[DJP]

LBird Why on earth do you think theory is idealist? Do you think the mental floats about in a different realm to the physical world?Unless you believe in some kind of spirit world or think that everything is in the mind you will be a physicalist or materialist (which is pretty much the same thing)http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/

[DJP]

Yes but to say minds supervene on or emerge from brains doesn't answer the question of how that can be so. What is it about a particular configuration of physical stuff that enables it to be a mind?All aproaches in philosophy of mind have problems and like I said I am holding off making a judgement for the time being. But my preference is to try to go for an explanation that does not involve the kind of property dualism that emergence seems to entail. All that you are doing is pushing the problem one step back rather than explaining it.Emergence seems to work very well when describing the structure of concepts and properties created by minds but not so well as an explanation of how minds can be in the first place…

[DJP]

LBird wrote:

Simply, the 'mind' is not the 'brain'. These are differing philosophical positions, DJP, between what we're saying.

Yes that is correct. But mind is not independent of brain..However I don't think the case for socialism turns on this question so I'm leaving it for now.

[DJP]

LBird wrote:

If one places the 'x' between the ears of the individual, one is 'fetishising' the 'relationship' which exists between the nearest ears of the two individuals.

Clattrap. I'm really starting to think you're aff yer head.If I was to aim the cross hairs of my revolver firmly between your ears and pull the trigger your mind would cease to be.Simularly if I was to slip some LSD into your drink the only effect would be in your mind, not in the mind of any others near you.Your mind is firmly placed inside your skull.I think we should change the discussion now to angels and pinheads.

[DJP]

LOL I'd like to know how philosophy of science escapes the tag of 'bourgeois' too.

[DJP]

"Naturalism" is the view that most things can and are best described through the framework of the natural sciences. Therefore it is a physicalist position.I think you need to look at the broader literature rather than trying to do a micro-Marxologist job.

[DJP]

Young Master Smeet wrote:

DJP wrote:

But where then does this "real substance of social relations" exist?

Everywhere, and, importantly, historically, during the process of creation: i.e. in the concrete social actions of sensuous human beings,

But what makes that "creating value" rather than people just doing stuff?It seems to me at some point you have to say that concepts are (socially produced) mental states.But mental states are not that easily reduced to physical states since "chocolate trombone" can could be realised via a presumably infinite combination of neural connections.n'est-ce pas?

[DJP]

Young Master Smeet wrote:

The value is a substance, and definitely material.  That is, not in human minds, not in the mind of God, but in the real substance of social relations.

But where then does this "real substance of social relations" exist?

[DJP]

LBird wrote:

Could you explain further what you mean, DJP? What are the 'problems of reductionism' to which you refer?And can you tell me which ideological approach you're using to understand these issues? For example, are you a reductionist or a critical realist, or something else?

It would take too much of my time to write something myself but have a look at this:http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/#7To be honest I haven't really made my mind up about much of this. It doesn't seem that anyone has the answers yet.

[DJP]

Vin Maratty wrote:

Marx refers to 'Value' as a  relationship between people expressed as a relationship between things. The relationship is in all our heads and has a material existence within our grey matter.

I'd agree. The fact that goods and objects appear as commodities and values is not due to any physical characteristic of the good or object itself. "Value" is not a physical property of objects but a social relationship that exists "in all our heads and has a material existence within our grey matter."As far as I know Marx was a monistic thinker and is not trying to claim that concepts and thoughts exist in some metaphysical realm (along with Plato's "forms" perhaps)

[DJP]

LBird wrote:

Only if I was a reductionist, and reduced structures to their components. I'm not a reductionist, DJP.I think structures have emergent properties. I've been through this before, though, so I won't labour the point with you, now.

OK that's all well and good. But, as far as theories of mind go, emergence and supervenience inherits rather than supersede the problems of reductionism.

[DJP]

alanjjohnstone wrote:

Confirmation of the Labour Theory of Value?

No I don't think so. In Marxian parlance new "value" is only created through the use of variable capital eg labour power.

[DJP]

LBird wrote:

To hold that opinion, DJP, is fair enough. But it's an individualist explanation, and so is likely to be anathema to Communists.

No it's a brief shorthand answer which you've read too much into.

LBird wrote:

The opposite viewpoint, that the mind is social, suggests that the mind lies in relationships between 'brains'.That is "the concept 'ghost' or 'father christmas' are just the result of a certain configuration of relationships outside the brain".

"Meaning aint all in the head", as Putman said and I agree. Read Wittgenstiens 'private language argument'. This is all pretty much mainstream stuff these days….I'd put it this way though "The meaning of words and concepts like  'ghost' or 'father christmas' are the result of certain relationships between brains"I don't see how meaning or concepts can exist outside brains.

LBird wrote:

Whereas, I'd place a single 'x' between our two nearest ears, in the middle of the photo.

Wouldn't that entail you having to explain how consciousness could exist free floating in space?

[DJP]

LBird wrote:

DJP wrote:

All that 'materialism' means, in the philosophical sense, is that "all that exists is physical stuff", clearly Marx never rejected such a view once he accepted it. No quotes can be found to show the otherwise…

Sounds similar to the 'pragmatism' expressed by YMS on the other thread, DJP.Matter is tangible. And consciousness is god.

Pragmatism (in philosophy of science) is a standard of "truth". It means other things in other contexts…Materialism / dualism / idealism are metaphysical assumptions about the way things are.Lets not mix meanings…

[DJP]

LBird wrote:

As to 'matter', if it's 'everything', is it also a 'ghost'? Isn't that just an idea, with no 'material' content? But if humans thoughts are real, they must be outside 'everything', because only 'matter' gives 'thingness'.

Well we're into philosophy of mind here…If we are to presume mind-brain identity then the concept 'ghost' or 'father christmas' are just the result of a certain configuration of grey matter inside the brain.That does lead us to the 'hard problem' of physicalism, the problem of 'intentionality' or 'aboutness' but compared to the other alternatives dualism (mental and physical as separate 'substances') or idealism (it's all mental) it really is the only game in town.You'll get better answers to these questions if you logged into a philosophy forum..

[Author]

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