Science for Communists?

[ALB]

LBird wrote:

1) Marx wasn't a 'materialist', in the accepted meaning of that term (everything is 'material' or 'physical'); I've explained this, and think that the term 'idealist-materialist' captures Marx's position far better, if one reads his Theses on Feuerbach.2) The realm of the 'real' includes material and ideas. Rocks and value have the same ontological status.

Actually, I agree with the substance of this, i.e (1) that Marx won't have held that everything is material or physical and (2) that material and ideas have the same status. In which case the argument would seem to be about what to call this view, which I'm sure could be eventually settled. But what's all this about "non-physical causal powers" and Bhaskar? Where do they fit in?

[moderator1]

LBird wrote:

Brian wrote:

Vin Maratty wrote:

As this thread  was started by LBird  , am I the only on who feels uncomfortable about discussing it when he is unable to respond.Perhaps it is only my own personal experience but I can feel his frustration. 

LBird is on moderation, not suspended, which means he can if he so wishes post here but all his posts are filtered by the moderator.

[my bold]This was untrue.I was banned for a period, and when I tried a dozen times to login and respond, I was confronted with a message that my name was blocked.A special thanks to Vin, for his comradely and openly expressed concern.

My sincere apologies to LBird for any inconvienence the blocking caused and I thank him for bringing this matter to the forums attention.  And I appreciate there was no grudge intended on his part. I was under the assumption that by placing a user on moderation by blocking the PM function was still open for dialogue between the user and myself.  Apparently, by blocking all dialogue ceases until the suspension is lifted.This imo means that the present process of actions available to me are at variance with the severance of the breach i.e. Reminder>1st,2nd&3rd Warning>(?)>suspension.I shall at the earliest opportunity bring these concerns to the attention of the Internet Committee and hopefully they can be resolved so the present system of sanctions is more appropriate to the severance of the breach and with such a moderation function in place I'll be better placed to administer an appropriate slap on the wrist rather than a crack on the knuckles.

[LBird]

ALB wrote:

LBird wrote:

1) Marx wasn't a 'materialist', in the accepted meaning of that term (everything is 'material' or 'physical'); I've explained this, and think that the term 'idealist-materialist' captures Marx's position far better, if one reads his Theses on Feuerbach.2) The realm of the 'real' includes material and ideas. Rocks and value have the same ontological status.

Actually, I agree with the substance of this, i.e (1) that Marx won't have held that everything is material or physical and (2) that material and ideas have the same status. In which case the argument would seem to be about what to call this view, which I'm sure could be eventually settled.

Yes, the 'name' is neither here nor there. The important thing is to recognise the substance.

ALB wrote:

But what's all this about "non-physical causal powers" and Bhaskar? Where do they fit in?

My advice is to leave Bhaskar out of it, for the moment anyway, and just regard him as one proponent of CR.I'm trying to get us towards an explanation of 'non-physical causal powers', but I think a few more steps of explanation of CR are required.If you can accept that Marx's 'value' is an example of 'non-physical causal powers', then the explanation about CR might be easier to understand and agree with.If one holds to 'materialism' or physicalism, and the suggestion that anything about 'ideas' is 'idealism', then most of what CR holds will be rejected, out of hand, as 'idealism'.

[LBird]

moderator1 wrote:

My sincere apologies to LBird for any inconvienence the blocking caused and I thank him for bringing this matter to the forums attention. And I appreciate there was no grudge intended on his part.

Thanks for the acknowledgement.

[DJP]

LBird wrote:

If one holds to 'materialism' or physicalism, and the suggestion that anything about 'ideas' is 'idealism', then most of what CR holds will be rejected, out of hand, as 'idealism'.

We're still on the wrong foot.Materialism / Physicalism in general does not deny the existence of ideas or mental phenomena.You can talk about ideas all day and still be a materialist…

[DJP]

ALB wrote:

Actually, I agree with the substance of this, i.e (1) that Marx won't have held that everything is material or physical and (2) that material and ideas have the same status. In which case the argument would seem to be about what to call this view, which I'm sure could be eventually settled. 

I agree with both points one and two.The answer as to "what to call this view" is still materialism though, after all Marx said quite plainly "I am a materialist".Materialism doesn't mean that everything is material but that everything is material or depends on or arises out of the material.We don't need a new term since no one still subscribes to the "crude materialism" that Marx (and Engels) criticized.

[LBird]

DJP, why call something that gives the 'material' and the 'ideal' an equal status, 'materialism'?Why not call it 'idealism', which by your logic is equally acceptable?

[DJP]

LBird wrote:

Why not call it 'idealism', which by your logic is equally acceptable?

It's not equally acceptable according to "my logic"Idealism means that "reality is predominantly mental or otherwise non-physical".How does that equate with"everything is material or depends on or arises out of the material."?But anyhow how is "Reality is just such a collection of entities endowed with causal powers that come from their inherent nature" any kind of improvement?

[Brian]

DJP wrote:

ALB wrote:

Actually, I agree with the substance of this, i.e (1) that Marx won't have held that everything is material or physical and (2) that material and ideas have the same status. In which case the argument would seem to be about what to call this view, which I'm sure could be eventually settled. 

I agree with both points one and two.The answer as to "what to call this view" is still materialism though, after all Marx said quite plainly "I am a materialist".Materialism doesn't mean that everything is material but that everything is material or depends on or arises out of the material.We don't need a new term since no one still subscribes to the "crude materialism" that Marx (and Engels) criticized.

I have to disagree which is why I've suggested making a distinction between CR and 'Critical Materialism'.  Agreed that a materialistic way of thinking can lead to applying critical thinking but like you and others have exemplified time and again the actual reponse elicited depends on a variance of a conflicting set of interests: from the methodology applied, to which side you bread is buttered, to citations of opposing views.Whereas if the term 'Critical Materialism' is adopted it (1) It makes these variances an established part of the methodology applied, and until the respondent declares and understands their specific interest the reader is left in no doubt that its suspect or contaminated by capitalist ideology or non-science.  (Which to some extent explains why LBird is so impatient and frustrated with our responses).  (2) It takes Marx and materialism a stage further in identifying a unity of purpose between science and social science.  For by default the whole subject is under constant review, assessment and re-assessment.This is going to run and run and we have yet to establish a sound terms of reference.

[LBird]

DJP wrote:

LBird wrote:

Why not call it 'idealism', which by your logic is equally acceptable?

It's not equally acceptable according to "my logic"Idealism means that "reality is predominantly mental or otherwise non-physical".How does that equate with"everything is material or depends on or arises out of the material."?But anyhow how is "Reality is just such a collection of entities endowed with causal powers that come from their inherent nature" any kind of improvement?

You missed out the key part of my quote, DJP.

LBird wrote:

DJP, why call something that gives the 'material' and the 'ideal' an equal status, 'materialism'?Why not call it 'idealism', which by your logic is equally acceptable?

You’d just agreed with the equal status of ‘material’ and ‘ideal’.

DJP wrote:

ALB wrote:

Actually, I agree with the substance of this, i.e (1) that Marx won't have held that everything is material or physical and (2) that material and ideas have the same status. In which case the argument would seem to be about what to call this view, which I'm sure could be eventually settled.

I agree with both points one and two.

Either you agree ‘that material and ideas have the same status’, or you don’t.If you do, you can’t claim either that “that "reality is predominantly mental or otherwise non-physical" (what you call Idealism) or “that "reality is predominantly physical or otherwise non-mental" (what you call Materialism).This is the whole point: ‘real’ means ‘material and ideal’ or ‘ideal and material’.You are trying to agree with ‘real’, but insisting (illogically) on ‘material’.This isn’t just a matter of words, although ALB is right, that ‘realism’ doesn’t have to be what this approach is called, but the use of the term ‘materialism’ must be confronted, because of its history and implied meaning. Its history is Leninism, and its implied meaning is that the ‘material’ takes prominence.I don’t think you would have any time for Leninism, DJP, but I think you are a ‘physicalist/materialist’, because you keep saying so.But ‘realism’ is not ‘materialism’. Realism gives equal weight to the material and the ideal.

Brian wrote:

I have to disagree which is why I've suggested making a distinction between CR and 'Critical Materialism'.

I think Brian is on the right lines, in his response to DJP, but again I have to disagree with his suggestion, because it retains the word ‘Materialism’, for the reasons already outlined. ‘Materialism’ is a dangerous hangover from Engels’ usage, which fed into Lenin’s.Of course, it doesn’t have to be ‘Critical Realism’ (it could just as easily be ‘Critical Whatsit-ism’), but I can guarantee that if the term ‘materialism’ is involved, those physicalists like DJP will agree with the use of the term, but disagree with its meaning.‘Real’ means the ideal and the material have the same status. To agree with this means a rejection of the ‘material’ having a special status.We have to get away from the ‘idea’ that ‘matter’ tells us what it is. That’s why ‘materialism’ is a form of Idealism. It replaces ‘god’ with ‘matter’, and both are outside of human control. The proletariat (and thus post-rev. humanity) can have no external master.

DJP wrote:

Materialism doesn't mean that everything is material but that everything is material or depends on or arises out of the material.

If we go with this definition, we’ll soon find a minority telling us what the ‘material’ is. This formula simply does not give ideal and material the same status, and it is anti-democratic.Marx insisted that our ‘knowledge’ of the world is both ‘ideal’ and ‘material’. It requires a method of ‘theory and practice’, which means the application of the ideal to the material. Perhaps ‘Critical Practicism’ captures this, for Brian?

[LBird]

I've been trying to think of a explanation for this problem which might work.If we call material A, ideal B and knowledge C, thenA+B=C; orB+A=C, which is the same thing.The fact that A existed for millions of years before B, is neither here nor there.At that point, when there was no B, neither was there C.So, when just A existed there wasA.When B came along, and only then, there was a possibility of C.old A + new B = possible CC is not a copy of A.C requires both A and B; or B and A; this is the sameAs Marx, in the Theses on Feuerbach says, A+B=C. Materialists insist A=C, or C=A.Idealists insist B=C, or C=BRealists insist that C=A+B, or C=B+A.For those interested, A=object, B=subject, C=knowledge,and the plus sign is 'practice'.Hope this helps, comrades.

[Young Master Smeet]

I don't see how C can be different from B, knowledge is ideal, in as much as it belongs to the realm of ideas.  And isn't this just a statement of basic monism?  Back to Loony's line: 'Intelligent idealism is closer to intelligent materialism than stupid materialism'. etc.Anyway, some drive-by quotes from Tony Pancake:

Quote:

If at times man is referred to as the “lawmaker of nature,” it must be added that nature very often disregards these laws and summons man to make better ones.

and

Quote:

Through his labor man does not oppose nature as an external or alien world. On the contrary, by the toil of his hands he transforms the external world to such an extent that the original natural substance is no longer discernable, and while this process goes on, man changes, too. Thus, man creates his own world: human society in a nature changed by him. What meaning, then, has the question of whether his thinking leads to truth? The object of his thinking is that which he himself produces by his physical and mental activities and which he controls through his brain. This is not a question of partial truths such as, for instance, those of which Engels wrote in his book on Feuerbach that the artificial production of the natural dye alizarin would prove the validity of the chemical formula employed.  This is not, to repeat, a question of partial truths in a specific field of knowledge, where the practical consequence either affirms or refutes them. Rather the point in question here is a philosophical one, namely, whether human thought is capable of encompassing the real, the deepest truth of the world. That the philosopher, in his secluded study, who is concerned exclusively with abstract philosophical concepts, which are derived in turn from abstract scientific concepts also formulated outside of practical life experiences, should have his doubts in the midst of this world of shadows is easily understood. But for human beings who live and act in the real every day world the question has no meaning. The truth of thought, says Marx, is nothing other than power and mastery over the real world.

http://www.marxists.org/archive/pannekoe/materialism/index.htm

[ALB]

LBird wrote:

My advice is to leave Bhaskar out of it, for the moment anyway, and just regard him as one proponent of CR.

OK. Noted.

LBird wrote:

If you can accept that Marx's 'value' is an example of 'non-physical causal powers', then the explanation about CR might be easier to understand and agree with.

I can accept that Marx's concept of value is "non-physical" and would say it has "explanatory power" but am not sure about saying it has "causal powers", not least because this raises the long-standing debate amongst philosophers of what is meant by "cause". So I'll suspend judgement on this while awaiting further clarification.

LBird wrote:

If one holds to 'materialism' or physicalism, and the suggestion that anything about 'ideas' is 'idealism', then most of what CR holds will be rejected, out of hand, as 'idealism'.

I'm not sure that there are any "physicalists" (who say that only what is physical is "real") here but if there were I wouldn't see this as a problem. It certainly wouldn't mean that they weren't socialist/communists.

[DJP]

LBird wrote:

Either you agree ‘that material and ideas have the same status’, or you don’t.

In materialism they have the same status, this is because materialism (like idealism) is a type of monism. So at base there is no material and ideas, there is just one kind of stuff which we call matter.An idealist would say the opposite "at base there is no material and ideas, there is just one kind of stuff which we call ideas."To put a strict and impenetrable cleavage between the two is dualism which is niether materialism or idealism.What you seem to be proposing is either some kind of dualism with a strict delineation between mental and physical or a kind of pluralism where reality is composed of an infinite number of "entities endowed with causal powers that come from their inherent nature"

[DJP]

LBird wrote:

Hope this helps, comrades.

It helps because it shows where we are getting in a muddle.

LBird wrote:

If we call material A, ideal B and knowledge C, thenA+B=C; orB+A=C, which is the same thing.

Like has been said C=B or if we presume materialism C=B=A, in other words at the end of the day it's all "material"

LBird wrote:

Materialists insist A=C, or C=A.Idealists insist B=C, or C=BRealists insist that C=A+B, or C=B+A.For those interested, A=object, B=subject, C=knowledge,and the plus sign is 'practice'.

Few problems here. A=C seems more like a description of naive realism than materialism.It is not a case of Materialism or Realism. Realism (in the sense that we are using it here) means something like "the parts that make up a theory refer to real things that exist in the universe" as opposed to anti-realism which means something like "the parts that make up a theory are just convenient fictions that help us predict happenings".So you see far from being incompatible there is quite a strong link between Materialism and Realism.You can be a Materialist and still say "C=A+B"

[Author]

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