[robbo203]

ALB wrote:

Certainly her pamphlet defends the day-to-day practice of the SPD of the time, i.e having a minimum programme of reforms as well as a maximum programme of the capture of political power for socialism. But is having or defending having a minimum programme automatically of itself reformist? I thought our position was more subtle, i.e that having a minimum programme runs the high risk of a party becoming reformist as its support will be built up on this basis rather than for socialism and eventually someone (like Bernstein) will come along and call for theory to be brought into line with practice. And the party become a reformist party.

 I don't see how having a  minimum programme could not be construed as reformist.  What you really seem to be saying is that having  a minimum programme does  not necessarily mean that on balance the party should be considered a reformist party if it continues to advocate revolution. That may be true but it does not detract from the fact that having a minimum programme is indeed "automatically of itself reformist".  Of course what will happen – inevitably – is that the reformist element of the party will crowd out the revolutionary element so you will end up with a completely reformist  party rather than a hybrid that it might at first be 

ALB wrote:

What I'm suggesting is that we restrict the word "reformist" to those who advocate that socialism can be established gradually by a long series of reform measures. But maybe this is too narrow as reformist (in this sense) parties go on to suffer a further degeneration and drop even the pretence that "socialism" is the long-term goal and end up just advocating reforms to capitalism as an end in itself. In other words, the link between "reformism" and "socialism" is completely broken. In practice we've more or less accepted this evolution of the word "reformism" and apply it to parties such as the Tories, Liberals, Greens and Nationalists which have never even claimed to be socialist.

 Aren't you slightly contradicting yourself here?  If the Tories et al are to be considered "reformist"  then how can you restrict the term reformist to those that advocate  that socialism can be established gradually?.  The Tories don't advocate socialism so what would you call them then in that case?  Non reformists?  Surely not.A  better approach would be simply to acknowledge that there are different varieties of reformism .  In my view the earliest variety was that associated with the Social Democratic movement  which in fact coined the very term "reformism",  Another major and more recent  variety of reformism does not have as its objective the structural transformation of capitalism into something else .  It is this particular variety of reformism, I suggest, that is the default form of reformism in general and to which all other forms of reformism will naturally  tend to collapse in the long term

ALB wrote:

Even when Luxemburg wrote her pamphlet (at the turn of the century) the SPD had become reformist (Bernstein was right).  Its voters and most of its members wanted social reforms and political democracy in Germany not socialism. Her mistake was to not realise this and to assume that it was a mass socialist party. On this assumption some of the things she says about reforms in the quotes Alan has given make more sense. A mass, genuinely socialist party would not neglect the position of workers under capitalism while this lasted. After all, even we can countenance Socialist MPs and local councillors when they are a minority voting for reforms or other pro-worker measures under some circumstances.

 Yes but the key difference here is refraining from the pro-active advocacy of reforms – legislative enactments. Once you get into that ball game you've crossed the Rubicon  and nothing but the slippery slope awaits you which will deliver you  into the quagmire of reformist politics from which there is no escape.  I might be wrong but I think some of the passages from Luxemburg Alan quoted hint at such an approach of not pro-actively advocating reforms but rather,  of "wringing concensions " from the state – that is, forcing the state to offer reforms as a sop in a bid to buy off the revolution

[robbo203]

Here are a few random links on the general subject of Mandela and apartheid which I offer without comment. You will no doubt be able to draw your own conclusions  …. http://www.leftcom.org/en/articles/2013-12-10/mandela-%E2%80%93-a-hero-for-capitalismhttp://www.spiked-online.com/newsite/article/mandelas_cult_like_worshippers_rewriting_history/14410#.UqyrQ2eA3rchttp://www.theamericancause.org/index.php?mact=News,cntnt01,detail,0&cntnt01articleid=1016&cntnt01origid=15&cntnt01returnid=29 Personally,  I find this all this compulsory  beatification of Saint Nelson, distasteful and the relentless insistance on casting Mandela in the role of some kind of  "great man" who made history while the rest of us were merely onloookers  or bit players, utterly depressing and deluded.  Little wonder that the likes of Obama should flatter Mandela in these glowing terms – to bask in the reflected glory of being a celebrity politican himself.  It is something  these political con artists  are particularly adept at and for good reason – the  art of mutual flattery is the means by whiich they massage their own egos. Still, at least the petty-bourgeois traders  in trinkets,  T shirts and memorabilia of all kinds have been able to make a killing on the flourishing market for such things.  I believe the extended Mandela family, when they have not been busily stabbing each other in the back and accusing each other of betrayal, have been falling over each other to milk his brand name for all its worth. Apparently there is even a  "House of Mandela wine collection"  you can now savour  and mull over – or given that we are now well into that most dreaded time of the year, the festive season,  turn into mulled wine!  For the curious, the details are here:http://thegrio.com/2013/12/11/mandelas-legacy-lives-on-through-house-of-mandela-wine-collection/

[robbo203]

pgb wrote:

Hi Robbo In the Introduction to her pamphlet Rosa Luxemburg refers to "the daily struggle for reforms, the amelioration of conditions of the workers within the framework of the existing social order, and for democratic institutions…." So she's identifying reforms with anything that ameliorates workers' conditions, which seems to me to be wide enough to include strictly trade union activity (eg. wage demands) as well as state or government activity (eg. welfare legislation). On this reading, "the daily struggle for democratic institutions" is treated separately from "the daily struggle for reforms". However, further on she refers more generally to "the struggle for reforms" and it is clear she is referring to both . But does it matter? The important thing is that she treats both as part of the class struggle, as a means for engaging in the "proletarian class war". And from this she takes the orthodox Marxist line, that the "struggle for reforms" provided the proletariat with the necessary practice to undertake the final battle which was of course the socialist revolution. The struggle for reforms was a means to the revolutionary end. This goes to the heart of her dispute with Bernstein. While for Bernstein and other revisionists the struggle for reforms was an end in itself, for Luxemburg this meant turning their backs on the ultimate goal – socialism. When Luxemburg said that reforms would fail, she meant that reformism (a la Bernstein et al) would fail to bring about socialism. I agree with ALB here. I don't think she ever believed that reforms of the kind fought for by workers and the SPD were necessarily "unrealisable" in themselves; only that they were "inadequate" as a means to the ultimate goal of socialism. Only in this sense would they "fail". In the same sense, she said that reforms on their own would be "meaningless" – if they were not a means to the conquest of power. As for comparison with Trotsky's transitional demands, I don't see that there's a total incompatibility. As I understand it, a transitional demand is one made in the knowledge that it would be unrealisable under normal capitalist conditions, like. eg. the demand: "Jobs for All!" I've heard demands like that made over many years by trade unionists in May Day marches! Whether they work or not is an empirical question. I don't think you can argue that they are inherently "unrealisable". Lenin's slogan "Peace, Land and Bread" is an example of a highly successful transitional demand. Given Rosa Luxemburg's strong belief in the role of the mass strike as the most effective weapon of working class revolt, I doubt that she would have rejected demands that she might have believed were unrealisable if they nonetheless had the promise of energising workers to deepen their struggle against capitalism.

 Hi PGBThanks for your useful comments. You say that Luxemburg's definition of reform is wide enough to include anything that might ameliorate the workers' conditions.  This would mean lumping together trade union activity with government or state activity as in the case of welfare legislation. That is precisely what I would see as problematic; it is insufficiently nuanced as an approach and therefore fails to heed what follows from the necessary distinction that needs to be made between the economic domain of class struggle and the political domainTrade union struggle in the economic domain is of course necessary and desirable but is essentially only a defensive struggle against the downward pressure exerted by capital; it cannot leadof itself  to a revolution since as the saying goes starvation always works on the side of the capitalists.  The struggle for reforms via the state is different matter: it  locates  itself on the the very terrain in which the revolution is to be effected – the political domain ( and I would argue necessarily represents a preference for reform over revolution on that terrain)  You maintain that Luxemburg   took the "orthodox Marxist line, that the "struggle for reforms" provided the proletariat with the necessary practice to undertake the final battle which was of course the socialist revolution" . If that was the case then I would suggest that this supposed  "orthodox Marxist line" is very much  subject to a fundamental flaw.  The struggle for reforms ( or reformism) in the sense of  measures undertaken the the state   cannot possibly prepare the working class to undertake the final battle in the form if the socialist revolution.  On the contrary,  it can only make for the perpetual postponement and eventual abandonment of that revolutionary goal  As one prominent Trotskyist , Duncan Hallas of the International Socialism group (forerunner of the British "Socialist Workers Party"),  once put it:  "Socialism will not be on the agenda"  if " capitalism can concede, for an indefinite period, the demands and aspirations of working people then, of course, it will be enormously strengthened" .  (Duncan Hallas, "Controversy: Do we support reformist demands?, International Socialism (1st series), No.54, January 1973. On the other hand , if capitalism cannot concede to the demand  and aspirations of workers in the form of particular reforms then  how can struggling for such reforms possibly prepare workers  to undertake the final battle  in the form of socialist revolution.  It is only by realizing the futility of such struggling  and of going cap in hand to the ruling class that workers will properly begin to prepare themselves for  that battle.  Refomism is a treadmill going nowhere, a quagmire into which any hope of revolution will disappear completely.That is the basic problem,  you see, and I don't really see how it is logically possible to get round:it.  You cannot  both seek to reform , and inadvertently,  strengthen the very system you have  supposedly set your sights on overthrowing. That just does not make any sense however you look at it. Inevitably the former will crowd out the latter and the whole sorry history of Second International is clear evidence of the truth of  this claim.  No Labour or Social Democratic Party anywhere any longer pretends even to want to overthrow capitalism let alone establish a genuine socialist alternative . The struggle for reforms is not and cannot be a means to revolution as Luxemburg claimed and it was Bernstein paradoxically who grasped better than Luxemburg what that struggle was about: – that  the goal would become nothing and the movement , everythingThat aside, I question the whole premise on which reformism rests.  In my view, measures enacted by the state do not so much initiate improvements to the conditions of the workers as respond to pressures in the economic domain that call for such improvement.  Reformism in other words is based on  a Post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy  – "after this, therefore because of this". In that sense that reforms are simply a ratification of what is happening on the ground. It is a fetishistic way of looking at things to hold  that it is a mere scrap of white paper over whose  contents a bunch of parliamentarians have debated that is in any way decisive in the matter.  What the matter really boils down is the relative share of the social product  going to the workers vis a vis the capitalists which as Marx put it, is a function of the relative strengths of the combatants in the class struggle – the practical organisation of the workers in the industrial field  – which would be weakened and compromised by reformism  and which is in turn influenced by such background factors as the state of the economy e.g. whether the economy is in a boom or a recession.  State enacted reforms are worth little more than the paper they are typed on and as we all know they can be widely ignored , more "honoured in the breach than in the observance",  watered down or even simply simply scrapped and consigned to the bin of history.On the question of Luxemburg's  attitude towards reforms I'm not sure you are correct in saying that when she observed that they were "inadequate" she meant from the point of view of obtaining socialism.  What I think she meant by inadequate or insufficient was from the point of view of meeting the needs of workers  under capitalism.  It was the realisation that they were inadequate from that point of view that would cause workers, in her view,  to turn to socialism insteadOn the question of transitional demand, well, I think that point  is that by definition such a reform is one that capitalism is meant to be structurally incapable of delivering or implementing and that consequently the implementation of such a reform would indicate that it could no longer  be considered a transitional demand. – something that was "unrealisable".  Trotsky as I said was not averse to supporting mere reforms.   More to the point he indicated that mere reforms could be converted into transitional demands should economic conditions render the former impracticable and unrealisable.  But the converse was equally true. You say of transitional demands that i I don't think you can argue that they are inherently "unrealisable".  But that is part of the very definition of a transitional demand – that they are unrelisable. If conditions changed that enable them to become  realisable  then this would indicate they were no longer transitional demands but had become "mere reforms"I m also not sure that the Bolshevik slogan "Peace, Land and Bread". is a good example of a " highly successful  transitional demand". Land reform for sure followed in the wake of the Bolshevik takeover but "peace" and "bread"? From what I understand the Russian working class in the early years of the revolution melted back into the countryside in large numbers  precisely because, amongst other things of the dire problem of food provision in the cities. And as for peace , well, one only has to mention the bitter civil war that ensued soon after the Bolshevik take over to put that particular claim to rest 

[robbo203]

ALB wrote:

And of course, although we don't advocate them (so as not to suffer the fate of the SPD and become a reformist party), we ourselves are not opposed to all reforms. Wouldn't we too describe any favourable reforms obtained as "inadequate"? We do regard some proposed reforms as "unrealisable" but say this openly and that workers are wasting their time pursuing them. Which of course is the basis of our criticism of Trotskyist "transitional demands".

 Yes  exactly.  And the nonsensical thing about Trotsky's crackpot theory of transitional demands  (so called) is a that it commits its proponents to maintaining the illusion that such reforms are not only achievable under capitalism but are of such a nature as to fully satisfy the needs of workers – that is to say are adequate should they be achieved  That being the case,  it cuts from under their feet the very grounds upon which they might want to advocate socialism to replace capitalism – namely . that capitalism cannot possibly be operated in the interests of workers  and adequately meet their needs.  This is why the Trots are almost driven by the very logic of their own thinking to play down the case for socialism for  fear of being lambasted as  " impractical dreamers"  (and is also why they criticise socialists for being "utopians"). To argue that socialism is the only answer is to imply that capitalism cannot be reformed to adequately meet the needs of workers which in turn directly runs counter to the illusion they are intent upon fostering for the purpose of recruiting workers to their cause – that transitional demands are indeed both achievable and fit for the purpose. In private, of course, they know otherwise but for the purpose of public consumption and political influence they are obliged to conceal this discomforting  fact.  Only the select few that comprise the vanguard can be trusted to safely digest this fact  and rationalise it away in terms a dialectical sleight of hand.  The theory of transitional demands requires them to make these demands to serve as a "bridge" to revolutionary consciousness.   According to the theory,  it is when workers realise the impossibility of such demands in capitalism they will turn to socialism. The truly laughable thing about such a deplorably manipulative and cynical tactic is that probably most workers already know well enough that such demands as,  say, a doubling of the minimum wage or reducing the pensionable age to 55, is just a pipe dream under capitalism .  But you don't see them flocking to the socialist cause, do you now? . To the contrary many of them will happily endorse Mrs T's old mantra that we must all live within our means  and give the likes of her the thumbs up when it comes to elections. For all the frantic efforts of the Trots to come across as pragmatic  realists, thoroughly grounded in the concrete day to day struggles of workers they are the very ones who end up looking the impractical dreamers in the eyes of most workers On the question "opposing reforms" and "opposing reformism " there is the interesting case of Samuel Gompers and the American Federation of labour circa  late 19th century. Gompers' rather tortured  reasoning for opposing reforms and not merely opposing reformism was a sort of dogmatic rendition/extension of a kind of  quasi Marxian stance . Since the state represented the interests of the ruling class, all legislation emanating from the state  would ipso facto  be bound to further the interests of that class and so work against interests of the workers.  On these spurious grounds, Gompers actively campaigned against reforms such as the eight hour day in certain states on the West coast of America. Gompers seemed to have subscribed to a purely voluntaristic concept of working class activism  which restricted itself to the economic field alone i..e  in the  trade union movement  – lest it be tainted by politics and hence the influence of ruling class ideas.  His ideas find some echoes in the thinking of the so called Economists (not to be confused with the practitioners of economics) who Lenin savaged in  "What is to be Done" (1902). The Economist movement  published a document entitled Credo (1899) in which it was argued  that it was to the liberal bourgeoisie to which the workers should defer to take up the political struggle against tsardom  and that the workers should confine themselves to such matters as fighting for higher wages and better working conditions. Here we see, once again,  the distinction being made the economic domain and the political domain  to which I earlier alluded. It was not the distinction as such that was invalid but how it was applied and in the case of  the two examples cited it was applied quite inappropriately , I would suggest

[robbo203]

ALB wrote:

But I don't think she can be found guilty of advocating Trotsky's dishonest and stupid policy of advocating reforms they know can't be achieved under capitalism in the expectation that workers will turn to "revolution" (insurrection under the leadership of a vanguard party) after the struggle for the unrealisable reforms inevitably failed. This assumes that the reforms struggled for can't be achieved, but there is no evidence that Luxemburg thought that the reforms she favoured the SPD advocating and struggling for were unrealisable. She merely says that they would be "inadequate", which is not the same as "unrealisable".I think her position was that if the working class struggled for reforms on a class basis this would help prepare them for the final and more important struggle for political power (and that this wouldn't happen unless there was a body of socialists consciously advocating this, so it's not going to happen on its own). 

 Thanks for your explanation, Adam.  It certainly does seem that the title of Luxemburg's pamphlet was somewhat misleading.    However,  I am not fully convinced that the distinction between Luxemburg's advocacy of reforms and Trotsky's transitional demands is quite so stark as you suggest though there is a formal sense in which they differ as you point out.  Where Luxemburg thought reforms would prove "inadequate",  Trotsky thought they would be "unrealisable"  in the case of so called  transitional demands (although it has to be remembered that Trotsky also advocated mere reforms along the lines of the SDPs minimum programme).  Nevertheless,  in substantive terms the outcome is basically  the same.  In both cases,  the needs of the workers would not be met  and, in both cases,  such reforms were to be  advocated in the full knowledge that such needs would remain unmet.  One might be forgiven for inferring a certain degree of cynicism in both cases – although, no doubt, Luxemburg was honest about  admitting the inadequacy of her reforms where Trotsky was deceitful in concealing the unrealisability of his.   There is also a certain structural similarity between Trotsky's metaphor of a  "bridge" and Luxemburg's idea of the Party steering a middle course between two "rocks" – the reformist aspirations of the working class and the revolutionary  intentions of the hardline  politicised revolutionariesThere is something else that occurs to me as well – what exactly did Luxemburg mean by reforms and reformism?I have always taken the view that reformism essentially entails the enactment of measures by the state operating in political field or domain that have as their focus issues arising in economic field or domain.  This seems to follow from our conceptualisation of capitalism as a fundamentally economic construct and reformism is an attempt (classically so in the case of Bernstein) to modify the economic behaviour of capitalism itself.  Trade unionism, for example, is not to be equated with reformism since in this  case, the field in which trade unions ideally  operate is the economic field and not the political field  – even if trade unionism has the same focus as reformism being the economic field or domainThese two conceptual categories of FIELD  and FOCUS are, I suggest,  vital analytical tools to distinguish  between different kinds of activities – like  reformism and trade unionism – in terms of the particular kind of configuration applying to each. I realise in practice  the political field and the economic field are thoroughly intermeshed.   So for example what is called  the "labour movement" stereotypically  comprises two wings – the political and the economic – having an overlapping membership and is (supposedly) represent respectively  by the social democratic-cum-labour parties,  on the one hand, and the trade unions on the other. Nevertheless we are talking here of ideal types and for the purposes of analytical clarity, it is sometimes necessary to resort to ideal types to get a better grasp of the subject under discussion.Which brings me to the point  Could it be be that by reforms, Luxemburg meant something different to measures enacted by the state?  You say that she held the classic SPD position of a socialist party having a maximum (socialism) and a minimum (reforms under capitalism) programme and the latter would certainly be classed as a measure to be enacted by a state but is there any possibility that she might have meant by reforms something more vague and having to do with the day to day struggles of workers to improve their pay and working conditions?  In other words could she possibly have been conflating the economic struggle and the political struggle in the guise of advocating reforms as a "means" to social revolution?The answer to that question might have a bearing on the legacy of Luxemburg who, to this day, remains a significant political icon to the revolutionary Left.

[robbo203]

LBird wrote:

robbo, since we both agree that ‘individualism’ is entirely historical, I think we can leave that concept alone.But, when we come to your ‘individuality’ as ‘transhistorical’, even you concede that it isn’t.

robbo203 wrote:

Individuality is something different. It has to do with the inner life of the person, the sense of self hood. This is something that is both historical and trans-historical.

So, even ‘individuality’ is ‘both historical and trans-historical’, not just simply ‘transhistorical’. But then you go further:

robbo203 wrote:

That is why I contend that this aspect of individuality is trans historical. It is a necessary built-in aspect of infant development in all human societies. Of course the content of our inner lives is also historically contingent and subject to social influence.

[my bold]So, the apparent essence of ‘individuality’ is ‘inner life’ and ‘self hood’, which is the bit which is ‘transhistorical’. But… even this you concede is ‘historically contingent and subject to social influence’ It seems to me that your thesis depends upon identifying just what the ‘necessary built-in aspect of infant development in all human societies’ consists of. You identify this as ‘individuality’, but I’m not so sure. It seems to me to be perfectly possible to identify this ‘necessary aspect’ with purely biological functions: that is, the infant ‘in all human societies’ must be taught to feed and water itself, keep itself warm, etc. This is a long way from any notions of ‘individuality’ in any modern sense; after all, most animals go through this process of ‘necessary self development’, which enables them to exist biologically as a species. That is, without an initial stage of close support from (usually) the mother, the ‘infant’ (child/pup/kitten/etc.) would die.

Hi L BirdWell, yes, sure there is a biological basis to this in the sense that obviously consciousness  – in this case , awareness of ourselves as individuals –  is dependent on the brain.  But you are still missing the essential point which is that the emergence of this sense of self is the product  of (and is dependent on)  a process of social interaction  and so is not purely a matter of biology. The brain does not automatically or spontaneously generate  or produce  this sense of self awareness on its own, it requires also the intervention of others. It is through interacting with significant others – most particularly of course  the mother – that the infant comes to to recognise the existence of others outside of itself  which, in the process, enables it to define itself as someone separate from these significant others and thus  acquire a sense of self hood.  I repeat this happens in EVERY society without exception (so you are quite wrong to say I "concede" that individuality is not in this respect transhistorical ) but the form that the social interactions take  (which then shapes the individual's particular sense of herself)  is obviously socially conditioned  and historically contingent.  It is for that reason that I say that individuality is BOTH historical  and transhistorical and that this corresponds to the form and the substance of the phenomenon of human individuality . What you are doing, with respect, is confusing this "form" with this "substance" when they need to be analytically distinguished, I don't think this is a particularly Freudian perspective, incidentally,  and as I said to ALB it is quite consonant with Mead's concept of the self.,  Freudian psychology, as I further said,  has been discredited on grounds quite other than what we are talking about – in particular the role it imputes to the unconsciousness mind

[robbo203]

ALB wrote:

Vin Maratty wrote:

I don't think the  SPGB's case for socialism is based on a moral objection to capitalism and if it is then best of luck with that one

Officially it isn't.In 2010 Conference passed the following resolution by 64 votes to 52 "Socialism is both scientific and ethical." Six branches then called a Party Poll to rescind this resolution. The result of this vote later the same year was:

Quote:

Results of the Party Poll on the following motion :  "That the 2010 Conference resolution that 'Socialism is both  scientific and ethical' be rescinded on the basis that 'the case for socialism  is one of class interest not one of morality.' Are you in favour? Yes / No"  No of votes cast : Yes      –  81 No         – 39 Abstain –   3 Spoilt    –   2  Therefore the 2010 Conference resolution – Socialism is both scientific and  ethical – is rescinded.

 Well in that case I think the SPGB merely succeeded in shooting itself  in the foot.  It looks pretty damn silly condemning capitalism in strident moral terms and then claiming the case for socialism is not in part a moral one. Class interest by definition entails a moral dimension since its implies a concern for the welfare and wellbeing of others (in the working class) which, actually, when you think about it , is what morality is about

[robbo203]

ALB wrote:

robbo203 wrote:

In terms of early childhood development what we see, to begin with. is what psychoanalysts call a stage of primary identification in which the infant develops a strong emotional attachment to the "significant other" (most particularly, the mother) but is unable to distinguish itself from the latter  whom it sees as a mere extension of itself.  This is followed by a form of identification called narcissistic identification  which derives from  the experience of loss of, or alienation from,  the other in question.  In coming to see our mothers as separate from ourselves we gain a sense of self hood.

I don't disagree with the basic point you are trying to make, but am surprised that you are making an appeal to "psychoanalysis" when Freud's theories have been so thoroughly discredited. The rival behaviourist theory is also capable of giving an account of the emergence of "self". See, for instance, this from GH Mead:http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/mead3.htmI was a bit surprised to find this on the Marxist Internet Archive but it's there and probably deserves to be as his theory does have socialist implications. His Mind, Self and Society used to be recommended to Party members for those interested in the subject as it provides a social materialist theory of "mind".

 Sure, Freudian psychoanalysis has been largely discredited but I dont think that means we must reject the basic explanation for the emergence of sense of self  as being contingent upon a process of  "objectifying" others. It  is by becoming aware of the existence of others as separate from ourselves that we begin to define ourselves as individuals. I dont think Mead's theory of the self contradicts this at all. Meads central argument is that the self is an emergent property of social interactions which is what I'm saying too.  The mother interacts with the infant and over a period of time  the infant becomes aware of the existence of the mother as an entity outside of itself  and so in the process becomes aware of itself. You can dispense with the Freudian-type jargon but I think the basic argument remains sound.   In any event,   I thought what was descreditable about Freudian psychoanalysis  was the imputed role of the unconscious  in human beings and the whole contrived typology of id, ego and superego.

[robbo203]

Vin Maratty wrote:

The case against capitalism is not based on any morality.  Being poor does not make you any 'better' than being rich. Who wouldn't want to be a capitalist?The SPGB is unique and cannot be attacked or its reputation tarnished for investing money, its case is not ethical or moral but is based on the interests of a class. A moral stand against capitalism is sterile. In capitalism money is power.The more money a socialist organisation has the more it can attack capitalism. A moral opposition to capitalism is on the same level as a belief in religion and should be rejected by socialists 

 Sorry Vin but I absolutely and categorically disagree with this argument. I think it is literally impossible for socialists not to take a moral position vis a vis capitalism. The dichotomy that is often presented – "socialism is a question of self interest" versus " socialism is a question of morality" is a totally false dichotomy.  It is necessarily and logically both of these things. Think about it.  Morality is an other-oriented perspective which ultimately is about the welfare and wellbeing of others (fellow workers) apart from ourselves. The very conception of class solidarity is implicitly a moral conception. If you take as starting point only that which concerns you from the point of view of your own perceived self interest then logically there can be no sense in you striving to foster a sense of solidarity amongst your fellow workers. It would make far more sense, I would suggest , to strive to become a capitalist  and take up the attitude "I'm alright Jack and sod the rest of you" in relation to our fellow workers. We dont because actually behind the macho posturing around self interest we care about others. We wouldnt be socialists if we did not. All this nonsense about socialism having nothing to do with morality and scientific socialism being some kind of "value free" construct is just so much  old fashioned 19th century mechanistic-cum-postivisitic  thinking and despite Marx's supposed repudiation of morality his writings are literally  suffused with a moral condemnation of capitalism.  How can you possibly condemn exploitation and seek to end it without this implying a moral perspective? Its plain nonsense.  As Stephen Lukes points out Marx's underlying moral judgements are all too self evident:Hence all the passages in Capital about ‘naked self-interest and callous cash payment’, ‘oppression’, ‘degradation of personal dignity’, ‘accumulation of misery’, ‘physical and mental degradation’, ‘shameless, direct and brutal exploitation’, the ‘modern slavery of capital’, ‘subjugation’, the ‘horrors’… and ‘torture’ and ‘brutality’ of overwork, the ‘murderous’ search for economy in the production process, capital ‘laying waste and squandering’ of labour power and ‘altogether too prodigal with its human material’ and exacting ‘ceaseless human sacrifices.’ (Lukes S Marxism and Morality, 1985 Oxford Clarendon Press p1). The part of the problem I would suggest is that people have misunderstood what is meant by a "moral perspective".  The influence of Kantian universalistic moral categories has not been helpful in this regard. Kantian thinking is what influenced people like Bernstein and Otto Bauer and you can see where this can lead to – appealing to abstract universal moral principles at the expense of a class analysis I would reject that kind of moral universalism in a favour of a moral perspective called ethical particularism.  Engels, surprisingly perhaps, put his finger on it in Anti-Duhring:We therefore reject every attempt to impose on us any moral dogma whatsoever as an eternal, ultimate and for ever immutable ethical law on the pretext that the moral world has its permanent principles which stand above history and the differences between nations. We maintain on the contrary that all moral theories have been hitherto the product, in the last analysis, of the economic conditions of society obtaining at the time. And as society has hitherto moved in class antagonisms, morality has always been class morality; it has either justified the domination and the interests of the ruling class, or, ever since the oppressed class became powerful enough, it has represented its indignation against this domination, and the future interests of the oppressed” (F Engels Anti-Dühring, Moscow 1947, p117). Class morality!. Now thats what we need. Coupled with the notion of self interest and not at the expense of the later.

[robbo203]

LBird wrote:

robbo, I’m not sure about your distinction between ‘individualism’ and ‘individuality’. Could you give me a brief summary of what you consider the essential differences to be? I’d be inclined to think that you are drawing a distinction between ‘ideology’ and ‘biology’, but at the moment this is just a guess. I don’t think that this distinction can be maintained, but if that’s not the point you are making, then ignore me on that point!

Hi LBirdI made an attempt of  sorts to distinguish between individualism and individuality in post no.46. Individualism is essentially  an outer directed ideological posture in the sense that it has to do with one's relationships with others, above all in a socio economic context ,  and is grounded in a conception of the individual as a self interested atomised agent who sees society as simply a means of his/her own ends Contract theories of the origin of society (e.g.. Locke)  typify this kind of outlook..  I  agree that individualism is entirely a historical phenomenon Individuality is something different.  It has to do with the inner life of the person, the sense of self hood.  This is something that is both historical and trans-historical.  In terms of early childhood development what we see, to begin with. is what psychoanalysts call a stage of primary identification in which the infant develops a strong emotional attachment to the "significant other" (most particularly, the mother) but is unable to distinguish itself from the latter  whom it sees as a mere extension of itself.  This is followed by a form of identification called narcissistic identification  which derives from  the experience of loss of, or alienation from,  the other in question.  In coming to see our mothers as separate from ourselves we gain a sense of self hood.  Even to talk of the existence of others outsides of ourselves (society) presupposes this process of separation in which became aware of ourselves as individuals.  We cannot recognise others as others without seeing ourselves as separate from them That is why I contend that this aspect of individuality is trans historical. It is a necessary built-in aspect of infant development in all human societies. Of course the content of our inner lives is also historically contingent and subject to social influence I think the point you are groping towards does not  concern individuality as such but rather the holism- individualism  distinction.  The French anthropologist Louis Dumont is the person to read up on in this connection – his books such as Homo Hierarchicus : the Caste system and its implications,  and  From Mandeville to Marx: The Genesis and Triumph of Economic Ideology  and Essays in Individualism   are classics A holistic ontology according to Dumont sees society as primary  and a logical entailment of that, according to him, is hierarchy as exemplified by by the Indian caste system.  An individualistic ontology by contrast, vests the individual with primary value and subordinates society to the individual.  Individualism according to Dumont logically entails equality at a fundamental level  and so we get notions such as "we are  equal in the eyes of the law". Of course differences exist between individuals e,g in the distribution of wealth but according to Dumont , from an individualist perspective such differences have to be explained in voluntaristic terms . They  cannot be said to emanate from the basic level of the abstract individual  in an individualistic outlook since to think that is to presuppose the existence of society as a higher value  which would threaten the very autonomy of the abstract individual I don't know if I've made myself clear but that in a nutshell is what Dumont is about.  I think there are huge problems with Dumont's thesis  but there are some useful insights too. Dumont traces modern individualism to the  early Christian concept tion of the self  which emerged from this latent form into a fully manifest form with the arrival of  capitalism

[robbo203]

LBird wrote:

No, I think you're making yourself clear, robbo. I just think that I disagree.I see 'individualism' as a product of a particular society, and not as any sort of 'trans historical' factor in humans.Societies in the past didn't have the concept of 'individual' in the sense we have. Your view about agricultural slaves, it seems to me, is just transposing the way we think now onto the past.

 Hi L Bird But I wasn't talking about "!individualism"!  I agree – individualism is a relatively recent ideological phenomenon and, as I pointed out earlier, closely associated with the rise of capitalism.  Individuality, on the other hand,  means something quite  different to individualism and I attempted to explain the difference in an earlier post   I maintain that individuality is part historical and part trans-historical in  the sense that it is an inevitable outcome of a socialisation process which happens in every society..There is a useful discussion of these terms in Abercrombie, Hill and  Turner's influential book Sovereign Individuals of Capitalism  (1986)  in which they too draw a sharp distinction between individualism and individuality Robin

[robbo203]

ALB wrote:

Quote:

John Pilger's 1998 documentary "Apartheid did not die"

I can guess what he's arguing but, strictly speaking, the title is inaccurate. Apartheid, as the legal separation of the different so-called "races" in South Africa with jobs reserved for some of them, did die (and a good thing too). And it died because it had proved to be a barrier to the normal operation of capitalism and the process of capital accumulation in South Africa. What its death didn't do was to improve the economic situation of most "Africans", even though it did improve that of some of them, not just businesspeople and politicians (who were able to enrich themselves).but also skilled workers (who were able to move into jobs previously reserved for "Whites"). Come on, let's not say that the formal abolition of apartheid made no difference and wasn't a welcome advance.

 Strictly speaking, apartheid has 3 aspects to it1)  social apartheid – what is called petty apartheid (the racial segration of public facilities such as public transport) , the segregation of the education system along so called racial lines , the "Immorality Act" forbidding sexual relationships between races2) economic apartheid  – job reservation and the colour bar3) political apartheid  –  the homeland policy and the denial of political rights to the Black majority within the so called White area of South Africa  (constituting some 87% of the land surface if I recall correctly),  separate constitutional rights for the mixed race ("Cape Coloureds" as they were called) and Asian populations, the further differentiation of the Black homelands along so called tribal or ethnic lines. Of these 3 aspects I would say political apartheid was the most important.  Apartheid was basically the grafting of a racist political ideology onto a capitalist economy.  It  needs to be understood, however,  that it was the British who first implemented many of the basic building  blocks of what emerged as  Apartheid after the second world war.  The Britsh, for instance, introduced the first pass laws and established the first native reserves in Natal and the Cape Colony – not the Boers. I mention this because it is sometimes argued  (by liberals like Merle Lipton) that capitalism and apartheid are fundamentally incompatible, with the implication that the involvement of  (mainly British) capital in the development of South Africa was essentially a progressive influence. Im rather skeptical about this thesis  and though I dont reject it out of hand  I think it is a bit simplisticIn the early days of South African industrial development  big capital, particularly in the case of the mining industry,  quite happily collaborated and colluded with the racist state – long before Aaprtheid was officially introduced  –  to ensure an abundant supply of cheap migrant labour. In fact , the size of the  native reserves were deliberately reduced so as to further undermine what remained of the subsistence economy of Black peasants and make them more dependent on migrant income . For the same reason, hut taxes were introduced or raised  – to force people to become more involved in a money economy It was the structural transformation of the South African economy  particularly after the second world war – with the growth of the  manufacturing  and service sector – which is often presented as the primary impetus begind the long term trend that would eventuate in the demise of apartheid.  In particular, it  was the growing shortage of skilled and semi skilled labour associated with this development that is said to have exerted an irresisitable pressure on the apartheid state  causing it to progressivly soften its hardline stance, ultimately leading the the scrapping of apartheid.  It is from this time that you began to see a split emerging within the white nationalist community between the more pragmatic verligtes and the die-hard verkramptes. I have some problems with this argument even though it has some truth in it , partly because there was in fact an expedient device which the apartheid state could – and to an extent, did – fall back upon to relieve  the shortage of skilled labour if it so desired.  This was called the floating colour bar.  Basically what this meant is that as the pressue of skill shortages grew you could relieve it by allowing  Blacks to do more  and more of the work previously  done by Whites only. In theory this could have nullifed what I term the internalist argumnent  – that capitalism mechanically and of its own accord brought about the demise of Apartheid..  Interestingly,  Harry Oppenhiner Chairman of Anglo American who funded the Progressive party – the political wing oif Liberal capitalism – himself expressed support for the the idea of a floating colour bar. The other problem with the internalist argument is that  even if  Apartheid  had to go because it had become economically ineffiicient  to operate a modernising capitalist economy along those lines,  that cannot possibly be the entire reason why Apartheid went.  More important,  arguably, was the mounting costs to the state resulting from political opposition.   One thinks here of  the enormous costs of  social unrest in the townships, of the government strategy of "total onslaught" against the frontline states (my brother and I narrowly missed being sent into Angola  to fight the Cubans and MPLA  at the time when we were both very naive young army conscripts,  by electing to join the regimental bugle band  back in Namibia!)  and of course the costs of international sanctions.  All these things took a tremendous toll on the apartheid state and caused it to reconsider So it really wasnt as simple as saying that capitalism was fundamentally at odds with apartheid and therefore the latter had to go. There was a lot more to it.

[robbo203]

LBird wrote:

robbo203 wrote:

The point Im trying to make is that individuality is to an extent is transhistorical in the sense that it is the outcome of an inevitable process of socialisation that occurs in all societies.

[my bold]Isn't this a contradictory statement?If a society doesn't stress 'individuality' in its socialisation processes, why should notions of 'individuality' emerge?No, I think 'individuality' is entirely historical..

 Perhaps I didnt make myself clear enough.  What I was trying to say was that individuality has both a historical and a transhistorical aspect.  Even the agricultural slave in Ancient Rome which you refer to has some sense of himself or herself as a distinct individual never mind what his or her master may think.  My point being that individuation is inevitably part of a socialisation process that happens in every society  and in that sense is transhistorical. Human societies are not bee colonies.  Individuality does not need to be stressed in that sense; it is an emergent property of socialisation.  Where it is stressed then perhaps  we are talking about the historical aspect of individuality…You might want to argue that individuality is always historical in that it is always stressed – more in some societies and less in others – but that is not the same as saying individuality is entirely historical

[robbo203]

LBird wrote:

robbo203 wrote:

So here's the point Im trying to make: could it be that Marx's preoccupatiuon with the abolition of the division of labour was based on a tacit acceptance of the argument that the division of labour necessitated the existence of a market to mediate between otherwise disconnected and dissimilar individuals…

I don't think the the D of L 'necessitates a market' robbo. All sorts of societies have had a D of L but no market to mediate between 'individuals'.I think 'individualism' is an ideology, not biology.Once all workers, when asked 'Are you an individual?', reply 'No, I'm a worker', then we'll know that we're getting somewhere.The real relations of the market and its ideological excuse both need to be criticised and smashed.We can have a voluntary D of L and still meet the aims of Communism, the building of a society of 'social individuals'. The development of any individual is dependent upon the development of all.

 Oh I perfectly agree that the D of L does not require a market and said as much in an earlier post in which I argued not for its abolition but for a diminution in its extent in communism  (which would happen anyway with the disappearance of money related occupations).  The point is that the D of L  has been conventionally seen as inextricably linked to market exchange ever since Smith penned his "The Wealth oif Nations" and probably earlier.. In  Book 1, Chapter 3 of that work Smith opines thus:As it is the power of exchanging that gives occasion to the division of labour, so the extent of this division must always be limited by the extent of that power, or, in other words, by the extent of the market. When the market is very small, no person can have any encouragement to dedicate himself entirely to one employment, for want of the power to exchange all that surplus part of the produce of his own labour, which is over and above his own consumption, for such parts of the produce of other men’s labour as he has occasion for. Marx of course adopted and developed the labour theory of value as presented by Smith and Ricardo. Im wondering therefore  whether, or to what extent, he might also have bought into this idea of Smith's concerning the relationship between the D of L and the market.   There is a logical symmetry to that after all.  If the D of L goes hand in hand with the market then to want to get rid of the market would seem to imply wanting to get rid of the  D of L as well. Which is precisely what Marx  said he wanted The problem is of course  that, for Smith, increases in material output depended very much  on deepening still further the division of labour in society, not scrapping it.  The ‘meanest labourer’ in 18th-century Scotland  he contended,  was much richer in his annual consumption of goods than the ‘richest’ Indian (and African) Prince and this was all down to the  enhanced division of labour .  We know also that for Marx,  the establishment of communism  was predicated on the capacity to produce  a high level of material  output but if that depended on an enhanced  division of labour then we clearly have a problem here.   You cannot logically stipulate as a precondition of communism both the abolition of the D of L  AND the productive potential for abundance.- if that productive potential is dependent on  the D of L. in the first place    Something has to give.  My question is – what? Like you I consider that Marx was wrong to call for scrapping tjhe division of labour and I consider his thoughts on the matter to be somewhat muddled. There is that famous passage in the German Ideology in which he saysAnd finally, the division of labour offers us the first example of how, as long as man remains in natural society, that is, as long as a cleavage exists between the particular and the common interest, as long, therefore, as activity is not voluntarily, but naturally, divided, man’s own deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of being controlled by him. For as soon as the distribution of labour comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a herdsman, or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood; while in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, herdsman or critic.Now this is confusing because the social division of labour has precisely to do with the proliferation  of  various kinds of occupations in society.  In suggesting some of the kinds of occupations that might exist in a communist society Marx is contradicting himself  having argued that communism is predicated on the abolition of the division of labour. It wont do to say that in the case of a communist society the difference is that one is not forced to take up one kind of occupation to the exclusion of another.  That is not what the D of L is about. Rather it is about the fact that a variety of occupations exist in the first place. Forcing or confining individuals to a particular occupation or "exclusive sphere of activity." has to do with the relations of productions pertaining to a particular society – i.e. capitalism – rather than the division of labour as such Like you and ironically like Marx as well  (though he did not seem to recognise that this is what he was recommending) I subscribe to the notion  of a voluntaristic  division of labour in which individuals chose what activity to undertake rather than have it forced upon them by the conditions of employment or the fear of unemployment Which brings me neatly  to your point about individualism. Yes individualism is an ideology but you need to make a disrinction between individualism and individuality. These are not the same thing. Individualism is essentially an outer-directed ideological stance which has to do with how we realte to others  as self interested atomised actors. and above all within a socio economic context  .  As an ideological construct it is  closely associated with the rise of capitalism.Individuality or individuation on the other hand is inner directed and has to do with  a sense of oneself  – one's self identity.  Psychoanalysts, particularly those in the Freudian tradition, distinguish between different forms of identification , the earliest of which is called primary identification .  At this stage the infant develops a strong emotional attachment to the significant other but is unable to distinguish itself from the latter  whom it sees as merely an extension of itself.  This is followed by a form of identification called narcissistic identification  which derives from  the experience of loss of, or alienation from,  the other in question. The apprehension that our mother, for instance, is an objective or independent being outside of ourselves and not a mere extension of ourselves,  precipitates a growing sense of self awareness in  which the boundaries between the self and others become apparent.  Thus, our ego comes to be constituted via a process of other-objectification within a kind of individuation-separation dialectic. The point Im trying to make is that individuality is to an extent is transhistorical in the sense that it is the outcome of an inevitable  process of socialisation that occurs in all societies. However, and most importantly  it is also a matter of degree inasmuch a  in some societies it is more strongly developed than in others  and this is where we come back to the my earlier comment on Durkheim's distinction between mechanical  solidarity and organic solidarrty.  Where the former is based on social homogeneity, the later is based oin social  differentiation  in which the division of labour plays a  pre-eminent  role I would argue that it is in a highly differentiated society  and thus one based on a highly developed division of labour that individuality will tend to be most pronounced.  A communist society, Marx claimed and as you noted,  would be one in which  the " full and free development of every individual forms the ruling principle" and in which the  " free development of each is the condition for the free development of all" . Far from the individual losing significance and fading from sight,  this would seem to suggest a marked degree of individuality  .  Why that should be so would not simply be due to the fact that a social division of labour would continue to exist in a communist society  but becuase of what follows from the fact that individuals  would be able to more closely approximate the idea of the polytechnic worker Marx imagined would materialise in capitalism as a precondition of communism . It would be because individuals would be able to freely chose what sphere of activity they wished to engage in and so,  to actively constitute themselves as individuals having a distinctive identity and sense of themselves.  This is very different from the kind  of approach that  passively depends on the outer trappings of material possessions  in order to define oneself as individual in the eyes of others.  With that, we relate to others through our possessions; it is objects – commodities – that mediate our social relationships and and atomise us as individuals in relation to one another .  Or to quote  Communist  Manifesto again – the bourgeosie "has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his “natural superiors”, and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous “cash payment”  .  In a sense this is the very opposite of individuality.  It is a retreat from genuine social intercourse and a denial of our social nature  whereas  individuality by contrast is an outgrowth from our social interactions.  Erich Fromm touched on these two radically different modes of existence – a  "being" mode and a "having" mode – in his book "To Have or To Be" (1979) So finally – phew and sorry about the rambling nature of this post! – to turn to your commentOnce all workers, when asked 'Are you an individual?', reply 'No, I'm a worker', then we'll know that we're getting somewhere.Actually, I would argue to the contrary ,  that it is when  workers reply " Im an individual   not  just a worker" that we will know that we are getting somewhere.  That is the paradox of class conscious workers, having reached the stage of a class-for-itself – that they should want to overthew the very economic category in terms of which they organise themselves against a system that enslaves and dehumanises them  and refuses to consider them as anything other than mere units of labour. For such workers, the truly revolutionary thing to do is to insist that they be treated as  human beings.

[robbo203]

ALB wrote:

Whether or not Marx was right to make the development of a "polyvalent worker" a precondition of socialism/communism (and I'm inclined to favour his other speculation that it requires a collective workforce capable of applying science to production, which we've already got as, after all, workers now collectively run production from top to bottom),  I don't think it can be said that he thought that this was something that workers could choose to themselves become within capitalism.There is a long exposition of his position in section 9 (on the health and education clauses of the Factory Acts) of chapter 15 ("Machinery and Large-Scale Industry) of Capital in which the following passage occurs:

Quote:

But if, on the one hand, variation of work at present imposes itself after the manner of an overpowering natural law, and with the blindly destructive action of a natural law that meets with resistance at all points, modern industry, on the other hand, through its catastrophes imposes the necessity of recognising, as a fundamental law of production, variation of work, consequently fitness of the labourer for varied work, consequently the greatest possible development of his varied aptitudes. It becomes a question of life and death for society to adapt the mode of production to the normal functioning of this law. modern industry, indeed, compels society, under penalty of death, to replace the detail-worker of to-day, grappled by life-long repetition of one and the same trivial operation, and thus reduced to the mere fragment of a man, by the fully developed individual, fit for a variety of labours, ready to face any change of production, and to whom the different social functions he performs, are but so many modes of giving free scope to his own natural and acquired powers.

It looks as if Engels wasn't the only one to talk of material conditions imposing themselves "after the manner of an overpowering natural law" on society ! But then Engels too was the joint author of the German Ideology and part of the "we" in the less deterministic quote Robbo gave from it.In the end, of course, it doesn't really matter what Marx or Engels wrote or thought as socialism/communism does not depend on that. They were just a couple of 19th century socialists whose views on what socialism/communism would or should be like are no more authoritative than those of  any other socialist.

 This last point is true enough.  But I suppose one is compelled to address  what Marx and Engels had to say on account of the idolisation of them by the political Left with whom socialists are engaged in critical debate on a seemingly almost permanant footing.  So what  M & E had  to say on sundry matters has become a sort of standard reference within socialist discourse, almost out of habit. Here i will admit  that  I'm as guilty as the next person in seemingly attaching too much importance to what these two 19th century thinkers had to say, even if a lot of what they had to say is still sound and relevant today. But, as i say,  it is because the Left is seen by socialists as our most promising target constituency that we are compelled to talk to them in terms of the langauge they speak and the idols they worship. On the specific issue of the division of labour, Im more  interested in the actual argument  behind the proposition that capitalism's demise is dependent upon bringing to an end the division of labour than the fact that Marx put forward this proposition. I can sort of see the logic behind what Marx was saying and it goes back to this idea of workers being able to identify with each other sociologically and culturally as a class rather than limit themselves to a mere "job consciousness" Im reminded here of Durkheims distinction between mechanical solidarity and organic solidarity.  Durkheim argued that in so called primitive traditional societies, a mechanical form of solidarity prevailed.  This was based on principle of homogeneity of outlook, experience  and character. So,  in a hunter-gatherer society for example, almost everyone engaged in roughtly the same kind of activity subject to a crude sexual division of labour (although even this was not an absoiute since there are ethnographic cases of societies where females fully participated in hunting expeditions, for example). Organic solidarity by contrast was based on differentiation, interdependence and above all , of course, the division of labour.  Along with this went the idea that, rather than taking a direct and personal form as in the case of mechanical solidarity where you identify/empathise  with someone else because he or she bears a close similarity to you,  social interactions came  instead to be increasingly mediated by the abstract forces of the market.  Implied in this view of society, which validates the existence of a market as a kind of social glue to bind individuals together, is the idea that it would be very diffluclt to get rid of such a society without catastrophic consequences.  Society would simply break up into a multitude of isolated disconnected atoms with nothing much  to hold them together or mediate between them  by way of a market. In short society as we know it would collapse and we would all go to the dogs (one might note in passing that  nationalist mythology might represent an attempt to address this concern by imputing to individuals an essential  national identity toi be shared with others and it is no concidence that nationalist thinking coincided with the rise of capitalism to complement the latter and to provide the conforting certainty- cum-safety net of an "imagined community" – to use Benedict Anderson's term) This is pure speculation of course but I wonder whether Marx's musings on the division of labour were unwittingly intended to address this problem?.    There is that wonderful,  almost lyrical, passage from the Communist Manifesto that suggests he might haveThe bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his “natural superiors”, and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous “cash payment”. It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom — Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation.  So here's the point Im trying to make:  could it be that Marx's preoccupatiuon with the abolition of the division of labour was  based on a tacit acceptance of the argument that the division of labour necessitated the existence of a market to mediate between otherwise disconnected and dissimilar individuals  and that consequently his hatred for the market and all other expressions of human alienation forced him to embrace that most primordial form of solidarity – mechanical solidarity – which in modern form would be represented by his ideal of  the polytechnic polyvalent  worker?Robin

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