Science for Communists?

[Anonymous]

LBird wrote:

Vin Maratty wrote:

LBird wrote:

That's why the bourgeoisie can't 'see' 'value', whereas we Communists can.

 How come I can see it?  

Perhaps you're an omniscient god, Vin.

You haven't an answer so it is the usual nasty uncomradely comment.. Why is it that a crass materialist, Stalinist and Leninist like myself  can see what only critical realists can see?

[DJP]

LBird wrote:

What about the 'physical' that 'supervenes' upon 'ideas'?

There is no physical that supervenes on ideas, that is not what supervenience means.Third time lucky…. The upper levels supervene on the lower..

LBird wrote:

Humans 'create' their world of knowledge, understanding and explanation, of production, distribution and consumption, much of which is not 'physical' in any meaningful sense, and much of which is the product of 'ideas', rather than the 'physical', so why the emphasis upon the 'physical'?

There is no particular "emphasis on the physical". It depends on what level of explanation is relevant to what you want to explain..

[LBird]

DJP wrote:

There is no physical that supervenes on ideas, that is not what supervenience means.

Yes, if the ideological definition of 'supervenience' is 'ideas on physical', then of course there isn't.But this is what I've been trying to explain about 'ideology' and 'meaning'.The point is, there is another ideology that does not accept the ideological belief that supervenience means ideas on physical.If that's your ideology, why not accept it and say so?And say that you reject 'Critical Realism'?It's pointless pretending that your ideology is 'objective', and claiming Marx's isn't.Humans are ideological. We have to deal with this knowledge produced by science.

[ALB]

I think you are mixing up two things here LBird. The nature of "reality" and explanations of the phenomena that are part of it. The physical and ideas are equally "real" but that does not preclude explaining ideas (as one part of "reality") as being dependent in some way on the physical  (as another part of "reality"). You seem to be accusing people who take up explanations of this kind as being crude "materialists" who say that ideas are not as "real" as physical things. But this is not the case.I don't know if this is your position but you seem to be saying that all "reality" is psycho-physical or something along those lines. I don't know because you haven't yet defined what you mean by "reality". But from what you have said so far I'm not sure that the  "realism" of "critical realism" is the correct word since, as DJP has been pointing out, traditionally in philosophy "realist" theories argue that knowledge is a "true" picture/description of "reality", a position you've been vehementally opposing all along. But we'll see when you get round to saying what "critical realism" means by "reality". All we've had so far is a mention of some mysterious "non-phyiscal causal powers".

[LBird]

ALB wrote:

I don't know if this is your position but you seem to be saying that all "reality" is psycho-physical or something along those lines.

I still can't believe, after 12 months and numerous statements to the opposite, that you think I'm arguing that 'all reality is psycho-physical'. I've constantly said 'reality' is external to humans, and existed prior to humans.The only way I can make sense of your continuing belief in that as 'what I'm saying' is your own ideological blinkers.

ALB wrote:

I don't know because you haven't yet defined what you mean by "reality". But from what you have said so far I'm not sure that the "realism" of "critical realism" is the correct word since, as DJP has been pointing out, traditionally in philosophy "realist" theories argue that knowledge is a "true" picture/description of "reality", a position you've been vehementally opposing all along.

I have said what CR means by reality: components, structures, emergent properties, causal mechanisms. I spent a whole long post explaining this, and no-one engaged with my post (as opposed to laughing at Bhaskar).You really must stop taking DJP's opinions as gospel, and start trying to ask yourself: "what ideology is DJP espousing, as compared to the ideology that LBird is espousing?". This will allow you, perhaps, to identify your ideology. If you agree with DJP, that's fine, but then you don't agree with me (or, I'd argue, Marx).

ALB wrote:

But we'll see when you get round to saying what "critical realism" means by "reality". All we've had so far is a mention of some mysterious "non-phyiscal causal powers".

Yes, to a certain ideological perspective in science, Marx's concept of 'value' is merely "some mysterious non-physical causal power", which can't be 'touched', and requires one to embrace a 'theory' to understand it.Once more, I think that you and DJP want to be 'at one with reality'; in other words, you're searching for The Truth of 'what's real'. On the contrary, Marx was engaged in a search to 'understand' reality.But 'understanding' is human (and thus social and historical) and so is not a 'copy' of 'reality'.I think you want to have a final Truth about what is 'real'. That's positivism, not Marxism.

[LBird]

ALB and DJP, I'm trying to explain our differences.I think you want to know what 'reality' really 'is'.Whereas I (and Marx) want to know what 'humans think reality is'.Or, you're interested in 'reality' outside of any human input; whereas I (and Marx) are interested in 'reality' in its interaction with humans.

Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, 2, wrote:

The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth — i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking that is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question.

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/theses.htmTrying to get to the truth of 'reality' (what 'is') outside of human theory and practice upon that reality, is, to Marx, 'a purely scholastic question'.Perhaps another way of putting it, is that you're interested in 'ontology' ('being') rather than 'epistemology' ('knowledge').19th century Positivism thought it was revealing 'being' with its 'neutral' method.We now know that science is concerned with human understanding, rather than the 'Truth' of 'stuff'.'Knowledge' is always human, rather than 'objective' (that is, the truth about stuff itself).

[ALB]

LBird wrote:

I still can't believe, after 12 months and numerous statements to the opposite, that you think I'm arguing that 'all reality is psycho-physical'. I've constantly said 'reality' is external to humans, and existed prior to humans.

I never actually said that you argued this but was just trying to work out what you do argue. Incidentally, arguing that "reality is psycho-physical" would not be arguing that "reality" is not external to human beings though, I agree, it would mean that it wouldn't have existed prior to humans. But since you confirm that this is not your position there is no point in pursuing this further.I do note, though, that in saying that "reality" existed prior to humans, you are conceding DJP's point that the physical part of reality existed before the ideas part.

LBird wrote:

I have said what CR means by reality: components, structures, emergent properties, causal mechanisms. I spent a whole long post explaining this, and no-one engaged with my post (as opposed to laughing at Bhaskar).

I see (actually, to tell the truth, I don't). I thought you agreed that it was humans that identified "components",  "structures", "properties" and "causal mechanisms" and that the ways in which they did this depended on their "ideology". Hence different "realities" for people with different ideolologies and cultures. And your oft-repeated contention that it was once "reality" that the Sun went round the Earth.                        

LBird wrote:

You really must stop taking DJP's opinions as gospel, and start trying to ask yourself: "what ideology is DJP espousing, as compared to the ideology that LBird is espousing?". This will allow you, perhaps, to identify your ideology. If you agree with DJP, that's fine, but then you don't agree with me (or, I'd argue, Marx).

I can see where DJP is coming from: the sort of "dialectal" (as opposed to "mechanical") "materialism" espoused by Dietzgen and Pannekoek. I'm not too sure where you are coming from. It seems to be the "critical realism" of this Bashkar character. As to Marx, he was clearly a "materialist" in the broad sense of holding that "reality" is external to humans and existed prior to them and also held that the human mind plays an active role in trying to understand "external reality" and does not simply reflect it as a "mechanical materialist" like Lenin did. All three of you are socialist/communists.

LBird wrote:

Yes, to a certain ideological perspective in science, Marx's concept of 'value' is merely "some mysterious non-physical causal power", which can't be 'touched', and requires one to embrace a 'theory' to understand it.

I'm not saying that non-physical phenomena can't play a role in explaining/understanding parts of reality but so can physical. I'm not sure whether or not your point is that only the non-physical can.

LBird wrote:

Once more, I think that you and DJP want to be 'at one with reality'; in other words, you're searching for The Truth of 'what's real'.

But isn't just what you've just said with your talk of components, structures, properties and causal mechanisms that you are trying to do?

LBird wrote:

On the contrary, Marx was engaged in a search to 'understand' reality.But 'understanding' is human (and thus social and historical) and so is not a 'copy' of 'reality'.

Exactly, Some agreement at last.

LBird wrote:

I think you want to have a final Truth about what is 'real'. That's positivism, not Marxism.

It's certainly not Marxism. But I don't think it's positivism either. I thought positivists argue that all that exists are the phenomena we experience and that there is no "ultimate reality" behind them and that knowledge consists of accurate and useful predictions about the future course of phenomenon. I can see that you are not one with your view that there is an ultimate reality behind the world of phenomena consisting of structures, emergent properties, causal mechanisms, etc. Perhaps I'm wrong after all and "critical realism" is a species of realism after all.

[LBird]

ALB wrote:

I do note, though, that in saying that "reality" existed prior to humans, you are conceding DJP's point that the physical part of reality existed before the ideas part.

I'm not 'conceding DJP's point'.'Reality' existed prior to humans, but the 'idea' of it being 'physical' is a human idea.This is part of the problem. DJP's ideology insists that the 'physical' is 'being', whereas it's part of 'human knowledge', as are 'ideas'. After all, is the 'space' between 'electrons and protons' physical in any meaningful sense?To insist that the 'physical' is the 'real', the 'basis' of reality, like DJP's post's diagram showed, is an ideological position, not something that 'reality' told us (or DJP, or told the thinkers he gets his ideas from).

ALB wrote:

And your oft-repeated contention that it was once "reality" that the Sun went round the Earth.

This is not what I keep saying. I keep saying it was 'the truth' that the sun went round the earth, not 'reality'. No-one 'knows' reality in itself. If they claim to 'know reality in itself', why don't these people tell us the 'method' that they use, to get to this truth? They don't, because they can't. Science teaches us this.'Truth' is socially-produced, but your ideology tells you that 'truth' is the same as 'reality'. That's why you interchange the words 'truth' and 'reality' and put words in my mouth, and can't understand my claim, because to your ideology it is meaningless to separate 'truth' from 'reality'.

ALB wrote:

As to Marx, he was clearly a "materialist" in the broad sense of holding that "reality" is external to humans and existed prior to them and also held that the human mind plays an active role in trying to understand "external reality" and does not simply reflect it as a "mechanical materialist" like Lenin did.

Yeah, 'external', 'prior', 'active role', 'understanding' and 'not a reflection'.So, how do you keep saying 'truth' is the same as 'reality'?Marx's method allows us to understand the history of 'truth', and its social origins.But if 'truth' is 'reality', it can only happen once. Thus, one falls into 'discovery science', of uncovering The Truth, the reality of reality, of being, final, absolute, mirror-like knowledge of reality.As I keep asking, if DJP has a method that tells us his schema of placing the 'physical' at the bottom is true, why not tell us it?Or did 'reality' tell him? Or is it 'just obvious', to any 'individual'?Critical Realists have no problem whatsoever in saying that 'structures, components, emergent properties and causal mechanisms' are human ideas, which attempt to make sense of our experience of 'reality'.We don't claim that 'reality' told us this, as DJP must claim for his schema.Because, once he admits it's a human schema, not a reflection of reality, he's plunged into the world of 'human ideology', which is precisely where we are, since Einstein. This is the 'scientific truth' that Rovelli identifies.And behind all this discussion, is the need for the maintenance of 'authority' in human affairs, a non-democratic authority because it is based upon 'physical truth', and thus can't be argued with.Surely the political consequences of this way of thinking is obvious to all Communists?

[LBird]

Regarding the 'physicalism' and 'materialism' that DJP refers to, here is a link to an article which might inform our discussion about the meaning of 'physicalism'.http://www.academia.edu/3035461/MAKING_ROOM_FOR_THE_MENTAL

Sayers wrote:

According to materialism, everything that exists or happens is ultimately material or physical. Insome form or other, this philosophy is a fundamental component of modern thought. For, withthe development of modern science, it has become increasingly clear that natural phenomena canbe described and understood in materialistic terms, without recourse to the notions of a divinecreator or an immaterial human mind.However, the general philosophical outlook of materialism can take different forms. In particular,materialism is often put forward as a mechanistic and reductionist philosophy. In the eighteenth century, materialism of this sort was called `mechanical' materialism; nowadays it goes under the title of `physicalism'. Quite standardly, it is treated as if it were the only form of materialism.

[my bold]

[ALB]

LBird wrote:

'Reality' existed prior to humans, but the 'idea' of it being 'physical' is a human idea.This is part of the problem. DJP's ideology insists that the 'physical' is 'being',

LBird wrote:

'Truth' is socially-produced, but your ideology tells you that 'truth' is the same as 'reality'.

LBird wrote:

how do you keep saying 'truth' is the same as 'reality'?

LBird wrote:

Thus, one falls into 'discovery science', of uncovering The Truth, the reality of reality, of being, final, absolute, mirror-like knowledge of reality.

When and where have I said that "truth" is the same as "reality"? I don't think this and I don't think DJP does either. I wouldn't have thought that most scientists do either.The trouble is you want a sparring partner who does think this and so sees science as uncovering the "true" nature of reality, the Truth. Not finding one here you invent one by accusing those who question some of your views of holding this view.To answer your points, I go along with Dietzgen and hold that the only "reality" is the ever-changing world of phenomena past and present and that humans classify parts of this by naming them with a view to better surviving in it by being able to predict more reliably ther future course of phenomena. In this sense,  science is not "uncovering the Truth" but describing the world as accurately and usefully as possible for human survival.The division of the one "reality" into physical and non-physical is a human idea and does not mean that the non-physical is any less a part of "reality" than the physical. At the same time it does not rule out descriptions and explanations of the non-physical in terms of the physical. The question is: are such descriptions and explanations useful (as opposed to True).I think this position is called "instrumentalism" in the philosophy of science. Or something similar to it, at least according to this which says that instrumentalism is

Quote:

opposed to Scientific Realism (the view that the world described by science is the real world, independent of what we might take it to be).

It seems we might even be fighting the same battle.

[LBird]

I'm unsure of the meaning of your post, ALB.Are you saying your position is 'instrumentalism'?My position isn't, and I don't think Marx's was. I think he was closer to what we'd now call 'Critical Realism'.Could you clarify this, please?

[ALB]

Sayers wrote:

According to materialism, everything that exists or happens is ultimately material or physical.

That's just the opinion/definition of one writer (who is opposed to "materialism?). I don't think this does help as it is not drawing any distinction between the "material" and the "physical" whereas Dietzgen, for instance, who described himself as a materialist, held that ideas were also part of "matter". As he put it:

Quote:

The distinguishing mark between the mechanical materialists of the 18th century and the Social-Democratic materialists trained in German idealism consists in that that the latter have extended the former’s narrow conception of matter as consisting exclusively of the Tangible to all phenomena that occur in the world.

Quote:

In the endless Universe matter in the sense of old and antiquated materialists, that is, of tangible matter, does not possess the slightest preferential right to be more substantial, i.e. more immediate, more distinct and more certain than any other phenomena of nature.

He also described himself as a "monist" as he held that only the universe existed and that the physical and non-physical parts into which humans divided it had the same status as part of the universe. This might be a better term to start from, to prevent you criticising a straw man of your creation.

[ALB]

Am I an "instrumentalist"? Sounds as if I might be. My position is set out in this article.Was Marx an "instrumentalist"? I don't know but you are the one who is always quoting  the part of his Theses on Feuerbach where he emphasises that the "truth" of thinking has to be shown by practice:

Quote:

The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth — i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice.

So, if he wasn't a "pragmatist" or an "instrumentalist" he was at least a "practicist". I can't see what he has in common with Bashkar's "critical realism".I notice that you are less keen on quoting other parts where he describes himself as a "materialist":

Quote:

IX. The highest point reached by contemplative materialism, that is, materialism which does not comprehend sensuousness as practical activity, is the contemplation of single individuals and of civil society.X. The standpoint of the old materialism is civil society; the standpoint of the new is human society or social humanity.XI. Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.

Marx describes himself as a "new materialiost" to distionguish his view from that of the sort of materialists you are criticising. But he still called himself a "materialist". Another reason why Sayers's definition is not helpful.

[LBird]

ALB wrote:

Sayers wrote:

According to materialism, everything that exists or happens is ultimately material or physical.

That's just the opinion/definition of one writer (who is opposed to "materialism?). I don't think this does help as it is not drawing any distinction between the "material" and the "physical" whereas Dietzgen, for instance, who described himself as a materialist, held that ideas were also part of "matter". As he put it:

Quote:

The distinguishing mark between the mechanical materialists of the 18th century and the Social-Democratic materialists trained in German idealism consists in that that the latter have extended the former’s narrow conception of matter as consisting exclusively of the Tangible to all phenomena that occur in the world.

Quote:

In the endless Universe matter in the sense of old and antiquated materialists, that is, of tangible matter, does not possess the slightest preferential right to be more substantial, i.e. more immediate, more distinct and more certain than any other phenomena of nature.

He also described himself as a "monist" as he held that only the universe existed and that the physical and non-physical parts into which humans divided it had the same status as part of the universe. This might be a better term to start from, to prevent you criticising a straw man of your creation.

[my bold]So, then, according to this statement, the 'non-physical' can 'supervene' on the 'physical' (DJP's position) but also (because they have 'the same status') it must mean that the 'physical' can 'supervene' on the 'non-physical'.Thus, if you agree with Dietzgen's statement, as you say you do, you must disagree with DJP's position.Am I correct is regarding you and DJP as holding different ideological views on this issue? Up until now, because you keep referencing DJP's posts and stances, it has seemed that you follow DJP uncritically.

[DJP]

LBird wrote:

Regarding the 'physicalism' and 'materialism' that DJP refers to, here is a link to an article which might inform our discussion about the meaning of 'physicalism'.http://www.academia.edu/3035461/MAKING_ROOM_FOR_THE_MENTAL

Sayers wrote:

According to materialism, everything that exists or happens is ultimately material or physical. Insome form or other, this philosophy is a fundamental component of modern thought. For, withthe development of modern science, it has become increasingly clear that natural phenomena canbe described and understood in materialistic terms, without recourse to the notions of a divinecreator or an immaterial human mind.However, the general philosophical outlook of materialism can take different forms. In particular,materialism is often put forward as a mechanistic and reductionist philosophy. In the eighteenth century, materialism of this sort was called `mechanical' materialism; nowadays it goes under the title of `physicalism'. Quite standardly, it is treated as if it were the only form of materialism.

[my bold]

Well I've skim read the article. I don't think current usage agrees with the above. See this:http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/…especially the section on non-reductive physicalism which was developed, in part at least, in responce to Davidson (who is mentioned in the article you link to)

[Author]

Posts