The Division of Labour

[robbo203]

LBird wrote:

robbo203 wrote:

So here's the point Im trying to make: could it be that Marx's preoccupatiuon with the abolition of the division of labour was based on a tacit acceptance of the argument that the division of labour necessitated the existence of a market to mediate between otherwise disconnected and dissimilar individuals…

I don't think the the D of L 'necessitates a market' robbo. All sorts of societies have had a D of L but no market to mediate between 'individuals'.I think 'individualism' is an ideology, not biology.Once all workers, when asked 'Are you an individual?', reply 'No, I'm a worker', then we'll know that we're getting somewhere.The real relations of the market and its ideological excuse both need to be criticised and smashed.We can have a voluntary D of L and still meet the aims of Communism, the building of a society of 'social individuals'. The development of any individual is dependent upon the development of all.

 Oh I perfectly agree that the D of L does not require a market and said as much in an earlier post in which I argued not for its abolition but for a diminution in its extent in communism  (which would happen anyway with the disappearance of money related occupations).  The point is that the D of L  has been conventionally seen as inextricably linked to market exchange ever since Smith penned his "The Wealth oif Nations" and probably earlier.. In  Book 1, Chapter 3 of that work Smith opines thus:As it is the power of exchanging that gives occasion to the division of labour, so the extent of this division must always be limited by the extent of that power, or, in other words, by the extent of the market. When the market is very small, no person can have any encouragement to dedicate himself entirely to one employment, for want of the power to exchange all that surplus part of the produce of his own labour, which is over and above his own consumption, for such parts of the produce of other men’s labour as he has occasion for. Marx of course adopted and developed the labour theory of value as presented by Smith and Ricardo. Im wondering therefore  whether, or to what extent, he might also have bought into this idea of Smith's concerning the relationship between the D of L and the market.   There is a logical symmetry to that after all.  If the D of L goes hand in hand with the market then to want to get rid of the market would seem to imply wanting to get rid of the  D of L as well. Which is precisely what Marx  said he wanted The problem is of course  that, for Smith, increases in material output depended very much  on deepening still further the division of labour in society, not scrapping it.  The ‘meanest labourer’ in 18th-century Scotland  he contended,  was much richer in his annual consumption of goods than the ‘richest’ Indian (and African) Prince and this was all down to the  enhanced division of labour .  We know also that for Marx,  the establishment of communism  was predicated on the capacity to produce  a high level of material  output but if that depended on an enhanced  division of labour then we clearly have a problem here.   You cannot logically stipulate as a precondition of communism both the abolition of the D of L  AND the productive potential for abundance.- if that productive potential is dependent on  the D of L. in the first place    Something has to give.  My question is – what? Like you I consider that Marx was wrong to call for scrapping tjhe division of labour and I consider his thoughts on the matter to be somewhat muddled. There is that famous passage in the German Ideology in which he saysAnd finally, the division of labour offers us the first example of how, as long as man remains in natural society, that is, as long as a cleavage exists between the particular and the common interest, as long, therefore, as activity is not voluntarily, but naturally, divided, man’s own deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of being controlled by him. For as soon as the distribution of labour comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a herdsman, or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood; while in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, herdsman or critic.Now this is confusing because the social division of labour has precisely to do with the proliferation  of  various kinds of occupations in society.  In suggesting some of the kinds of occupations that might exist in a communist society Marx is contradicting himself  having argued that communism is predicated on the abolition of the division of labour. It wont do to say that in the case of a communist society the difference is that one is not forced to take up one kind of occupation to the exclusion of another.  That is not what the D of L is about. Rather it is about the fact that a variety of occupations exist in the first place. Forcing or confining individuals to a particular occupation or "exclusive sphere of activity." has to do with the relations of productions pertaining to a particular society – i.e. capitalism – rather than the division of labour as such Like you and ironically like Marx as well  (though he did not seem to recognise that this is what he was recommending) I subscribe to the notion  of a voluntaristic  division of labour in which individuals chose what activity to undertake rather than have it forced upon them by the conditions of employment or the fear of unemployment Which brings me neatly  to your point about individualism. Yes individualism is an ideology but you need to make a disrinction between individualism and individuality. These are not the same thing. Individualism is essentially an outer-directed ideological stance which has to do with how we realte to others  as self interested atomised actors. and above all within a socio economic context  .  As an ideological construct it is  closely associated with the rise of capitalism.Individuality or individuation on the other hand is inner directed and has to do with  a sense of oneself  – one's self identity.  Psychoanalysts, particularly those in the Freudian tradition, distinguish between different forms of identification , the earliest of which is called primary identification .  At this stage the infant develops a strong emotional attachment to the significant other but is unable to distinguish itself from the latter  whom it sees as merely an extension of itself.  This is followed by a form of identification called narcissistic identification  which derives from  the experience of loss of, or alienation from,  the other in question. The apprehension that our mother, for instance, is an objective or independent being outside of ourselves and not a mere extension of ourselves,  precipitates a growing sense of self awareness in  which the boundaries between the self and others become apparent.  Thus, our ego comes to be constituted via a process of other-objectification within a kind of individuation-separation dialectic. The point Im trying to make is that individuality is to an extent is transhistorical in the sense that it is the outcome of an inevitable  process of socialisation that occurs in all societies. However, and most importantly  it is also a matter of degree inasmuch a  in some societies it is more strongly developed than in others  and this is where we come back to the my earlier comment on Durkheim's distinction between mechanical  solidarity and organic solidarrty.  Where the former is based on social homogeneity, the later is based oin social  differentiation  in which the division of labour plays a  pre-eminent  role I would argue that it is in a highly differentiated society  and thus one based on a highly developed division of labour that individuality will tend to be most pronounced.  A communist society, Marx claimed and as you noted,  would be one in which  the " full and free development of every individual forms the ruling principle" and in which the  " free development of each is the condition for the free development of all" . Far from the individual losing significance and fading from sight,  this would seem to suggest a marked degree of individuality  .  Why that should be so would not simply be due to the fact that a social division of labour would continue to exist in a communist society  but becuase of what follows from the fact that individuals  would be able to more closely approximate the idea of the polytechnic worker Marx imagined would materialise in capitalism as a precondition of communism . It would be because individuals would be able to freely chose what sphere of activity they wished to engage in and so,  to actively constitute themselves as individuals having a distinctive identity and sense of themselves.  This is very different from the kind  of approach that  passively depends on the outer trappings of material possessions  in order to define oneself as individual in the eyes of others.  With that, we relate to others through our possessions; it is objects – commodities – that mediate our social relationships and and atomise us as individuals in relation to one another .  Or to quote  Communist  Manifesto again – the bourgeosie "has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his “natural superiors”, and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous “cash payment”  .  In a sense this is the very opposite of individuality.  It is a retreat from genuine social intercourse and a denial of our social nature  whereas  individuality by contrast is an outgrowth from our social interactions.  Erich Fromm touched on these two radically different modes of existence – a  "being" mode and a "having" mode – in his book "To Have or To Be" (1979) So finally – phew and sorry about the rambling nature of this post! – to turn to your commentOnce all workers, when asked 'Are you an individual?', reply 'No, I'm a worker', then we'll know that we're getting somewhere.Actually, I would argue to the contrary ,  that it is when  workers reply " Im an individual   not  just a worker" that we will know that we are getting somewhere.  That is the paradox of class conscious workers, having reached the stage of a class-for-itself – that they should want to overthew the very economic category in terms of which they organise themselves against a system that enslaves and dehumanises them  and refuses to consider them as anything other than mere units of labour. For such workers, the truly revolutionary thing to do is to insist that they be treated as  human beings.

[LBird]

robbo203 wrote:

The point Im trying to make is that individuality is to an extent is transhistorical in the sense that it is the outcome of an inevitable process of socialisation that occurs in all societies.

[my bold]Isn't this a contradictory statement?If a society doesn't stress 'individuality' in its socialisation processes, why should notions of 'individuality' emerge?No, I think 'individuality' is entirely historical.

Perry Anderson, Passages, pp. 24-5 wrote:

…in Roman theory, the agricultural slave was designated an instrumentum vocale, the speaking tool, one grade away from the livestock that constituted an instrumentum semi-vocale, and two from the implement which was an instrumentum mutum.

Talk about ‘calling a spade, a spade’!Spade, sheep, slave, citizen. No ‘individuality’ there. A gradation which places some humans as tools.I think you underestimate the particularity of ‘individuality’, robbo. It’s entirely an ideological and historical construct, not some biological and transhistorical truth.

[robbo203]

LBird wrote:

robbo203 wrote:

The point Im trying to make is that individuality is to an extent is transhistorical in the sense that it is the outcome of an inevitable process of socialisation that occurs in all societies.

[my bold]Isn't this a contradictory statement?If a society doesn't stress 'individuality' in its socialisation processes, why should notions of 'individuality' emerge?No, I think 'individuality' is entirely historical..

 Perhaps I didnt make myself clear enough.  What I was trying to say was that individuality has both a historical and a transhistorical aspect.  Even the agricultural slave in Ancient Rome which you refer to has some sense of himself or herself as a distinct individual never mind what his or her master may think.  My point being that individuation is inevitably part of a socialisation process that happens in every society  and in that sense is transhistorical. Human societies are not bee colonies.  Individuality does not need to be stressed in that sense; it is an emergent property of socialisation.  Where it is stressed then perhaps  we are talking about the historical aspect of individuality…You might want to argue that individuality is always historical in that it is always stressed – more in some societies and less in others – but that is not the same as saying individuality is entirely historical

[Anonymous]

In a socialist society we are going to have our own individuality which can noy  be confused with individualism,  as we have learned in the capitalist society.  

[LBird]

robbo203 wrote:

Perhaps I didnt make myself clear enough. What I was trying to say was that individuality has both a historical and a transhistorical aspect. Even the agricultural slave in Ancient Rome which you refer to has some sense of himself or herself as a distinct individual never mind what his or her master may think. My point being that individuation is inevitably part of a socialisation process that happens in every society and in that sense is transhistorical. Human societies are not bee colonies. Individuality does not need to be stressed in that sense; it is an emergent property of socialisation. Where it is stressed then perhaps we are talking about the historical aspect of individuality…You might want to argue that individuality is always historical in that it is always stressed – more in some societies and less in others – but that is not the same as saying individuality is entirely historical

No, I think you're making yourself clear, robbo. I just think that I disagree.I see 'individualism' as a product of a particular society, and not as any sort of 'transhistorical' factor in humans.Societies in the past didn't have the concept of 'individual' in the sense we have. Your view about agricultural slaves, it seems to me, is just transposing the way we think now onto the past.Ruling classes always try to 'eternalise' their rule, and present their ideas as 'natural'. I think that this is what happens when people view the past through the lens of our 'ruling ideas' from the present. I regard 'individualism' as historically specific. That's why Descartes' claim of 'I doubt, therefore I think; I think, therefore I am' was so revolutionary. It represented a way of thinking that was entirely new. Before that 'individuals' didn't 'think'; it was left to their 'betters' (like the pope and lords) to do that!This is why I think Anderson's words are so revealing: some humans were 'tools', to the Roman ruling class. When people are treated in a certain way, they act in that way. That is what 'socialisation' is all about.I'm reminded of ruling class ideas when I see episodes of the 60s cartoon, The Flintstones. Many people really think that in the stone age people lived just like in 60s America. Husband going to work, wife at home, couple of kids, family pet, own nuclear family home/cave, neighbours, boss at work, holidays, vacations, etc., etc.No, in the past, people thought differently, and understood themselves and their societies in very different ways to ours.That's one of the reasons that I'm a Communist: I think 'things change', and that includes ideologies.PS. I should quickly say, robbo, that I'm not accusing you of seeing The Flintstones like that! For illustrative purposes only, comrades!

[DJP]

LBird wrote:

Ruling classes always try to 'eternalise' their rule, and present their ideas as 'natural'. I think that this is what happens when people view the past through the lens of our 'ruling ideas' from the present. I regard 'individualism' as historically specific. That's why Descartes' claim of 'I doubt, therefore I think; I think, therefore I am' was so revolutionary. It represented a way of thinking that was entirely new. Before that 'individuals' didn't 'think'; it was left to their 'betters' (like the pope and lords) to do that!

LOL You're not getting the wrong end of the stick again are you!? What was new in Descartes was not the idea that individuals could think or view themselves as individuals but the idea that the only thing that cannot be disolved by scepticism was the fact that if I am thinking there must exist an 'I' that is doing it.Everything could be halucination or deception, the only indisputable thing is that if there is a thought going on something is doing it. It is impossible to disprove the claim that we are just brains in a vat and the richness of our experiences comes from electrical signals fed to us by a mad scientist. But there's no good reason to accept that either. I should know I am a trained philosopher after all.Also the concept of an individual and 'individualism' is not the same thing….

[LBird]

DJP wrote:

LOL You're not getting the wrong end of the stick again are you!? …. I should know I am a trained philosopher after all.Also the concept of an individual and 'individualism' is not the same thing….

Would you like to give the rest of us the benefit of your 'training', DJP, and explain how either 'individualism' or 'the concept of an individual' are 'transhistorical', as robbo203 suggests?

[DJP]

LBird wrote:

Would you like to give the rest of us the benefit of your 'training', DJP, and explain how either 'individualism' or 'the concept of an individual' are 'transhistorical', as robbo203 suggests?

My expert training tells me to tell you to re-read post 48. 

[LBird]

DJP wrote:

LBird wrote:

Would you like to give the rest of us the benefit of your 'training', DJP, and explain how either 'individualism' or 'the concept of an individual' are 'transhistorical', as robbo203 suggests?

My expert training tells me to tell you to re-read post 48. 

Wow! And that's what 'philosophy training' gives one, eh? Boy, I'm impressed.Anyone else care to discuss robbo203's suggestion about 'transhistorical individualism', and my counter-suggestion about 'historically specific individualism'?

[Anonymous]

LBird wrote:

Anyone else care to discuss robbo203's suggestion about 'transhistorical individualism', and my counter-suggestion about 'historically specific individualism'?

Not really. What was it Marx said in The German Ideology……..

[DJP]

LBird wrote:

Anyone else care to discuss robbo203's suggestion about 'transhistorical individualism', and my counter-suggestion about 'historically specific individualism'?

If you want to think there was a period in time when people did not distinguish there own arse from the others elbow be my guest. But it seems to me that survival of the species requires some sense of the individual. If not I would not be able to distinguish my pains or my hungers as my own and would soon get into trouble.But of course the sense of what an individual is and how it is related to a seperated from the group does change over time, no one has denied that.

[robbo203]

LBird wrote:

No, I think you're making yourself clear, robbo. I just think that I disagree.I see 'individualism' as a product of a particular society, and not as any sort of 'trans historical' factor in humans.Societies in the past didn't have the concept of 'individual' in the sense we have. Your view about agricultural slaves, it seems to me, is just transposing the way we think now onto the past.

 Hi L Bird But I wasn't talking about "!individualism"!  I agree – individualism is a relatively recent ideological phenomenon and, as I pointed out earlier, closely associated with the rise of capitalism.  Individuality, on the other hand,  means something quite  different to individualism and I attempted to explain the difference in an earlier post   I maintain that individuality is part historical and part trans-historical in  the sense that it is an inevitable outcome of a socialisation process which happens in every society..There is a useful discussion of these terms in Abercrombie, Hill and  Turner's influential book Sovereign Individuals of Capitalism  (1986)  in which they too draw a sharp distinction between individualism and individuality Robin

[Brian]

By the way, from a materialist perspective Descates' got it wrong.  Indeed he forgot to put his individual thinking cap on regarding an understanding of matter.  Matter is primary and its impossible to isolate the individual thinking process from it. Which means in effect 'I am, therefore I think'.

[DJP]

Brian wrote:

By the way, from a materialist perspective Descates' got it wrong.  Indeed he forgot to put his individual thinking cap on regarding an understanding of matter.  Matter is primary and its impossible to isolate the individual thinking process from it. Which means in effect 'I am, therefore I think'.

Actually Descartes was wrong but not for the reason given here. He assumed an "I", a self, when by his own logic he should not have. So he should have said "it thinks, therefore thinking" or something like that…Now Brian, for the purposes of this thought experiment, what irrefutable reason have you got for thinking that matter exists? Lets presume that all our sensations and perceptions are just fed to us by an evil demon that is trying to deceive us. How can we prove that this is not the case?

[Brian]

DJP wrote:

Brian wrote:

By the way, from a materialist perspective Descates' got it wrong.  Indeed he forgot to put his individual thinking cap on regarding an understanding of matter.  Matter is primary and its impossible to isolate the individual thinking process from it. Which means in effect 'I am, therefore I think'.

Actually Descartes was wrong but not for the reason given here. He assumed an "I", a self, when by his own logic he should not have. So he should have said "it thinks, therefore thinking" or something like that…Now Brian, for the purposes of this thought experiment, what irrefutable reason have you got for thinking that matter exists?  Lets presume that all our sensations and perceptions are just fed to us by an evil demon that is trying to deceive us. How can we prove that this is not the case?

From a materialist perspective I would say you are going off topic!  What have demons got to do with alienation and the division of labour?I was merely correcting Descartes materialistically not philosophically.

[Author]

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