The Division of Labour

[LBird]

robbo203 wrote:

But I wasn't talking about "!individualism"! I agree – individualism is a relatively recent ideological phenomenon and, as I pointed out earlier, closely associated with the rise of capitalism. Individuality, on the other hand, means something quite different to individualism and I attempted to explain the difference in an earlier post I maintain that individuality is part historical and part trans-historical in the sense that it is an inevitable outcome of a socialisation process which happens in every society.

robbo, I’m not sure about your distinction between ‘individualism’ and ‘individuality’. Could you give me a brief summary of what you consider the essential differences to be? I’d be inclined to think that you are drawing a distinction between ‘ideology’ and ‘biology’, but at the moment this is just a guess. I don’t think that this distinction can be maintained, but if that’s not the point you are making, then ignore me on that point!Meanwhile, I’m providing some quotes, to give you some idea of where I’m coming from, with my questioning of your ‘transhistorical’ use of ‘individuality’.

Callinicos, Making History, p. 17, wrote:

However, cultures seem to have existed where conceiving ‘each one of us’ as ‘many’ was deeply embedded in everyday discourse. A. W. H. Adkins argues that Homeric Greece was one such culture:

Adkins wrote:

The Homeric psuché has no specific mental or emotional functions in life: it is simply that whose presence ensures that the individual is alive. To observe the mental and emotional activity of Homeric man, we must turn to…other words…whose conventional renderings, all of which are somewhat misleading, are thumos, ‘spirit’; kradie, etor, ker, ‘heart’; phrenes, ‘mind’ or (physiologically) ‘diaphragm’, or ‘lungs’; nõos, ‘mind’. The manner in which these words are used, if we take it seriously, reveals a psychological landscape quite different from our own. We are accustomed to emphasize the ‘I’ which ‘takes decisions’, and ideas such as ‘will’ or ‘intention’. In Homer, there is much less emphasis on the ‘I’ or decisions: the Greek words just mentioned take the foreground, and enjoy a remarkable amount of democratic freedom. Men frequently ‘act as their kradie and thumos bids them’…

Callinicos, Making History, pp. 18-9, wrote:

Habermas’s account of mythical thought was drawn from the work of anthropologists. But rarely has what he had in mind been better described than by Carlo Levi in his portrait of the peasants of the remote Lucanian village to which he was exiled under Mussolini in the 1930s:

Levi wrote:

They are literally pagani, ‘pagans’, or countrymen, as distinguished from city-dwellers. The deities of the state and the city can find no worshippers here on the land, where the wolf and the ancient black boar reign supreme, where there is no wall between the world of men and the world of animals and spirits, between the leaves of the trees above and the roots below. They cannot have even an awareness of themselves as individuals, here where all things are held together by acting upon one another, and each one is a power unto itself, working imperceptibly, where there is no barrier that cannot be broken down by magic. They live submerged in a world that rolls on independent of their will, where man is in no way separate from his sun, his beast, his malaria, where there can be neither happiness, as literary devotees of the land conceive it, nor hope, because these two are adjuncts of personality and here there is only the grim passivity of a sorrowful Nature…. To the peasants everything has a double meaning…. People, trees, animals, even objects and words have a double life. Only reason, religion, and history have clear-cut meanings…. And in the peasants’ world there is no room for reason, religion, and history. There is no room for religion, because to them everything participates in divinity, everything is actually, not merely symbolically, divine: Christ and the goat; the heavens above, and the beasts of the field below; everything is bound up in natural magic. Even the ceremonies of the church become pagan rites, celebrating the existence of inanimate things, which the peasants endow with a soul, and the innumerable earthy divinities of the village.

[my bold]The distance between such ways of thinking and the ‘orthodox conception of agents’ is evident.

I hope this helps to outline to you my difficulties, robbo

[DJP]

You might like this LBird:http://philosophynow.org/issues/97/How_Old_is_the_Self

[Anonymous]

Brian wrote:

From a materialist perspective I would say you are going off topic!  What have demons got to do with alienation and the division of labour?I was merely correcting Descartes materialistically not philosophically.

 I have noticed that 'philosophy' tends to boycott a lot of  topics on this materialist forum 

[LBird]

DJP wrote:

You might like this LBird:http://philosophynow.org/issues/97/How_Old_is_the_Self

This is a link to the actual article:http://fsrcoin.com/Jaynes.htm

[robbo203]

LBird wrote:

robbo, I’m not sure about your distinction between ‘individualism’ and ‘individuality’. Could you give me a brief summary of what you consider the essential differences to be? I’d be inclined to think that you are drawing a distinction between ‘ideology’ and ‘biology’, but at the moment this is just a guess. I don’t think that this distinction can be maintained, but if that’s not the point you are making, then ignore me on that point!

Hi LBirdI made an attempt of  sorts to distinguish between individualism and individuality in post no.46. Individualism is essentially  an outer directed ideological posture in the sense that it has to do with one's relationships with others, above all in a socio economic context ,  and is grounded in a conception of the individual as a self interested atomised agent who sees society as simply a means of his/her own ends Contract theories of the origin of society (e.g.. Locke)  typify this kind of outlook..  I  agree that individualism is entirely a historical phenomenon Individuality is something different.  It has to do with the inner life of the person, the sense of self hood.  This is something that is both historical and trans-historical.  In terms of early childhood development what we see, to begin with. is what psychoanalysts call a stage of primary identification in which the infant develops a strong emotional attachment to the "significant other" (most particularly, the mother) but is unable to distinguish itself from the latter  whom it sees as a mere extension of itself.  This is followed by a form of identification called narcissistic identification  which derives from  the experience of loss of, or alienation from,  the other in question.  In coming to see our mothers as separate from ourselves we gain a sense of self hood.  Even to talk of the existence of others outsides of ourselves (society) presupposes this process of separation in which became aware of ourselves as individuals.  We cannot recognise others as others without seeing ourselves as separate from them That is why I contend that this aspect of individuality is trans historical. It is a necessary built-in aspect of infant development in all human societies. Of course the content of our inner lives is also historically contingent and subject to social influence I think the point you are groping towards does not  concern individuality as such but rather the holism- individualism  distinction.  The French anthropologist Louis Dumont is the person to read up on in this connection – his books such as Homo Hierarchicus : the Caste system and its implications,  and  From Mandeville to Marx: The Genesis and Triumph of Economic Ideology  and Essays in Individualism   are classics A holistic ontology according to Dumont sees society as primary  and a logical entailment of that, according to him, is hierarchy as exemplified by by the Indian caste system.  An individualistic ontology by contrast, vests the individual with primary value and subordinates society to the individual.  Individualism according to Dumont logically entails equality at a fundamental level  and so we get notions such as "we are  equal in the eyes of the law". Of course differences exist between individuals e,g in the distribution of wealth but according to Dumont , from an individualist perspective such differences have to be explained in voluntaristic terms . They  cannot be said to emanate from the basic level of the abstract individual  in an individualistic outlook since to think that is to presuppose the existence of society as a higher value  which would threaten the very autonomy of the abstract individual I don't know if I've made myself clear but that in a nutshell is what Dumont is about.  I think there are huge problems with Dumont's thesis  but there are some useful insights too. Dumont traces modern individualism to the  early Christian concept tion of the self  which emerged from this latent form into a fully manifest form with the arrival of  capitalism

[ALB]

robbo203 wrote:

In terms of early childhood development what we see, to begin with. is what psychoanalysts call a stage of primary identification in which the infant develops a strong emotional attachment to the "significant other" (most particularly, the mother) but is unable to distinguish itself from the latter  whom it sees as a mere extension of itself.  This is followed by a form of identification called narcissistic identification  which derives from  the experience of loss of, or alienation from,  the other in question.  In coming to see our mothers as separate from ourselves we gain a sense of self hood.

I don't disagree with the basic point you are trying to make, but am surprised that you are making an appeal to "psychoanalysis" when Freud's theories have been so thoroughly discredited. The rival behaviourist theory is also capable of giving an account of the emergence of "self". See, for instance, this from GH Mead:http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/mead3.htmI was a bit surprised to find this on the Marxist Internet Archive but it's there and probably deserves to be as his theory does have socialist implications. His Mind, Self and Society used to be recommended to Party members for those interested in the subject as it provides a social materialist theory of "mind".

[robbo203]

ALB wrote:

robbo203 wrote:

In terms of early childhood development what we see, to begin with. is what psychoanalysts call a stage of primary identification in which the infant develops a strong emotional attachment to the "significant other" (most particularly, the mother) but is unable to distinguish itself from the latter  whom it sees as a mere extension of itself.  This is followed by a form of identification called narcissistic identification  which derives from  the experience of loss of, or alienation from,  the other in question.  In coming to see our mothers as separate from ourselves we gain a sense of self hood.

I don't disagree with the basic point you are trying to make, but am surprised that you are making an appeal to "psychoanalysis" when Freud's theories have been so thoroughly discredited. The rival behaviourist theory is also capable of giving an account of the emergence of "self". See, for instance, this from GH Mead:http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/mead3.htmI was a bit surprised to find this on the Marxist Internet Archive but it's there and probably deserves to be as his theory does have socialist implications. His Mind, Self and Society used to be recommended to Party members for those interested in the subject as it provides a social materialist theory of "mind".

 Sure, Freudian psychoanalysis has been largely discredited but I dont think that means we must reject the basic explanation for the emergence of sense of self  as being contingent upon a process of  "objectifying" others. It  is by becoming aware of the existence of others as separate from ourselves that we begin to define ourselves as individuals. I dont think Mead's theory of the self contradicts this at all. Meads central argument is that the self is an emergent property of social interactions which is what I'm saying too.  The mother interacts with the infant and over a period of time  the infant becomes aware of the existence of the mother as an entity outside of itself  and so in the process becomes aware of itself. You can dispense with the Freudian-type jargon but I think the basic argument remains sound.   In any event,   I thought what was descreditable about Freudian psychoanalysis  was the imputed role of the unconscious  in human beings and the whole contrived typology of id, ego and superego.

[LBird]

robbo, since we both agree that ‘individualism’ is entirely historical, I think we can leave that concept alone.But, when we come to your ‘individuality’ as ‘transhistorical’, even you concede that it isn’t.

robbo203 wrote:

Individuality is something different. It has to do with the inner life of the person, the sense of self hood. This is something that is both historical and trans-historical.

So, even ‘individuality’ is ‘both historical and trans-historical’, not just simply ‘transhistorical’. But then you go further:

robbo203 wrote:

That is why I contend that this aspect of individuality is trans historical. It is a necessary built-in aspect of infant development in all human societies. Of course the content of our inner lives is also historically contingent and subject to social influence.

[my bold]So, the apparent essence of ‘individuality’ is ‘inner life’ and ‘self hood’, which is the bit which is ‘transhistorical’. But… even this you concede is ‘historically contingent and subject to social influence’.It seems to me that your thesis depends upon identifying just what the ‘necessary built-in aspect of infant development in all human societies’ consists of. You identify this as ‘individuality’, but I’m not so sure. It seems to me to be perfectly possible to identify this ‘necessary aspect’ with purely biological functions: that is, the infant ‘in all human societies’ must be taught to feed and water itself, keep itself warm, etc. This is a long way from any notions of ‘individuality’ in any modern sense; after all, most animals go through this process of ‘necessary self development’, which enables them to exist biologically as a species. That is, without an initial stage of close support from (usually) the mother, the ‘infant’ (child/pup/kitten/etc.) would die.The philosophical background to my doubt about your thesis is Marxism. This is an essentially historical ideology, which stresses modes of production and the emergence of ideologies that ‘fit’ with specific ‘real’ circumstances of life. Further, Marx stresses the changes in ideologies over time.So, any theories of ‘individuality’ which focus on the unbroken line between, say, the Ancient Greeks or Christianity, are suspect from the start, from this perspective. I’m sure you’re aware that bourgeois thinkers constantly stress the link between the past and now, in an academic attempt to legitimise what exists ‘now’ by emphasising how little has changed from ‘then’. Ideologically, bourgeois thinkers are compelled to stress the stability and similarity of the ‘transhistorical’, as opposed to the instability and difference of the ‘historical’.I’m not accusing you of ‘bourgeois deviationism’, but merely trying to give some philosophical justification for my doubts!Further, I regard Freud as a quintessential bourgeois ideologist, so I’m very wary of anyone using his ideas to bolster other theses. ALB has mentioned this wariness, too.To finish, given the evidence I’ve provided from Anderson and Callinicos, about societies where humans are regarded as ‘tools’ and as ‘multiplicities’ which extend beyond their own skins, I’m still not convinced about the value for Communists to use a theory of ‘transhistorical individuality’. I think both our ideological basis (theoretical assumptions) and the historical and anthropological evidence from societies other than capitalist society, argue against your stance, comrade.To summarise, ‘individuality’ is a close ideological cousin of ‘individualism’, in my opinion. At best, it is only a biological concept, rather than a social one which is of use for understanding human society and its history.

[robbo203]

LBird wrote:

robbo, since we both agree that ‘individualism’ is entirely historical, I think we can leave that concept alone.But, when we come to your ‘individuality’ as ‘transhistorical’, even you concede that it isn’t.

robbo203 wrote:

Individuality is something different. It has to do with the inner life of the person, the sense of self hood. This is something that is both historical and trans-historical.

So, even ‘individuality’ is ‘both historical and trans-historical’, not just simply ‘transhistorical’. But then you go further:

robbo203 wrote:

That is why I contend that this aspect of individuality is trans historical. It is a necessary built-in aspect of infant development in all human societies. Of course the content of our inner lives is also historically contingent and subject to social influence.

[my bold]So, the apparent essence of ‘individuality’ is ‘inner life’ and ‘self hood’, which is the bit which is ‘transhistorical’. But… even this you concede is ‘historically contingent and subject to social influence’ It seems to me that your thesis depends upon identifying just what the ‘necessary built-in aspect of infant development in all human societies’ consists of. You identify this as ‘individuality’, but I’m not so sure. It seems to me to be perfectly possible to identify this ‘necessary aspect’ with purely biological functions: that is, the infant ‘in all human societies’ must be taught to feed and water itself, keep itself warm, etc. This is a long way from any notions of ‘individuality’ in any modern sense; after all, most animals go through this process of ‘necessary self development’, which enables them to exist biologically as a species. That is, without an initial stage of close support from (usually) the mother, the ‘infant’ (child/pup/kitten/etc.) would die.

Hi L BirdWell, yes, sure there is a biological basis to this in the sense that obviously consciousness  – in this case , awareness of ourselves as individuals –  is dependent on the brain.  But you are still missing the essential point which is that the emergence of this sense of self is the product  of (and is dependent on)  a process of social interaction  and so is not purely a matter of biology. The brain does not automatically or spontaneously generate  or produce  this sense of self awareness on its own, it requires also the intervention of others. It is through interacting with significant others – most particularly of course  the mother – that the infant comes to to recognise the existence of others outside of itself  which, in the process, enables it to define itself as someone separate from these significant others and thus  acquire a sense of self hood.  I repeat this happens in EVERY society without exception (so you are quite wrong to say I "concede" that individuality is not in this respect transhistorical ) but the form that the social interactions take  (which then shapes the individual's particular sense of herself)  is obviously socially conditioned  and historically contingent.  It is for that reason that I say that individuality is BOTH historical  and transhistorical and that this corresponds to the form and the substance of the phenomenon of human individuality . What you are doing, with respect, is confusing this "form" with this "substance" when they need to be analytically distinguished, I don't think this is a particularly Freudian perspective, incidentally,  and as I said to ALB it is quite consonant with Mead's concept of the self.,  Freudian psychology, as I further said,  has been discredited on grounds quite other than what we are talking about – in particular the role it imputes to the unconsciousness mind

[LBird]

robbo203 wrote:

Well, yes, sure there is a biological basis to this in the sense that obviously consciousness – in this case , awareness of ourselves as individuals – is dependent on the brain.

But 'consciousness' or 'awareness' doesn't necessarily mean 'individuality'.The fact that you are interpreting this as 'individuality' is a social product of your experience in this society, and, I would argue, ruling class ideas.But, I won't keep labouring the point: I've given some pointers to societies which interpret this differently, and I'll leave the issue alone, now. Thanks for the comradely discussion, robbo!

[Author]

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