Pannekoek’s theory of science

[LBird]

Whilst we're quoting Kolakowski as an authority:

Kolakowski wrote:

Briefly: the abolition of the market means a gulag society.

http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Leszek_Ko%C5%82akowskiWould you trust this man's opinions on 'science', given his opinions on 'economics'?Whatever, there's no substitute for discussing our opinions about cognition, rather than widening the discussion so that it fades from view.

[ALB]

LBird wrote:

You're not participating in a discussion of 'cognition', but merely insisting that what I'm saying can't be correct, without any evidence from Marx, Pannekoek or Dietzgen, to back up your opinions.

That's an odd statement as which theory of "cognition" is correct cannot depend on quotes from Marx, Pannekoek or Dietzgen. All quotes from them would show is what they thought about the matter but we're not arguing about that. Or are we? If we are, if you claim that they held that, for instance, creationism was once true in any sense then it's up to you to show this. As they say, extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.I'm sorry you didn't find helpful what I said about Bogdanov (and I only quoted Kolakowski guardedly simply to give an idea of Bogdanov's ideas. No need to buy the book). In Materialism and Empiriocriticism Lenin devotes a two whole chapters to Bogdanov:http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1908/mec/four5.htm#v14pp72h-226http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1908/mec/six2.htm#v14pp72h-322Apologies for Lenin's style of arguing, but I see that one of his insults to Bogdanov is to call him a "cognitive socialist".

[LBird]

Once more, here’s an extract from Pannekoek’s introduction to Dietzgen’s  The Positive Outcome of Philosophy (incidently, a book translated by Untermann, one of whose books, Science and Revolution, I’m about to read also):

Pannekoek, intro, p. 33 wrote:

The mind is a faculty of generalization. It forms out of concrete realities, which are a continuous and unbounded stream in perpetual motion, abstract conceptions that are essentially rigid, bounded, stable, and unchangeable. This gives rise to the contradiction that our conceptions must always adapt to new realities without ever succeeding…

Here we have our three entities of cognition:Object: concrete perpetual motion (not ‘fixed’ things to ‘discover’, once and for all);Subject: our minds, actively forming something which is not the object (otherwise, why ‘form’, we could just passively observe and record?);Knowledge: temporary conceptions formed, which eternally contradict the object.Given this, where does this leave the notion of ‘the path of the sun going round the earth’, in the way we conceive it, now, as a ‘fixed piece of knowledge of reality’ which having been ‘discovered’, can’t be changed?You, DJP, et al, might be correct, that our ‘truth’ about the relative paths of the sun and earth is now an eternal ‘Truth’, a fixed reflection of reality, but that is not what Pannekoek (or Dietzgen) say.I know that I’m now wasting my time, and that you, DJP, et al, have already made up your minds on this issue, but, still, it would be nice if any one of you could give some evidence from Marx, Pannekoek or Dietzgen, to back up your opinions. If you can’t, it leaves one wondering just where your ideas come from. Perhaps bourgeois positivist ‘common sense’ science, the stuff we all learn as kids? Perhaps you're all just 'brilliant individuals', who don't need to 'quote' authorities, as 'cognition' is an open book to you all?Hopefully, I’ll soon be adding Untermann to my list of suitable quoters.Funnily enough, these Marxists seem to be closer to late 20th century philosophical thought (Kuhn, Feyerabend, Lakatos, Bhaskar, Archer) than their own bourgeois contemporaries. That is, Communists were up to 150 years ahead of bourgeois thinkers in their ideas about science and nature.Oh, I’ve noticed that the sun has come up again, this morning.

[LBird]

ALB wrote:

In Materialism and Empiriocriticism Lenin devotes a two whole chapters to Bogdanov:http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1908/mec/four5.htm#v14pp72h-226http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1908/mec/six2.htm#v14pp72h-322Apologies for Lenin's style of arguing, but I see that one of his insults to Bogdanov is to call him a "cognitive socialist".

The SPGB is quoting Lenin as an 'authority', now? Lenin?Well, I've got M & E on the book shelf, so I'll have a look at his opinions on Bogdanov.

[DJP]

LBird wrote:

Pannekoek, intro, p. 33 wrote:

The mind is a faculty of generalization. It forms out of concrete realities, which are a continuous and unbounded stream in perpetual motion, abstract conceptions that are essentially rigid, bounded, stable, and unchangeable. This gives rise to the contradiction that our conceptions must always adapt to new realities without ever succeeding…

Here we have our three entities of cognition:Object: concrete perpetual motion (not ‘fixed’ things to ‘discover’, once and for all);Subject: our minds, actively forming something which is not the object (otherwise, why ‘form’, we could just passively observe and record?);Knowledge: temporary conceptions formed, which eternally contradict the object.

Is it correct to make the jump from conceptions to "knowledge"? I don't think so. Knowledge can only be true conceptions.Is the 'truth' of a conception settled in the sphere of the object or the subject? The object, since truth can only be tested in practice, in engaging with the real world.

LBird wrote:

Given this, where does this leave the notion of ‘the path of the sun going round the earth’, in the way we conceive it, now, as a ‘fixed piece of knowledge of reality’ which having been ‘discovered’, can’t be changed?You, DJP, et al, might be correct, that our ‘truth’ about the relative paths of the sun and earth is now an eternal ‘Truth’, a fixed reflection of reality, but that is not what Pannekoek (or Dietzgen) say.

I don't think anyone has claimed that reality is unchanging. So you're attacking strawmen here.As someone, can't remember who, said. "The map [theories] is not the territory [external reality]" and external reality is always in a state of flux.None of this has to lead to a relativistic notion of "truth" or the conceptions of "non-observable reality"

Lbird wrote:

I know that I’m now wasting my time, and that you, DJP, et al, have already made up your minds on this issue, but, still, it would be nice if any one of you could give some evidence from Marx, Pannekoek or Dietzgen, to back up your opinions. If you can’t, it leaves one wondering just where your ideas come from. Perhaps bourgeois positivist ‘common sense’ science, the stuff we all learn as kids? Perhaps you're all just 'brilliant individuals', who don't need to 'quote' authorities, as 'cognition' is an open book to you all?

Hopefully I haven't "made my mind up" on anything, I'd hope that I still possess the ability to change my views in the light of enough persuasive evidence…

Lbird wrote:

Oh, I’ve noticed that the sun has come up again, this morning.

LOL!

[ALB]

LBird wrote:

The SPGB is quoting Lenin as an 'authority', now? Lenin?

Don't be silly. Of course not.I was just referring you to more information (more likely, misinformation) about Bogdanov and placing him in his political and historical context.  You really ought to follow up on Bogdanov because he does seem to have put forward a theory similar to yours, including (I think) the view you (I think) were going to develop that the "subject" is social and that  how "reality" is perceived is a construct of the social mind. Hence the possibility of a social mind at different times and/or places interpreting "reality" differently and so having different, even contradictory, concepts of what is "true".

[DJP]

LBird wrote:

The SPGB is quoting Lenin as an 'authority', now? Lenin?

ALB is not the same thing as The SPGB. We may be a small party but for the time being the membership figures are greater than one…But anyway, come off it. The use of quotes and references does not imply endorsement and the notion that only communists can say true things is rather silly. Though I guess it would follow from your relativism…

[LBird]

DJP wrote:

But anyway, come off it. The use of quotes and references does not imply endorsement and the notion that only communists can say true things is rather silly.

'Rather silly'? That's a defensible opinion, DJP.Why not 'defend' it, then?Or is 'silly' obvious? Is it a mere matter of 'common sense'?Can you give us some other authority for that opinion of yours? Or are you the only one that holds it?'Rather silly'. Hmmm…. not a very scientific term, is it?Where do you get your ideas about science, DJP?

DJP wrote:

Though I guess it would follow from your relativism…

Ahhhh, so you do hold ideas, not of your making! 'Relativism', eh?I've already explained 'relativism' in terms of the tripartite theory of cognition, and then gone on to show how I don't agree with that model, and have outlined the model I do consider to be better.But… none of this from you, no attempt to explain, defend, quote authorities…No, just your 'opinion'. 'Rather silly'. No much of an argument, is it?

[LBird]

Lenin, M and E, p. 290, wrote:

These perfectly clear materialistic propositions are, however, supplemented by Dietzgen thus: “Nevertheless, the non-sensible idea is also sensible, material, i.e. real…. The mind differs no more from the table, light, or sound than these things differ from each other” (p. 54).  This is obviously false. That both thought and matter are “real,” i.e., exist, is true. But to say that thought is material is to make a false step, a step towards confusing materialism and idealism.

[my bold]Lenin goes on to say that Dietzgen is only ‘inexact’.So, Lenin adopts the same method being adopted here.a) have a preconceived yet unexplained viewpoint;b) quote Dietzgen (or Pannekoek) for support;c) accuse Dietzgen of being ‘inexact’;d) replace Dietzgen’s expressed viewpoint by one’s own so far unexpressed viewpoint;e) continue to claim the now expurgated Dietzgen as an authority for one’s differing viewpoint.If ALB and DJP don’t agree with Pannekoek or Dietzgen, then that’s fine. But then they must say who they do agree with. Lenin, here, on the 'material'?Otherwise, this discussion descends to personal opinion, anecdote, and ‘feelings’ about things being ‘silly’.

[DJP]

LBird wrote:

If ALB and DJP don’t agree with Pannekoek or Dietzgen, then that’s fine. But then they must say who they do agree with. Lenin, here, on the 'material'?

OK, let's put 'silly' to one side in order to have a productive discussion…The thing is myself and ALB do agree with Pannekoek and Dietzgen, but not your reading of them. Which I think contradicts what they said…What do you think of my comments in post #95?

[ALB]

Just re-read part III of Pannekoek's 1937 article "Society and Mind in Marxian Philosophy":http://www.marxists.org/archive/pannekoe/society-mind/ch03.htmBrilliant stuff. I agree with every word of it.I am more Pannekoekian (or just as Pannekoekian) than thou.

[ALB]

LBird wrote:

Lenin, M and E, p. 290, wrote:

These perfectly clear materialistic propositions are, however, supplemented by Dietzgen thus: “Nevertheless, the non-sensible idea is also sensible, material, i.e. real…. The mind differs no more from the table, light, or sound than these things differ from each other” (p. 54).  This is obviously false. That both thought and matter are “real,” i.e., exist, is true. But to say that thought is material is to make a false step, a step towards confusing materialism and idealism.

[my bold]If ALB and DJP don’t agree with Pannekoek or Dietzgen, then that’s fine. But then they must say who they do agree with. Lenin, here, on the 'material'?

This crossed with my last post. I agree with Dietzgen not Lenin, of course. As Pannekoek put it in that 1937 article:

Quote:

The human mind is entirely determined by the surrounding real world. We have already said that this world is not restricted to physical matter only, but comprises everything that is objectively observable. The thoughts and ideas of our fellow men, which we observe by means of their conversation or by our reading are included in this real world. Although fanciful objects of these thoughts such as angels, spirits or an Absolute Idea do not belong to it, the belief in such ideas is a real phenomenon, and may have a notable influence on historical events.

In other words, thoughts, etc are just as much a part of the "real world" as physical, tangible things.I'm afraid I am unable to resist pointing out that Pannekoek's view here excludes the concept of "non-observable reality" …..

[twc]

Why Dietzgen Is Not a Critical Realist      Because Schaff’s Subject is Transcendental

LBird, asserting the entities of cognition, wrote:

Here we have our three entities of cognition: [Object, Subject, Knowledge].

Dietzgen recognizes all three entities as objects of cognition. Schaff recognizes only the Object as an object of cognition.

LBird, revising the Object, wrote:

[#70] If the concept of the ‘universal object’ implies that the ‘object of cognition’ can only be ‘everything’, then I disagree.   A pre-selection must take place from ‘everything’…[#93] Object: concrete perpetual motion (not ‘fixed’ things to ‘discover’, once and for all);

LBird seems to revise the Object: #70 — [concrete] individual object [= mutable thing] #93 — [concrete] universal object [= ensemble of mutable things].Owing to changed context, LBird might clarify whether he thinks “concrete perpetual motion” is universal or individual.Either way, Dietzgen recognizes the universal object as well as the individual objects, which we carve out of it, as objects of cognition.

twc, asserting the universal object, wrote:

… the universal subject is a component of the universal object — exists within it — and so is not independent of the object of cognition.

Since we are part of the universe, subject [we] and object [universe] interpenetrate.   Subject and object are united through shared commonality.   As Dietzgen says “they share the same substance”, which he calls [historical materialist] matter.If they were constituted of different substances, it is impossible to understand — in materialist terms — how one could ever comprehend the other.   Their interpenetration opens up the possibility of cognition.Appearances to the contrary, the comprehending [abstract] subject and the comprehended [concrete] object both comprise [historical materialist] matter.   Comprehension is thereby possible.

LBird, denying the universal object, wrote:

Here, twc appears to deny the separateness of the entities of ‘object’ and ‘subject’. … this would undermine any tripartite theory of cognition, not just Schaff’s version.

That’s precisely why Dietzgen is not a critical realist.   He would not fetishize a tripartite model that separates, in imagination, that which he was at pains to show is united.Dietzgen openly acknowledges that the subject is very much a part of the object.   Subject and object are fundamentally entangled, and they can only be separated in imagination.Our social interpenetration with the universe is the fount and origin of dialectics — our attempt to free ourselves intellectually from that which we can never escape physically.Schaff valiantly attempts to free himself from the universe.   His transcendental subject stands above and beyond its alienated object, in imagined detachment from it.Because the critical realist thinks he transcends his object of cognition, he unconsciously fuels the following parody:The critical realist must, therefore, divide the universe into two parts, one of which [the transcendental subject] is superior to the universe [the alien object].   He is therefore the educator who stands in need of education.Schaff calls upon the magic of reflection between cognizing subject and alien object to unite these ‘fraternal twins’ that are separated at birth.   The possibility of their reunion — like the possibility of cognition — remains a mystery that must bridge an unbridgeable gulf while always preserving it.Why not simply recognize with Dietzgen that subject and object are of the same [historical materialist] substance?

[LBird]

ALB wrote:

I am more Pannekoekian (or just as Pannekoekian) than thou.

Not on the issue of ‘truth’, ALB.You (and DJP) argue that ‘truth’ is located in ‘object’.I (and Pannekoek) argue that ‘truth’ is located in ‘knowledge’.For Pannekoek, as we have seen, ‘object’ is “concrete realities, which are a continuous and unbounded stream in perpetual motion”.For Pannekoek, as we have seen, ‘knowledge’ is “immutable substances, matter, energy, electricity, gravity, the Law of entropy, etc., …are products which creative mental activity forms out of the substance of natural phenomena”.Given Pannekoek’s words, how could ‘truth’ be a ‘stream in perpetual motion’? Aren’t ‘matter and electricity’ forms of ‘truth’, a ‘truth’ which is ‘produced by mind’? ‘Knowledge’ can be ‘true’, but to say ‘object’ can be ‘true’ would be meaningless. Unless, that is, one is a naïve realist, and thinks that the ‘object’ can be accessed by a neutral, positivist, scientific method.As to the ‘fixity’ of ‘truth’ (conceived as a one-off ‘discovery’ of the orbits of the planets, for example) Pannekoek says “The mind is a faculty of generalization. It forms …abstract conceptions that are essentially rigid, bounded, stable, and unchangeable. This gives rise to the contradiction that our conceptions must always adapt to new realities without ever succeeding…”.Human views of the ‘orbits of the sun and earth’ are ‘rigid abstract conceptions’ that are ‘contradicted’ by ‘new realities’. This is how we account for changes in ‘truth’.The alternative that you and DJP propose, that ‘truth’ is located in the ‘object’ and thus, once ‘known’, is a final ‘truth’, just doesn’t accord with Pannekoek’s (or indeed Dietzgen’s) expressed views.When I say 17th century views were ‘true’ then and that now they are not, you counter that they were obviously ‘false’ then. But this depends on you believing that what we know as a ‘truth’ now is the datum point for eternity, that ‘truth’ now is the measure of ‘truth’ then. This can’t be done using a Pannekoekian model of cognition. He says that our ‘conceptions’ are ‘products’, not a ‘mirror’ of ‘reality’, which they would have to be, to sustain your view of ‘truth’. He specifically says that, what you identify as ‘truth’, is an ‘unbounded stream in perpetual motion’.'Pannekoekian', ALB? No, I think you are 'DJPian'!

[twc]

Surely, ALB and DJP, you must acknowledge the historical materialist content of LBird’s assertion about truth.If “social being determines consciousness” then truth is socially determined like all consciousness.Truth is not a concrete object of cognition.   It is one of Dietzgen’s abstract objects of cognition.A central Earth simply was the truth for pre-Copernican society.   And all society was pre-Copernican once.Social practice, from the planting of crops, the telling of time, the calendar, the worship of gods, sacrifice, augury and divination, building of pyramids, the [Ptolemaic] science of astronomy, etc. was conceived as occurring within a pre-Copernican solar world.Copernican truth, like every social power, had to be fought for, in order to displace earlier truth.   Just as we must fight capitalist truth for our Object.LBird well knows my misgivings over his critical realism, but I support him on this.

[Author]

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