Stephen Hawking’s error
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From an interview in today's Times:
Quote:"Since civilisation began, aggression has been useful inasmuch as it has definite survival advantages," he said. "It is hard-wired into our genes by Darwinian evolution. Now, however, technology has advanced at such a pace that this aggression may destroy us all by nuclear or biological war. We need to control this inherited instinct by our logic and reason."Agression "hard-wired into our genes", an "inherited instinct". Oh dear.
Further evidence that to be a genius in one subject, doesn't make it so in another topic, outside of your disciplnscope of expertiseBen Carson in America is similar …a fantastic neuro-surgeon by all respects but nevertheless a foolish politician.
Disappointing from Hawkin. He is no Einstein politically. He will need to try harder. Has been distracted by seeing Labour Party or governments funding as part of a solution instead of thinking outside the capitalist mind prison.
Modern anthropology has taught us, through comparative investigation of so-called primitive cultures, that the social behavior of human beings may differ greatly, depending upon prevailing cultural patterns and the types of organization which predominate in society. It is on this that those who are striving to improve the lot of man may ground their hopes: human beings are not condemned, because of their biological constitution, to annihilate each other or to be at the mercy of a cruel, self-inflicted fate. https://monthlyreview.org/2009/05/01/why-socialism/
Engels wrote: Scientists are materialists on their laboratory, and methaphysical in their private life
He's said it again:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-40461726
Quote:He also feared aggression was "inbuilt" in humansThough I suppose it could be argued that he has downgraded his view from an assertion to a fear.
alanjjohnstone wrote:Further evidence that to be a genius in one subjects, doesn't make it so in another topic, outside of your disciplnscope of expertiseYep. He doesn't keep up on subject outside of his speciality. Surely he can google. It is not just us socialists that think Mr Hawkins is wrong: "For many years, it was believed that the human brain is essentially hardwired—that we are born with a set of cognitive abilities, which are more or less unalterable for the rest of our lives. But the discovery of neuroplasticity—our brain’s ability to selectively transform itself in response to certain experiences—has proven to be one of the biggest paradigm shifts that neuroscience has seen over the last 25 years. Simply put, neuroplasticity refers to our brain’s malleability—its ability to respond to certain intrinsic or extrinsic stimuli by reorganizing and building its structure, function and connections (NCBI)." "The fact that our brain doesn’t just absorb—but can also re-wire itself in response to certain repeated activities and experiences—has opened new opportunities for cognitive therapy. " https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/driven-distraction/201401/your-brain-is-not-the-hard-wired-machine-you-think-it-is
I would strike a note of caution on this whole neuroplasticity thing."The reality is that most self-induced and lasting changes to brain function are hard-won, unpredictable and almost always limited in their scope. Yes, neuroplasticity can occur, but very many, and perhaps even most, aspects of brain function are deeply resistant to change. What is more, this is usually a very good thing.Sure, if our brains were infinitely plastic, then we’d never have to worry about brain injuries again and we really could make ourselves into exactly the kind of person we think we want to be. But there is an inescapable flip-side to such extreme malleability. Any change we do make would be apt to unravel as soon as our circumstances change. We’d be tossed around on the sea of experience like a lifeboat in a storm, constantly re-inventing ourselves. Our brains’ robustness insulates crucial mental processes from being derailed by external influences; it also gives us the ability to form memories and emotional responses that are so crucial for our sense of self, and for this sense to have some continuity through our lives."https://medium.com/@mountainogre/beware-the-neuroplasticity-hype-e448d4efd119
I don't think we are necessarily committed to the view that everybody's (or anybody's) individual behaviour is flexible (though this may be the case) but rather to the view that human social behaviour is, as witnessed by the great variety of behaviour patterns throughout the history of our species, and so a fixed "human nature" is not a barrier to a socialist society working.
Interesting talk here which touches on the subject of "neuroplasticity":http://www.taraswart.com/tedx-lse-neuroscience-nationalism/
On the other hand, he has redeemed himself with this:
https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/science/stephen-hawking-claims-no-possibility-god-last-book-ncna921806
This so called “Darwinian” view was not in fact the view of Darwin at all as regards ‘man’.
As this ‘moral sense’ and ‘conscience’ will causes a lot of buttock clenching with materialist ‘Marxists’.
What it is about is a social instinct or instinctive co-operative behaviour.
Eg Pannekoek and Kropotkin
Fred employed the idea and phrase ‘social instinct’; after Darwin’s second book.
Actually Darwin’s position in 1871 was the same as Fuerbachs and Karl’s before 1844.
Karl dropped it later after Stirner because there was no materialist or natural explanation for it, or Fuerbach’s human essence.
Darwin provided a theoretical explanation for it; “from the side of natural history”.
“……….I fully subscribe to the judgment of those writers1 who maintain that of all the differences between man and the lower animals, the moral sense or conscience is by far the most important. This sense, as Mackintosh2 remarks, “has a rightful supremacy over every other principle of human action;” it is summed up in that short but imperious word ought, so full of high significance. It is the most noble of all the attributes of man, leading him without a moment’s hesitation to risk his life for that of a fellow-creature; or after due deliberation, impelled simply by the deep feeling of right or duty, to sacrifice it in some great cause. Immanuel Kant exclaims, “Duty! Wondrous thought, that workest neither by fond insinuation, flattery, nor by any threat, but merely by holding up thy naked law in the soul, and so extorting for thyself always
This great question has been discussed by many writers4 of consummate ability; and my sole excuse for touching on it is the impossibility of here passing it over, and because, as far as I know, no one has approached it exclusively from the side of natural history. The investigation possesses, also, some independent interest, as an attempt to see how far the study of the lower animals can throw light on one of the highest psychical faculties of man.
The following proposition seems to me in a high degree probable—namely, that any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts,5 would inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience, as soon as
3 ‘Metaphysics of Ethics,’ translated by J. W. Semple, Edinburgh, 1836, p. 136.
4 Mr. Bain gives a list (‘Mental and Moral Science,’ 1868, p. 543-725) of twenty-six British authors who have written on this subject, and whose names are familiar to every reader; to these, Mr. Bain’s own name, and those of Mr. Lecky, Mr. Shadworth Hodgson, and Sir J. Lubbock, as well as of others, may be added.
5 Sir B. Brodie, after observing that man is a social animal (‘Psychological Enquiries,’ 1854, p. 192), asks the pregnant question, “ought not this to settle the disputed question as to the existence of a moral sense?” Similar ideas have probably occurred to many persons, as they did long ago to Marcus Aurelius. Mr. J. S. Mill speaks, in his celebrated work, ‘Utilitarianism,’ (1864, p. 46), of the social feelings as a “powerful natural sentiment,” and as “the natural basis of sentiment for utilitarian morality;” but on the previous page he says, “if, as is my own belief, the moral feelings are not innate, but acquired, they are not for that reason less natural.” It is with hesitation that I venture to differ from so profound a thinker, but it can hardly be disputed that the social feelings are instinctive or innate in the lower animals; and why should they not be so in man? Mr. Bain (see, for instance, ‘The Emotions and the Will,’ 1865, p. 481) and others believe that the moral sense is acquired by each individual during his lifetime. On the general theory of evolution this is at least extremely improbable.
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its intellectual powers had become as well developed, or nearly as well developed, as in man. For, firstly, the social instincts lead an animal to take pleasure in the society of its fellows, to feel a certain amount of sympathy with them, and to perform various services for them. The services may be of a definite and evidently instinctive nature; or there may be only a wish and readiness, as with most of the higher social animals, to aid their fellows in certain general ways. But these feelings and services are by no means extended to all the individuals of the same species, only to those of the same association.
Secondly, as soon as the mental faculties had become highly developed, images of all past actions and motives would be incessantly passing through the brain of each individual; and that feeling of dissatisfaction which invariably results, as we shall hereafter see, from any unsatisfied instinct, would arise, as often as it was perceived that the enduring and always present social instinct had yielded to some other instinct, at the time stronger, but neither enduring in its nature, nor leaving behind it a very vivid impression. It is clear that many instinctive desires, such as that of hunger, are in their nature of short duration; and after being satisfied are not readily or vividly recalled. Thirdly, after the power of language had been acquired and the wishes of the members of the same community could be distinctly expressed, the common opinion how each member ought to act for the public good, would naturally become to a large extent the guide to action. But the social instincts would still give the impulse to act for the good of the community, this impulse being strengthened, directed, and sometimes even deflected by public opinion, the power of which rests, as we shall presently see, on instinctive sympathy. Lastly, habit in the individual would ultimately play a very
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important part in guiding the conduct of each member; for the social instincts and impulses, like all other instincts, would be greatly strengthened by habit, as would obedience to the wishes and judgment of the community. These several subordinate propositions must now be discussed; and some of them at considerable length………….”
http://darwin-online.org.uk/converted/published/1871_Descent_F937/1871_Descent_F937.1.html
Of course if we are motivated or feel the urge to do something and it is for our own self gratification or egotism then any blockhead like Stirner, or a Marxist materialists, can understand that without much trouble.
However if we are motivated by something altruistic, or observe it, we are inclined to attempt to make some ‘sense’ of it; as we are with everything.
Eg Kant.
But we can also attempt to make sense of things ‘metaphysically’ eg by supernatural forces at work etc.
Thus it is possible that the observations and experience, or in this case feelings of ‘moral sense’ and ‘conscience’, could generate a ‘flawed explanation’ or idea.
Rather than the other way around.
Thus;
If you were too look at the Essence of [early] Christianity; in a Fuerbachian sense.
[The Essence of [early] Christianity has as much to do with modern Christianity as early Marxism has to do with Stalinism. It probably took about 400 years to flip early Christianity the self described Marxist did it in less than 40.]
Then, if that was the case, the social co-operative [‘base’] instinct comes first and early Christianity is the ‘super-structural’ paraphernalia that is supposed to fit around it.
And if that was the case; it would turning things on its head so say that that ‘super-structural’ paraphernalia causes some kind of ‘moral sense’ rather than being an effect of it.
That was why people like Fred, Kautky and Rosa felt it safe to revisit early ‘communist’ Christianity after Darwin’s second book.
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