do not state facts, but express rules we use to make sense of the world. [And rules aren't the sort of thing that can be true or false, only useful or useless, effective or ineffective, practical or impractical, etc.]So, when Newton, for example, tells us that the rate of change of momentum is proportional to the applied force, he isn't stating a fact (otherwise it could be false, but if that were so, its falsehood would change the meaning of 'force', and it would thus be about something other than the subject of Newton's Second Law!), but proposing/establishing a rule that can be used to study acceleration, among other things.[Of course, he might not have seen things this way, but that doesn't affect the point being made. Recall the comments made at the top of this page: This Essay "tackles issues that have sailed right over the heads of some of the greatest minds in history…." I will say more about why such 'Laws' are in effect rules in Essay Thirteen Part Two. (Incidentally, this approach to scientific 'Laws' helps account for the odd fact that they all appear to tell lies about nature — this links to a PDF. [On this, see Cartwright (1983).] Why that is so will also be examined in the aforementioned Essay.) ]I use the indicative mood in the same way — as part of interpretative and/or elucidatory rules –, except, in this case, I do so only in order to show that philosophical theses themselves are non-sensical, and incoherent.Someone might refer us to Wittgenstein's notorious statement:

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"6.54: My propositions [Sätze — sentences, RL] serve as elucidations in the following way: Anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical [unsinnig], when he has used them — as steps — to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)"He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright." [Wittgenstein (1972), p.151.]

And then claim (as many have) that he only succeeded in refuting himself.As I explained earlier, in place of "nonsense" I prefer "non-sense" [on this word see the end of this post, where I also explain "sense"], and that is clearly what Wittgenstein also intended; that is, he was referring to propositions (sentences) which are incapable of expressing a sense (Sinn). [He pointedly contrasts Unsinnig (non-sense) with Sinnloss (senseless) sentences.]So, Wittgenstein's own Unsinnig sentences [Sätze] — not those of the metaphysicians he is criticising — express rules ("elucidations") in propositional (sentential) form (that is, they use the indicative mood, by-and-large). He employed these "elucidations" in an endeavour make it clear how our actual sentences express a sense (Sinn), or fail to express a sense (Sinnloss) –, or worse, can't express a sense (Unsinnig). Once that has been done, or once we see what Wittgenstein was trying to do, we no longer need these rules and can "throw them away".Now rules, as I pointed out earlier, can't express a sense (they are Unsinnig), but that doesn't prevent us from understanding them (which we plainly do once we see they aren't like empirical propositions or metaphysical pseudo-propositions, but are "elucidations" — i.e., that they aren't incoherent non-sense). In that case, Wittgenstein was outlining, or proposing a set of interpretative rules that sought to make his analysis of language clear.Again, when Newton, for example, informs us that the rate of change of momentum is proportional to the impressed force, he is telling us how he intends to use certain words, and how he proposes to make sense of nature by means of them. His laws elucidate his physics, and as such are rules.But, why "throw them away"? Well, consider someone who is trying to teach a novice how to play chess, how the pieces move, how they can capture other pieces, etc., etc. In doing this, they will explain the rules of chess in the indicative mood: "The Queen moves like this, or this…". Of course, the rules can also be expressed in the imperative mood, too: "Move your Rook like this…", "The King has to move this way…", but this isn't absolutely essential. In addition, the rules of the game can be taught by practical demonstration — by simply playing! Novices can even learn by just watching others play, asking the odd question or two.The rules of chess are Unsinnig, too, since they can't be false. "The Bishop doesn't move diagonally", isn't an alternative rule for the Bishop in chess, since the way that piece moves defines what the word "Bishop" means in that game. The rules elucidate how that word is used and how that piece behaves. If a 'Bishop' were to move (legitimately) in any other way, it would be part of an alternative game, not chess!Some might want to argue that "The Bishop moves like this…" is in fact true, but if that were the case, "The Bishop moves like this…" would be descriptive not prescriptive, making this an assertion which could be true or which could be false. But, anyone who now claimed that such rules were descriptive would have no answer to someone who retorted "Well, I move it any way I like!" — other than an appeal to tradition, to how the game has been played in the past. So, in order to proscribe the antics of such maverick chess players, "The Bishop moves like this…", and sentences like it, would have to be viewed prescriptively, and thus as rules, not descriptions.Of course, "The Bishop moves like this…" is a correct (or true) description of, or assertion about, a rule in chess, in the sense that anyone who used it would be speaking truly about the rules themselves, but the prescriptive nature of this rule doesn't depend on such true reports, but on the application of that rule, a rule which defines how certain pieces must move. Once we have grasped these rules we can in effect "throw them away" (unless, of course, we have to explain them to someone else, or appeal to them to settle a dispute, etc.). How many times do you have to say to yourself once you have mastered the rules of chess: "The Rook moves like this, the Pawns like that…"?Every single Wittgenstein commentator misses these simple points, and they then struggle to comprehend the Tractatus! Now, I'm not suggesting Wittgenstein was crystal clear about this, but it is the only way, it seems to me, to make the Tractatus comprehensible, so that (1) It doesn't self-destruct, or (2) It doesn't change into something different as a result of the rather wild interpretations developed by, for example, the 'New Wittgensteinians'. [On this, see Crary and Read (2000), Read and Lavery (2011).]But, even if it could be shown that Wittgenstein didn't hold this view, it certainly represents my view, and my attempt to repair the Tractatus.

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Incidentally, it is worth pointing out that (in the above) "non-sense" is not the same as "nonsense". The latter expression has various meanings ranging from the patently false (such as "Karl Marx was a shape-shifting lizard") to plain gibberish (such as "783&£$750 ow2jmn 34y4&$ 6y3n3& 8FT34n")."Non-sense", as it is being used here, characterises indicative sentences that turn out to be incapable of expressing a sense no matter what we try to do with them ("sense" is explained below) — that is, they are incapable of being true and they are incapable of being false. In Metaphysics, as we have seen, the indicative/fact-stating mood has plainly been mis-used and/or mis-applied. So, when sentences like these are employed to state supposedly 'fundamental truths' about reality, they seriously misfire since they can't possibly do this. [Later sections of this Essay will explain why that is so.]Hence, non-sensical sentences are neither patently false nor plain gibberish. [However, there are different sorts of non-sense. More about this later.]Finally, the word "sense" is being used in the following way: it expresses what we understand to be the case for the proposition in question to be true or what we understand to be the case for the proposition in question to be false, even if we do not know whether it is actually true or whether it is actually false, and may never do so.T1: Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital.For example, everyone (who knows English, who knows who Tony Blair is, and that Das Kapital is a book) will understand T1 upon hearing or reading it. They grasp its sense –, that is, they understand what (certain parts of) the world would have to be like for it to be true and what (certain parts of) the world would have to be like for it to be false.

The above was taken from one of my essays (where several of the things I appear to take for granted are explained and substantiated — and where the references I have used can also be accessed).http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2012_01.htmSo, when scientists misconstrue the rules they use to understand the world as fundamental truths about it, they are indulging in metaphysics. And this isn't surprising, since they too had been educated to believe that this is what they should be doing.Hence, it isn't just Marxists who have been bamboozled in this way.[Incidentally, this is what it means to take Marx seriously when he said the ideas of the ruling-class always rule.]

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[Rosa Lichtenstein]

ALB:

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On the contrary, the third section later published as the pamphlet Socialism Utopian and Scientific is  a brilliant and perhaps the best introduction to socialist theory. If anyone is going to read just one writing by Marx or Engels this pamphlet should be it.

I agree that Socialism Utopian and Scientific is excellent, but I was referring to the first half of Anti-Duhring.

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I can see why you don't like the first part on philosophy (but then you wouldn't have liked it no matter what he wrote), but this is another case of you throwing out the baby with the bathwater, indeed with the bath.

In fact, more like kicking an alligator out of a creche.

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[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LB:

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Of course, we'd have to discuss, compare and contrast all these methods: Marx's dialectical, linguistic analysis, analytical philosophy, and critical realism. I think we'd need Rosa for 2 and 3, because I for one know nothing about Wittgenstein.

There are some similarities between Wittgenstein's method and certain aspects of Marx's approach to language and philosophy. I have explored several of them here:http://www.thenorthstar.info/?p=10792I hasten to add, that I am just as critical of Wittgenstein's failure to apply his own method consistently in certain areas, as I am of philosophers in general.As was the case with Feuerbach, Wittgenstein just didn't go far enough. My work seeks to put that right.

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[Rosa Lichtenstein]

ALB:

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True but Lenin did. As quoted by Dunayevskaya:

And not just her; practically everyone (who isn't an anti-Leninist), quotes this passage as if it had been delivered from off the top of a mountain, carved on stone tablets.

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[Rosa Lichtenstein]

DJP:

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Now Marx did have a method that he refered to as "dialectic" if we want to we could discuss what he meant by this and how his method is different from others e.g Wittgenstein.

If so, it's a bad idea to begin by ignoring what Marx himself said/endorsed about 'the dialectic method' in the Postface to the second edition of Das Kapital, isn't lt?

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[Rosa Lichtenstein]

DJP:

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Have you really done that? Anyone who is interested enough and knows how to read and think for themselves can just refer back to the primary texts. I really don't care what you think you have proved or disproved.

In which case, unless you can show otherwise, I have shot your 'proof texts' down in flames.

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[Rosa Lichtenstein]

ALB:

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Do you think it is possible to understand Marx's Capital without first having mastered Hegel's Logic? Hopefully, the answer will be "no", but what if it's "yes"?

Not even Marx made this claim about his own work; indeed, as we have seen, the exact opposite is the case: Das Kapital is a Hegel-free zone.

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[Rosa Lichtenstein]

Comrades have started to refer to Ollman's Dance of the Dialectic (and especially his view of 'abstraction'):As I noted earlier, I have taken this aspect of Ollman's work apart here:http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2003_02.htm#Ollmans-Traditionalism%5BThis link won't work properly if you are using Internet Explorer 10, unless you switch to 'Compatibility View' (in the Tools Menu).]Also see the discussion I had with a few of Stalinists (about 'abstractionism'), here:http://www.soviet-empire.com/ussr/viewtopic.php?f=107&t=52413%5BMy comments begin about a fifth of the page down.]

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