Science for Communists?

[DJP]

LBird wrote:

To 'God', for example, I can add 'Value'.Neither god nor value have substance (or as Marx says, 'not an atom of matter'), but are 'real', nevertheless.Since your ideology of physicalism defines 'real' as 'material', DJP, you can't agree with me.

So presumably you think that materialism entails denying the existence of patterns and relationships? Neither of these are "material" either.You still haven't explained what "causal powers" are and how they exert their influence.

[DJP]

LBird wrote:

3. Knowledge=product of interaction between Subject (NB. a society, not an individual) and Object (Social Objectivism, Critical Realism, 'the practice of idealism-materialism', Marxism)=Truth as a social and historical Product.

I don't have any problems with this as a description of knowledge that produces small t "truth". But this is not incompatible with materialism.But if you reject materialism, what is the "object"?My ideology is Pastafarianism BTW.

[LBird]

YMS wrote:

I note that Lbird declines to explain the consequence of voting in any practical manner.

Spoken like a true 'practical man', the bourgeois who distains to philosophise, and wants to move immediately to 'practical matters'.Your method involves jumping in, feet first, to 'the real world' (copyright, Conservative Philosophy, Ltd.).No matter how many times I say it, you ignore Marx's method of 'theory and practice', which requires 'theory' to be addressed first.As all theory is ideological, I'm trying to expose both my ideology and yours (and DJP's, Vin's, ALB's, etc.), precisely so we can move on to employing our Communist theory in the world, both social and natural.Now, I've done this 'exposing' of myself from the very start (in fact, the thread title says it all), but you (et al) have consistently refused to expose your ideology to the gaze of other posters.You apparently don't even recognise the word, tossing it around like dog with an unfamiliar animal bone: "Ideology? What does that mean? Let's discuss 'ideology' and its manifold meanings… Why, once, as Wittgenstein said to me, or was it Kant…  no, no, it was Schopenhauer…".I'm a Marxist and a Communist, YMS, stop prevaricating and playing silly. If you're not, I'm not interested on this thread in discussing these thinkers with you. Start a new thread called 'Science for bourgeois liberals', or some such.And indeed, take your hatred of democracy somewhere else.I'm not interested in talking to elitist liberals, but democratic Communists.Why do you keep pestering me, with your meaningless, non-Communist, non-democratic, ideological musings?

[LBird]

DJP wrote:

LBird wrote:

3. Knowledge=product of interaction between Subject (NB. a society, not an individual) and Object (Social Objectivism, Critical Realism, 'the practice of idealism-materialism', Marxism)=Truth as a social and historical Product.

I don't have any problems with this as a description of knowledge that produces small t "truth". But this is not incompatible with materialism.But if you reject materialism, what is the "object"?

[my bold]Yes, it is incompatible with materialism.It's 'idealism-materialism'. Why won't you read what I'm writing?The 'Object' is the 'Real'. We've done this dozens of times, and even ALB has provide you with Dietzgen's quote.You're not a Critical Realist, you're a 'physicalist/materialist'.If you're wanting to use 'materialism', that's fine by me, but why continue to post on a thread about 'idealism-materialism'?Why not start your own thread, named 'Science for materialists?'I can't take a discussion about Critical Realism forward, if you can't accept the tenets of it as the basis for a discussion about 'Science and Communists'.You're thinking and discussing at cross-purposes, and you won't get any joy out of it.Put simply, unless you think that the material and ideal have the same ontological status, as do Marx, me, Dietzgen and (apparently now) ALB, you won't understand the discussion.You'll just keep saying 'That's not true!' – and it won't be, from your ideological perspective.

[Young Master Smeet]

So much for theory and practice, and the architect who unlike bees sees his vision whole in his mind before he commits it to paper.  Labird cannot even, in theory, explain how voting relates to knowledge and the scientific process, beyond a mere fetish for voting.  Lbird demonstrates a misunderstanding of democracy: democracy is the organisation of the people by the people themselves.  Now, ISTR is was Neurath who distinguished between democracy between enemies (where you count up how many guns each side has, and declare the numerically superior team to be the winners) and democracy between friends, the process, say, whereby since you are agreed to go to the cinema together, you negotiate and all go to see the same film, despite it not being the first preference of some of the gang.  Now, in the context of a socialist community, obviously, sometimes we're going to need to make such calls.  We'll need to decide whether to act if AGW is true, because that is something that connects us in our ongoing communal existence.  Whether 1 kilo is a litre of water at 4C at sea level is something we will have to agree, in order to have authoritative weights for our industry.  Whether pulsars are made of dark matter or string is something we can agree to disagree on and still be friends.

[ALB]

I still think that "materialism", even "physicalism", is not incompatible with a "monist" view which gives equal status to physical and non-physical stuff as long as it is considered one theory of the relationship between the physical and the non-physical parts of this "monist" world. After all, I'm prepared (like Dietzgen and Pannekoek) to call myself a "materialist" in the monist sense (of "stuff", i.e. "matter", being both the physical and the non-physical). I must confess, though, that I'm not too keen on the term "physicalism".

[DJP]

This description and defence of a realistic materialist monism is pretty good, though I'm not sure I would take a panpsychist position as Strawson (and Deitzgen) do. Though perhaps that is me being inconsistent. As far as philosophy of mind is concerned this is my "ideology" LBird…http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Strawson.html

[LBird]

ALB wrote:

I still think that "materialism", even "physicalism", is not incompatible with a "monist" view which gives equal status to physical and non-physical stuff as long as it is considered one theory of the relationship between the physical and the non-physical parts of this "monist" world.

I don't agree, ALB.To me, the simple test is to ask any random physicalist if the material can supervene on the ideal.For us, given the ontological identity of 'material' and 'ideal', we would answer 'yes'.For physicalists, the relationship, with 'base' at bottom, is:IdealMaterial; orMaterialMaterial.Whereas for us, the relationship can be:IdealMaterial; orMaterialMaterial; orMaterialIdeal; orIdealIdeal.And so on, with ideal appearing at any point in a hierarchy.This is clearly opposed to Engels' nonsense about 'in the final analysis'.

ALB wrote:

I'm prepared (like Dietzgen and Pannekoek) to call myself a "materialist" in the monist sense (of "stuff", i.e. "matter", being both the physical and the non-physical). I must confess, though, that I'm not too keen on the term "physicalism".

This is mostly my position, too.As long as 'materialist' is amended to 'realist', to keep things clear. Why cause difficulties for workers who will necessarily come to these issues in the future?If we continue to use the term 'material', they'll think we mean 'material'. And we don't, do we?At least 'real' will cause them to ask, 'what does that mean?', and we can answer 'material and ideal'.

[LBird]

DJP wrote:

This description and defence of a realistic materialist monism is pretty good, though I'm not sure I would take a panpsychist position as Strawson (and Deitzgen) do. Though perhaps that is me being inconsistent. As far as philosophy of mind is concerned this is my "ideology" LBird…http://cognet.mit.edu/posters/TUCSON3/Strawson.html

Thanks for that, DJP.

Galen Strawson wrote:

Materialists hold that every thing and event in the universe is physical in every respect. They hold that "physical phenomenon" is coextensive with "real phenomenon," or at least with "real, concrete phenomenon," and for the purposes of this chapter I am going to assume that they are right.

As I been saying for months (and threads), you follow Strawson, whose ideology is 'real=physical=material=concrete'.This is different to Marx and Dietzgen's ideology, which is 'real=(material/physical/concrete) or ideal'.So, DJP, mate, comrade, you won't agree with Critical Realism.It seems pointless me continuing, to the echo of "That's not true!" and "That's idealism!".We obviously don't share the same scientific ideology. We'd have to prefix every comment by "According to x ideology…", where 'x' would represent either 'Critical Realism' or 'Materialism', depending upon who's posting the comment. It would be very tiresome, when the better option is to keep this thread for those who want to get to grips with CR, and let you and the other physicalists/materialists start their own thread.What more can I say? You could call it "Science for proper, concrete, hard-as-nails Marxists, and non of those idealist counter-revolutionaries, like LBird", and I won't post on it.

[DJP]

LBird wrote:

At least 'real' will cause them to ask, 'what does that mean?', and we can answer 'material and ideal'.

And then awkward buggers like me will ask what do you mean by 'material' and 'ideal' and what it is that separates the two?

[DJP]

LBird wrote:

This is different to Marx and Dietzgen's ideology, which is 'real=(material/physical/concrete) or ideal'.

There's no Dualism in Marx or Dietzgen so this is wrong. And as far as I know this is not the definition of "real" that is put forward by the critical realists either (see previous posts in the thread)…

[LBird]

DJP wrote:

LBird wrote:

At least 'real' will cause them to ask, 'what does that mean?', and we can answer 'material and ideal'.

And then awkward buggers like me will ask what do you mean by 'material' and 'ideal' and what it is that seperates the two?

That's fine by me!But, don't forget, if they've read Dietzgen…Your questions will probably be meaningless to workers who want to understand the natural and the social. And like Marx, demand a unified method for doing so.On the other hand, if workers want to remain in thrall to 'materialism', they'll turn to the elite, who, they are told, have a special consciousness, which means that the workers need not trouble themselves about these complex issues of science, epistemology, ontology… errr… production, distribution, consumption…

[LBird]

DJP wrote:

LBird wrote:

This is different to Marx and Dietzgen's ideology, which is 'real=(material/physical/concrete) or ideal'.

There's no Dualism in Marx or Dietzgen so this is wrong. And as far as I know this is not the definition of "real" that is put forward by the critical realists either (see previous posts in the thread)…

There's no dualism in Marx, Dietzgen, Critical Realists or my views either.The ideal and the material are understood using the same method.I've said it before (but I've said most of these things before), but you seem to be interested in 'being', whereas Marx was interested in 'understanding'.That is, what 'reality really is' outside of humans; as opposed to what 'humans understand about reality', which unavoidably involves humans.Or, 'The Truth', as opposed to 'our truth'.Or, 'something which tells us', as opposed to 'something we produce'.Or, 'passive reflection' of the existing, as opposed to 'critical creation' of the new.

[ALB]

LBird wrote:

ALB wrote:

I still think that "materialism", even "physicalism", is not incompatible with a "monist" view which gives equal status to physical and non-physical stuff as long as it is considered one theory of the relationship between the physical and the non-physical parts of this "monist" world.

I don't agree, ALB.To me, the simple test is to ask any random physicalist if the material can supervene on the ideal.For us, given the ontological identity of 'material' and 'ideal', we would answer 'yes'.

As so often, we are talking at cross purposes. I'm not talking about the content of a theory but about its status. No doubt some of those who call themselves "materialists" or "physicalists" do think that the physical does "supervene" on the non-physical in "reality" (and so are "dualists"). But It's a theory and, as we are agreed (or at least I am), theories are descriptions of phenomena that are either useful or not useful in terms of predicting the future course of phenomena, useful or not useful that is for human survival and its improvement.As such a description "physicalism" may or may not be useful. It could well be, since this would explain why it can be said that the physical preceded in time the non-physical and why it cannot be said that the mind can exist separate from the body. In fact, I would say it's got a lot going for it as a useful description (even though I don't like the word).In other words, "physicalism" is one among other theories describing the passing world of phenomena. It's not a theory of the nature of reality or, if someone of its adherents say it is, they are mistaken (now that we can use this word).

[DJP]

ALB wrote:

No doubt some of those who call themselves "materialists" or "physicalists" do think that the physical does "supervene" on the non-physical in "reality" (and so are "dualists").

Bear in mind there are two kinds of dualism. Property dualism (there are two kinds of properties mental and physcal) is compatible with materialist monism whilst substance dualism (there are two kinds of substances the mental and the physical) is not.Strawson is a property dualist and he makes the distinction between "stuff monism" and  "thing monism".

wikipedia wrote:

According to stuff monism there is only one kind of stuff (e.g. matter or mind), although there may be many things made out of this stuff. According to thing-monism there exists strictly speaking only a single thing (e.g. the universe), which can only be artificially and arbitrarily divided into many things.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monism

Note I'm only mentioning Strawson because he mentions stuff that seems useful to our discussion. I haven't read that much of his stuff but have previously heard of him in the textbooks…

[Author]

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