[LBird]

Hrothgar wrote:

…I hope you fill this thread with your insults and childish inanities. That level of response is all you have when confronted with facts that are inconvenient.

Poo.

[LBird]

Hrothgar wrote:

That's the infantile level on which you conduct this debate. In fact, to call this 'reasoning' is an insult to the common toad.

Ah-ha! Not if one is dealing with a racial sub-species of the 'common toad', the 'infantile common toad', Latin name Hrothgar simpletonus all-whytus.A little known fact.

[LBird]

Brian wrote:

Thanks for that. However, it seems to me you are assuming that knowledge by default = understanding. This is not always necessarily so because we have come across endless "scientific experts" who seem to possess the 'knowledge' but fail miserably when providing an understanding of that knowledge.

Thanks for the feedback.The issue of 'knowledge not equalling understanding', is I think, a problem with the bourgeois version of 'scientific knowledge'.Within a Communist society, where we would expect science to be a mass activity, then the idea of 'experts producing a knowledge that most don't understand' would not be allowed to prevail. We would expect our human science to be available to everybody. That is, a 'scientist' would be defined as someone who can explain. I suspect the few who can't explain would be regarded as 'mystics' of some sort.

Brian wrote:

Indeed when they are reminded that change is a constant they visibly shrink at the thought that their 'knowledge' could effectively become redundant with the paradigm shift in understanding.

[my bold]I don't think that Kuhn's ideology of 'paradigms' and their 'shifts' is the best one to employ. I prefer Lakatos' 'research programmes'. The essential difference, I think, is that 'paradigms' are in 'series', so that a later one replaces an earlier one (a 'shift'). In contrast, 'research programmes' are in 'parallel', so that more than one is usually operative at the same time.This can be seen in my argument earlier, that two 'computer systems' reflecting the same business can both be 'true' whilst at the same time being different.Broadly speaking, I'm in favour of multiplicities of choices and democratic decisions between them. This is essentially an 'anti-authoritarian' approach to human society. Unlike 'bourgeois science', which people quote as an authority that can't be questioned: 'as science tells us…' or 'we know from science…'. The assumption here is that science produces 'The Truth', which is always an identical copy of the object. As I've tried to show, this can't be done, and amounts to 19th century positivism.

[LBird]

LBird wrote:

alanjjohnstone wrote:

I hope someone is going to eventually explain this thread to the rest of us in an easy to understand way so we know what it's all about

Yeah, absolutely!If these issues, complex though they appear, can't be explained to those without the requisite detailed reading to participate in this discussion at present, then we will have failed as Communists.The use of analogies, of situations with which comrades are familiar and already understand, must be employed to make these vital issues understandable and relevant to all Communists.I've had a discussion over the weekend with my son, and we're now of the opinion that computer programming methods might make this easier to understand. Are you familiar with 'programming' in any way ajj? If not, I'll have to get my thinking cap on, again!

In line with alanjjohnstone’s request for someone to try to ‘explain this thread to the rest of us in an easy to understand way so we know what it's all about’, and my suggestion that the world of computers might help, I’ll make an attempt to use the analogy of ‘building a computer system’. Of course, the problem with analogies is that, if they’re taken too literally, they obscure rather than illuminate the real issue. So, please bear this in mind, and ask questions if something seems to present a problem, rather than take something which is irrelevant to the explanation and erroneously try to follow that wrong turn and completely misunderstand.If we think of the process of building a computer system, say, for the NHS.The NHS really exists, prior to the attempt to build a computer system for it.The business analysts who ask questions of the doctors, nurses and administrators of the NHS to try to gain an understanding of the workings of the NHS, the system designers who interpret the analysis and produce a paper design of something which should work, the programmers who actively write the code following the design, and the testers who ensure that the code ‘works’ in line with the design, are all humans with pre-existing ideas, both of their own jobs, each others’ jobs, and the NHS itself. These humans have to extract relevant information from the NHS, actively design, write and use a plan reflecting the NHS.The end result of this human active process is a new product, an NHS Computer System, which in some way reflects the workings of the NHS, but is clearly not a ‘carbon copy’ of the NHS, but only a comprehensive attempt to replicate the features regarded as essential and relevant to the computer system.So, in terms of the separate entities of Schaff’s tripartite theory of cognition:the NHS is the ‘object’;the human analysts, designers, coders and testers, are the ‘subject’;the NHS Computer System is the ‘knowledge’.Is the System a ‘true’ reflection of the NHS? Yes, if it works as proposed.Is the System an identical copy of the NHS? Of course not. Another System could be built, produced by different analysts, designers, coders and testers, with different ideas about what the NHS is, and what purposes and interests the System should serve, and this second System can also be regarded as a ‘true reflection’ of the NHS, whilst still being different to the other ‘true reflection’ of the first System.As another example of this tripartite schema, perhaps posters remember DJP’s likening ‘nature’ (object) to ‘evidence’, and my response that ‘evidence’ instead was similar to ‘knowledge’ which had been selected from a ‘crime scene’. In this example, the ‘crime scene’ (object) forms the basis of an active examination by the legal offices (subject) who then build a case of evidence (knowledge).This is the cognitive method of science: scientists (subject) actively interrogate the universe (object) and employ the product (knowledge) to prove itself.Perhaps one could say that ‘knowledge’ is a representation accurate enough for the purposes of the producer. Thus, knowledge is formed by humans from the entity it represents for a reason, and the ability of the knowledge to be used for those reasons proves its accuracy.But… knowledge is not the object; knowledge is not an identical copy of object; knowledge is a selection made by an interested subject.I hope this all helps, comrades. I would appreciate some feedback from those readers who didn’t feel that they properly understood the more arcane parts of this thread, but that now they do (or don’t, as it may be).Of course, if it doesn’t work, or comrades disagree with the usefulness of the analogy, or comrades wish to explore further some things left implicit (relevant, interests, reasons, purposes, etc.), then we can continue to discuss.

[LBird]

On the sun/earth debate, and the ‘social content’ of the truth of their relationship:

Ernest Untermann, Science and Revolution, pp. 7-8 wrote:

In this sense, then, I declare that my science is a proletarian science. Not that I do not appreciate what the bourgeois scientists of the past have accomplished, or what the bourgeois scientists of to-day are doing in the way of accumulating material for the storehouse of human knowledge. But proletarian science is the expression of the revolutionary fact that the proletariat has learned to think for itself, that it refuses to accept the teachings of members of other classes without critical reservation, that it prefers to think for itself in all other sciences as it does in economics and politics, that it interprets the facts of its terrestrial and cosmic environment as it sees them from its own standpoint.

[my bold]I expose my position: that of Marx, Pannekoek, Dietzgen and, now, Untermann.

[LBird]

ALB wrote:

Leszek Kolakowski wrote:

Thus Marx's theory of revolution and socialism can be based only on a global understanding of society that cannot be achieved by any detailed, factual analysis.

[my bold]No, No, NO!Kolakowski must tell us which theory he's employing which determines the 'facts' to be selected for this 'detailed, factual analysis' which prove that 'Marx's theory of revolution' 'cannot achieve'.From a 'Communist perspective', it can be based on an understanding that is achieved by a detailed, factual analysis.From an 'Anti-Communist perspective', it cannot be based on an understanding that is achieved by a detailed, factual analysis.The 'facts' will be chosen from the innumerable stream to fit the assumptions of the theoretical framework, as Pannekoek and Dietzgen argue. The human social subject cannot be removed from the process of generating 'knowledge'. On one hand, the 'stream' must contain the 'facts' to be 'selected', but, on the other, the selection of what is determined to be 'relevant' is done by humans, in their society, which means 'class cognition'.The 'theory will determine what can be observed', to echo Einstein.The position of the observer must be revealed.'Facts' do not present themselves unbidden to the impartial observer. That is naive realism.'Facts' are produced as part of a pre-existing social and theoretical framework.Kolakowski is an anti-Communist.If anyone wants to employ Kolakowski's theory of cognition, fine.But declare that one is doing so.

[LBird]

I'm afraid this thread is going to have to be taken forward on the basis of DJP's theory of cognition.It's my fault, my lack of stamina, but I just haven't got the heart to continue saying the same things and asking the same (unanswered) questions.Sorry, comrades.

[LBird]

ALB wrote:

So do I, though I'd prefer to say that this is not what "science" does even if some think that it is. To tell the truth, I don't think that this is what science these days claims to be doing either.

Yes, I agree: science 'doesn't do' this, but it's not 'some' who 'think' this, but the vast majority of our society. I think that the length of this thread is testament to that!As to 'science these days', again I think that you're right, if you're referring to philosophers of science, and scientists like Einstein perhaps.But… the vast majority of people (and, I think, the vast majority of Communists) still think that 'science' produces the 'truth', and that the 'scientific method' is a socially-neutral method for accessing 'reality'.That's why so many comrades will prefix a statement with 'science tells us…' or 'according to science…', as if that strengthens their further claims. It assumes a status for 'science' and its 'truths' that don't stand up to examination.We have to ask, 'Whose science?' says things, and 'What method?' they employ, and 'What status?' its truths have.These are all questions that we are taught not to ask in our society. I wonder why. I think it's related to 'respect for authorities', for the concept of TINA.I think a 'fresh' day is required, on my part, at least, before we progress to the 'social subject'.

[LBird]

DJP wrote:

Maybe it's me being thick, or I've missed one of your posts but please then do explain how this fits into your model i.e. what your criteria for evaluating truth is.

But 'criteria' logically follow what we determine 'truth' is (ie, where it lies).If we all accept that 'truth' is an attribute of 'knowledge', we can move to a discussion of 'criteria', and whether that involves relativism, in the senses that you've expressed concerns over, concerns I share.But it's pointless anybody 'pretending', for the sake of an illusory progress, to agree with my model, because that model will form the basis of my further answers, and the disagreement we have now will merely transfer itself to that discussion.We might as well sort it out now!If we disagree, we'll have different opinions about 'relativism', I think.

[LBird]

ALB wrote:

But sticking to your language, you are right: "'Truth' is not a fixed, one-off, reflection of 'reality'". But why add "which science produces by a neutral method"?

Because we're discussing 'Pannekoek's theory of science'.'Science' claims to produce, by a socially-neutral method, the 'truth', by 'discovery'. This 'discovery method' is claimed to produce 'scientific knowledge' which is 'true', once and for all.Pannekoek (and Dietzgen) claim that this can't be done, and I agree with them.One's choice of 'cognitive method' makes clear which 'method' one is using in science.That's why I'm trying to get some agreement behind Schaff's model of 'object/subject/knowledge'.

ALB wrote:

Surely, the sort of "truth" Dietzgen, Pannekoek and we here are talking about is also produced by some agreed method?

Yes, 'some agreed [cognitive] method'. That's what I'm discussing. That's what I'm trying to get some agreement on.The issue of 'relativism' (as I've already said) can only be addressed, I think, once we have some 'agreement', because the form of that agreement will be used to build an answer to the concerns of those (like me!) who don't agree with 'relativism'.

[LBird]

DJP wrote:

With the exception of a priori systems I would like to know how this could be done without refering to the material world, the object.

The model of cognition I am arguing for does refer to the object.I've said this over and over. I don't know how I can say this, without it being any clearer.Why do you keep going back to statements you made earlier? To stop 'going round in circles', we have to build upon what's been said.

[LBird]

twc wrote:

I may be presumptuous but, for me, it’s time to move on to other content.

twc, you can move on to anything you like.I'm not engaging with you, because you are constantly rude, refuse to answer reasonable questions, and talk jibberish.I only thanked you for your support for my position through common manners.Don't bother to ask me any questions.

[LBird]

DJP wrote:

LBird wrote:

I can only ask again, concerning a tripartite theory of cognition (object, subject, knowledge), do you agree that 'truth' pertains to 'knowledge'?

It's actually a relation between all 3.To move things forward …

I'm afraid I can't 'move things forward', DJP.We disagree about 'truth'.'Truth' is not 'a relation'.'Truth' is a 'product' of a relationship between an active social subject and a really existing external object. 'Truth' is an attribute of 'knowledge'.If don't accept that 'truth' is a 'product', we can discuss it. Of course, I'll ask you to explain your view of 'truth' within a theory of cognition.

[LBird]

alanjjohnstone wrote:

I hope someone is going to eventually explain this thread to the rest of us in an easy to understand way so we know what it's all about

Yeah, absolutely!If these issues, complex though they appear, can't be explained to those without the requisite detailed reading to participate in this discussion at present, then we will have failed as Communists.The use of analogies, of situations with which comrades are familiar and already understand, must be employed to make these vital issues understandable and relevant to all Communists.I've had a discussion over the weekend with my son, and we're now of the opinion that computer programming methods might make this easier to understand. Are you familiar with 'programming' in any way ajj? If not, I'll have to get my thinking cap on, again!

[LBird]

DJP wrote:

I suppose I could accept Lbirds use of "truth", as meaning the socially constructed what is "true for" people in a certain period of history, but only so long as it remains in parentheses.Otherwise we're just going to end up going round in circles.

Yeah, 'round in circles'!But to try to get some 'common ground' between us, we have to be sure on what it is we 'agree' on. 'Suppose…could…a certain…so long…parentheses' leaves too much leeway, I'm afraid, in my humble opinion.I can only ask again, concerning a tripartite theory of cognition (object, subject, knowledge), do you agree that 'truth' pertains to 'knowledge'?One other way of conceiving 'truth' is to regard it as pertaining to 'object'. But I've argued that neither Marx, Pannekoek nor Dietzgen (or Einstein!) would agree with this way of understanding 'truth'.In fact, the notion that 'truth' is a fixed, one-off, correct-for-all-time product of a neutral scientific method, as an exact reflection of object, is a central plank of positivism, and furthermore, I would argue, remains a central plank of bourgeois ideology of 'science' as an 'authority' outside of democratic control by the proletariat/future humanity, even though recent bourgeois philosophers have themselves already undermined this outdated, 19th century, concept of 'science' and its 'method'.I've already said that, in my opinion, this shows that Marxist thinkers were up to 150 years ahead of bourgeois thinkers in reaching these conclusions.I've already also said that I share your concerns about 'relativism', 'moral relativism' and 'cultural relativism', but I think that to move onto a discussion of those valid concerns, we have to get some agreement on the process of cognition, which will affect our understanding of, and answers to, those concerns.

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