[LBird]

DJP, some further info on where I'm exploring this issue of the mind being outside our 'grey matter'

wikipedia, on EMT, wrote:

The "extended mind thesis" (EMT) refers to an emerging concept that addresses the question as to the division point between the mind and the environment by promoting the view of active externalism. The EMT proposes that some objects in the external environment are utilized by the mind in such a way that the objects can be seen as extensions of the mind itself. Specifically, the mind is seen to encompass every level of the cognitive process, which will often include the use of environmental aids.The seminal work in the field is "The Extended Mind" by Andy Clark and David Chalmers (1998).[1] In this paper, Clark and Chalmers present the idea of active externalism (similar to semantic or "content" externalism), in which objects within the environment function as a part of the mind. They argue that it is arbitrary to say that the mind is contained only within the boundaries of the skull. The separation between the mind, the body, and the environment is seen as an unprincipled distinction. Because external objects play a significant role in aiding cognitive processes, the mind and the environment act as a "coupled system". This coupled system can be seen as a complete cognitive system of its own. In this manner, the mind is extended into the external world. The main criterion that Clark and Chalmers list for classifying the use of external objects during cognitive tasks as a part of an extended cognitive system is that the external objects must function with the same purpose as the internal processes.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extended_mindAnd I've ordered a book by Andy Clark:http://www.amazon.com/Supersizing-Mind-Embodiment-Cognitive-Philosophy/dp/0199773688#_Your questions about critical realism and emergence, and your individualist 'grey matter' counter-arguments, have spurred me on to do some more research. Thanks!

[LBird]

DJP, have you come across the distinction between an ‘internalist’ theory of mind (which I think you and Vin espouse), and an ‘externalist’ theory of mind, which I think fits better with Marx’s views of society and value?

Gregory McCulloch (1995) The Mind and its World Routledge, London, p. xii, wrote:

The other principal moral drawn is that these outstanding issues should be resolved in a non-Cartesian manner. Although it is customary now to reject Descartes' immaterialism, it is almost as customary to adopt a form of materialistic Cartesianism, according to which the mind is, essentially anyway, a (material) thing to be found in the head. This is the most common contemporary form of Internalism,the view that an individual's mental characteristics are wholly constituted by what goes on within the skin of that individual, so that matters in the individual's physical or cultural environment have no bearing on the identity conditions of these mental characteristics. Against this, I recommend an Externalist position which combines elements of Wittgenstein, and a dash of existentialism, in making embodiment partly constitutive of having a mind; and which blends this with Fregean themes to yield an accommodation of Putnam's influential views on natural kinds and our thoughts about them. According to the resulting position, the mind is separable neither from the body nor from the surroundings in which this body lives and moves.

http://www.amazon.com/The-Mind-World-Problems-Philosophy-ebook/dp/B000FBF8L0#_Although I’m no expert on ‘mind’, this seems to me to be more appropriate to a critical realist perspective, than a physicalist perspective. Put simply, my explanation earlier about placing a single ‘x’ between the adjacent ears of two individuals captures the location of ‘mind’ better, than placing two ‘x’s between each individual’s own ears.Mind is our social, cultural and historical environment, rather than in one’s ‘grey matter’.

[LBird]

DJP wrote:

LBird wrote:

Emergence.

OK, but physicalism incorperates that and is not neccesarily reductive.http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/#9

DJP, I’m still trying to find out what is actually meant by ‘supervene’ within the ideology of physicalism. For the moment, perhaps this will help. 

Quote:

This is not to suggest that living things are animated by an immaterial `vital force' or anything like that. Biological organisms are purely natural, material entities. In some cases the underlying physical and chemical mechanisms and processes that govern their behaviour are beginning to be understood. Yet this does not mean that biological phenomena as such can be described and explained in terms of mere physics or chemistry, or that such reduction will ever be possible. For biology involves a different and higher level of understanding.For example, insulin is a biological product; it is a hormone which is secreted in the pancreas. The chemical composition of insulin is known, and it can even be synthesised artificially. Some of its chemical effects in the body are understood. But this does not mean that the biology of insulin has been or can be reduced to chemistry. To describe and understand insulin in biological terms involves much more than a knowledge of its chemical composition and properties. It involves understanding its role as a hormone – that is to say, its function in the body as a whole. Chemistry can provide an account of the mechanisms underlying this role; but this role itself can be comprehended only with a different level of concepts and principles which are constitutive of biology as a distinct science.Page 5 Of course, a living organism is composed of physical and chemical constituents, and nothing more. Nevertheless, it is not a mere collection of such constituents, nor even of anatomical and physiological parts. It is these parts unified, organised and acting as a whole. This unity and organisation are not features only of our descriptions: they are properties of the thing itself; they are constitutive of it as a biological organism. Nor are the laws governing its behaviour simply a function of our theories; they are operative in the organism itself as its laws. There are real – objective and material – differences between a living thing and a merely physical or chemical entity which it is the aim of biology to describe. This is the realist and materialist view.Again, it must be stressed, this is not to suggest that living things involve a transcendent `organic unity' or that they are animated by any non-natural `vital principle'. Biological forms and laws do not transcend those of physics and chemistry; they do not supplant or replace them.  On the contrary, in a living thing the laws of the lower – physical and chemical – levels continue to operate. On this basis, however, new structures and forms develop. New – biological – principles come into effect, and physical and chemical laws, although they continue to operate, in Hegel's words, `cease to be final and decisive, and sink, as it were, to a subservient position'.21 Physical processes are subsumed within a higher law. Such biological laws have objective existence and real effects, not by acting independently of physical laws, nor by replacing them, but rather by giving a new and higher form of organisation to the physical and chemical phenomena. The biological level arises within, and exists on the basis of, the physical and chemical levels, not outside or apart from them.Process in NatureIn this way, biological concepts and principles are neither reducible to those of chemistry or physics, nor are they entirely autonomous or transcendent. These different levels are relatively autonomous: they are not only distinct but also united; there is continuity as well as difference between them. The clearest demonstration of this is provided by the fact – and modern science takes it for a fact – that biological phenomena emerge from merely chemical and physical – i.e., non-biological – conditions, by purely natural processes.Evolution of higher and more complex forms from lower and simpler ones is not peculiar to biological evolution, it is a fundamental  feature of material existence more generally. It is exhibited at a simpler level in the evolution of the universe as a whole – in the formation, development  and ultimate  death  of galaxies,  stars  and planetary  systems – described  and explained by cosmology. Likewise, geology describes the development of the material features of the planet. These phenomena are material processes which have their basis in certain physical and chemical mechanisms. Nevertheless, such processes cannot be reduced to chemistry, physics or mechanics. And this is not just for the reasons given so far: that the concepts and principles of these  sciences  are  irreducible  to  purely  physicalist  terms.  For  physicalism  involves  the reductionist view that all natural processes can be explained entirely in terms of a few simple and eternal laws of physics and mechanics. This view is blind to development and process in nature; it excludes the very ideas of the emergence and evolution of new forms and new laws within the material world. That is to say, physicalism gives an unsatisfactory account of the material world even in its physical aspect.Pages 6-7

 http://www.kent.ac.uk/secl/philosophy/articles/sayers/mental.pdf

[LBird]

Young Master Smeet wrote:

Mike,I couldn't find the other quote I half remember, which is that Agnostic is just a polite English word for Atheist.  I can never see any distinction between agnosticism and atheism.  The former is just louder about the "as far as I know" caveat than the latter.

YMS, I think the distinction is that a-gnostic means no-knowledge, whereas a-theist means no-god.This makes the latter a much more positive statement of belief, ironically.I should add, I'm an atheist myself!

[LBird]

DJP wrote:

LBird wrote:

Out of non-living material, comes living material.Out of unconscious, living material, comes living consciousness.Out of living consciousness, comes self-consciousness.Out of self-consciousness comes original ideas.Original ideas form the basis for conscious changes to non-living material.But, to reduce these steps to saying 'non-living material changes non-living material', while true at some level, surely loses some of the subtlety in an explanation of human, conscious activity within our natural world.

OK great. Now explain why you think that is not a physicalist or is incompatible with a physicalist framework.Thanks.

Emergence.Living is not non-living; consciousness is not unconscious living; self-consciousness is not (just) consciousness; original ideas are not self-consciousness.The reduction of original ideas to matter doesn't explain anything. Emergence means newness, not more oldness.If we deny humans the ability to create something that doesn't exist, where does Communism come from? Material conditions? That's the argument that "Rocks make history, but not in piles of their own choosing!"

[LBird]

DJP wrote:

If you can define what you mean when you say 'materialism', 'physicalism' and 'realism' we might be able to get somewhere..

If you will allow me some leeway to try to explain, please, comrade!I'm not saying that you'll agree with the following characterisation, but it's my attempt to explain our differences, from my perspective.Out of non-living material, comes living material.Out of unconscious, living material, comes living consciousness.Out of living consciousness, comes self-consciousness.Out of self-consciousness comes original ideas.Original ideas form the basis for conscious changes to non-living material.But, to reduce these steps to saying 'non-living material changes non-living material', while true at some level, surely loses some of the subtlety in an explanation of human, conscious activity within our natural world.I feel obliged to add, that I'm trying to throw into sharp relief our two positions ('materialism' as opposed to 'idealism-materialism'), rather than giving an accurate account of arguments that have been going on for millenia. Please take this as a rough attempt to illustrate with crayons, rather than an accurate architect's drawing.

[LBird]

Vin Maratty wrote:

It is not 'crass mechanistic' to say that a material brain is required for thinking with.

No-one is arguing that it isn't required, Vin.

VM wrote:

If you wish to ignore things you have no answer for…..

This is starting to border on the childish, now.What I am I supposed to say back? Nah, nah, na-nah, nah…The answers that I've been giving are from the perspective of critical realism, not physicalism.The fact that you won't acknowledge or discuss your perspective is not my fault.

[LBird]

Vin Maratty wrote:

You are now backtracking on what you said earlier  LBird wrote: 'the inseparability of ideas and material conditions'. LBird wrote:You're right, 'idealism-materialism' doesn't mean the 'primacy of ideas over material conditions'. As you say, it's 'a false dichotomy'.   

As long as you're happy that I'm 'backtracking', then you're satisfied. That's OK by me, Vin.

[LBird]

DJP wrote:

LBird wrote:

Theory and practice is not 'materialist', but 'idealist-materialist'.

And that's where you're plainly wrong.Materialism entails that all things including 'theory and practice' are material.I think the problem with this discussion is that we are using the same terms to mean different things….

But this is what I keep telling you, DJP!I'm 'plainly wrong' from the 'materialist/physicalist' perspective! Of course I am. But I'm not a 'materialist/physicalist'. I'm a 'critical realist'. So, I'm not 'plainly wrong' from that perspective.Unless we discuss the differences between 'materialism' and 'critical realism', and then compare the results to Marx's work, we can't advance the discussion.The real problem seems to be that DJP and Vin don't even accept that they're employing a theory, but are merely just 'dealing with the Truth'. So, we can't resolve our differences, not even on the level of understanding those differences (rather than coming to any agreement, which is impossible).

[LBird]

Vin Maratty wrote:

Humans can create communism where the material conditions exist.

[my bold]To me, Vin, this 'potential' clashes with:

VM wrote:

I suggest the answer is a materialist one

Why reduce 'can' to 'material'?If you'd written 'must', then the answer would simply be a 'materialist one'.The 'can' doubt destroys the logic of the 'materialist' answer.Theory and practice is not 'materialist', but 'idealist-materialist'.Any formulation that reduces to 'material' has lost Marx's advances made in the Theses on Feuerbach.I'm not a 'materialist', Vin, and I don't think that the answer is a 'materialist one'.

[LBird]

robbo203 wrote:

The point Im getting at is that we should move away from this kind of crass mechanistic notion that material conditions "produce" ideas which the base-superstructure model often, unfortunately, seems to encourage. Actually this is a form of mysticism. Ideas are held to be latent in the mysterious workings of the universe and become manifest in its unfolding. This is to strip history of any kind of creative aspect and reduce us to the role of passive onlookers.

This is the key philosophic point, robbo, that all of us 'non-materialists' are making.One of the consequences of adopting this 'active and creative human' perspective, however, is to undermine the model of science we are all taught in school, that 'science produces the Truth of material reality'.

robbo203 wrote:

A more useful model of historical materialism which acknowleges that ideas do have an influence and an internal development of their own is the one outlined by Marx when he pointed out that men make their own history but not under conditions of their own making. This posits the idea of material conditions as a constraint rather than a determinant.

Perhaps we should also see 'material conditions' also as developing potential, as well as constraint. Of course, the notion of 'material conditions' determining human actions is the 19th century positivism and materialism, erroneously embraced by Engels.The materialists never answer how Communism is possible (ie. the self-emancipation of the proletariat) if material conditions determine human actions.Humans must consciously create Communism. We can't leave it to 'the rocks' to instruct us.

[LBird]

The essential difference between our ways of understanding 'value', DJP, is an ideological one.You use 'physicalism', whereas I use 'critical realism'.IMO, Marx's claim that 'value does not contain matter' is more explicable by critical realism, than by physicalism.Since I've already given some explanation of some concepts in CR, and some further reading of texts, for any comrades that are interested in following up this discussion, I'll leave it at that.

[LBird]

DJP wrote:

If you think physicalism is unable to deal with relations you are wrong.

Surely you mean Marx is wrong?

Marx, Capital, wrote:

The value of commodities is the very opposite of the coarse materiality of their substance, not an atom of matter enters into its composition.

[my bold]https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch01.htm#S1

[LBird]

Marx, Capital, wrote:

The value of commodities is the very opposite of the coarse materiality of their substance, not an atom of matter enters into its composition.

[my bold]https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch01.htm#S1It doesn't seem as if we're going to get to the bottom of Marx's quote, on this thread, now.Perhaps he was talking out of his arse, and value is material (whether cloth, 'grey', or titchy bits of the sun…).

[LBird]

Young Master Smeet wrote:

Lbird,what I wrote was a (slightly edited for context) quote from Marx.  "Substance" and "Material" (Materiatur)are his words.http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/appendix.htm

Yes, but I wasn't asking for a Marx quote. I can read him just as well as you.I was asking you which ideology you use to understand 'value'.That is, what you think.If it's 'materialism' (or one of its synonyms) that OK by me.Then we can progress the thread, because I'm not a 'materialist' (or one of its synonyms).Do you ever have the feeling you're going round in circles?

[Author]

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