Pannekoek’s theory of science
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'Straw man' and 'Enlightenment', eh?Saves having to talk about 'cognition', I suppose.Are Sokal and Bricmont Communists?I don't suppose it matters, what with 'science' being nothing to do with 'politics' or 'ideology'.Just like 'economics'.What does Samuelson say about 'the labour theory of value'? And there's no such thing as 'society', because Thatcher said so.Yeah, every 'individual' is entitled to their opinion, and 'common sense' is a good basis for discussions.Evasion, ignorance and obfuscation. We can all do it. I claim it's all part of the 'scientific method', because my mate Jenkinson says so.And as Jim Royle would say, 'Cognition? My arse!'
Here's an article by Pannekoek in which he blames capitalist states, in pursuit of capitalist interests, for misusing the work of scientists not the scientists themselves for their work:http://www.marxists.org/archive/pannekoe/1948/revolt.htmAnd here he is setting out on the opening page of Anthropogenesis what he sees as the "scientific method":
Quote:The problem of the origin of man cannot be solved by experiment or observation. The appearance of man on earth is a fact of the past of which no report or witness could reach us. The factual data which we have at our disposal are comparisons of man of today with animals, supplemented by extremely rare, imperfect and damaged fragments of fossils of prehistoric man and remains of his stone implements. But they are silent with regard to the forces which have caused the evolution of animal to man.Where direct empirical data are lacking and indirect ones are so few, a far stronger appeal than is needed in experimental science has to be made to the mental equipment of the scientist. Whereas in the case of plenty of empirical facts that can be increased at will, no more is necessary than arranging and combining them and from them deducing new problems and making new experiments, the scarcity of such facts causes theoretical discussion to play a more important part. What matters here is the logical combination of differing data, the seeking for connexion between what lies far apart, the making of conclusions, and the careful weighing of probabilities.No hint that before Lamarck, Darwin and the others it was "true" that some supernatural being created humans by an act of will some 4000 years ago, i.e that creationism was once "true".
Well, it doesn't mention 'cognition', but so what?Just give another random quote, outside the context of a discussion about 'cognition'. Just like those who 'prove' Marx hated Jews. It's a tried and trusted method.Forget my wacky ideas, and stick to 'discovery science'. Oh, yeah, and forget Pannekoek, too.'The earth goes round the sun: fact of nature! Discovery done, and ticked off, once and for all, for humanity!'Except, Pannekoek said it wasn't.
Pannekoek wrote:Natural scientists consider the immutable substances, matter, energy, electricity, gravity, the Law of entropy, etc., as the basic elements of the world, as the reality that has to be discovered. From the viewpoint of Historical Materialism they are products which creative mental activity forms out of the substance of natural phenomena.[my bold]
LBird wrote:'The earth goes round the sun: fact of nature! Discovery done, and ticked off, once and for all, for humanity!'Again, no-one is putting this position forward.
LBird wrote:Pannekoek wrote:Natural scientists consider the immutable substances, matter, energy, electricity, gravity, the Law of entropy, etc., as the basic elements of the world, as the reality that has to be discovered. From the viewpoint of Historical Materialism they are products which creative mental activity forms out of the substance of natural phenomena.[my bold]
And no-one is disagreeing with this.What we are disagreeing with is your relativistic use of 'truth'.
Critical RealismLBird identifies with critical realism as outlined in Adam Schaff’s History and Truth [Chapter 1].Schaff bases critical realism on a theory of reflection — “precisely such an interpretation of the theory of reflection can be reconstructed from the corresponding statements of Marx, Engels and Lenin [sic].”Schaff’s theory of reflection [reconstructed from Marx, Engels and Lenin] is what rescues critical from naive — or critical realism from naive realism.Critical Realist CognitionCritical realist cognition is separated from naive realist cognition by its subject, which is sensuously-active society [consciousness], and by its method, which is critical realist reflection [practice].Schaff’s critical realist theory of cognition is based on four [positive] prior recognitions:“the objective existence of the object of cognition — its existence outside of any perceiving mind and independently of it.”“the objectively existing object of cognition is the external source of sensual impressions without which the process of cognition would be impossible.”“the process of cognition is … a subjective–objective relationship.”“the object is knowable … in the process of cognition the thing in itself becomes the thing for us” — [Engels: Anti Dühring]For Schaff, 1 and 2 are critical realist materialism, 3 and 4 are critical realist reflection, and 1, 2, 3 and 4 are critical realist cognition — or critical realism itself.Critique of Critical RealismIf critical realism were merely Schaff’s theory of cognition, we could ignore it as one more abstract variant on Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach by a professional soviet philosopher.But Schaff proclaims critical realism to be the marxian theory of cognition, and so we must engage critically with it.Fetishism of the Individual ObjectSchaff explicitly makes the subject of cognition universal [social, in the sense of society] — in line with Thesis VI.Schaff implicitly makes the object of cognition individual [he does so unconsciously, falling for naive practice] — in line with naive realism.Consequently, for Schaff, the universal subject [we] must bring the individual naive realist object [it, the thing in itself] into being [i.e. into our consciousness] in part by prior recognition of the individual object’s external existence.Marx would never base cognition of the individual naive realist external object on Schaff’s prior recognition 1.For Marx, like Hegel, the only object is the universal object — the universe of experience. The universal object is basic for Marx — the individual object is superstructural.Existence Independent of Mind?Schaff, by prior recognizing the existence of individual objects independent of mind — a result rather than a starting point of a theory of cognition — has assumed the objective independent-of-mind existence of the individual object as an article of faith for each and every cognized object out there. Did he consciously intend to do that?The history of human cognition is littered with the corpses of prior recognized individual objects.Universal Subject and ObjectFor Marx [like Hegel], subject and object are identical. We are basically the universe, even if superstructurally we come to cognize ourselves as a part of it.Our consciousness is the universe’s consciousness. We are of it; our thinking is it thinking. [The implications for cognition are enormous.]With Hegel, whose thought was pregnant for Marx just like Feuerbach’s, the Hegelian social subject [consciousness] initially misconceives individual objects [man and nature] as “alien” [just like Schaff’s prior recognition 1] but after its historical journey recognizes them as itself [Phenomenology].With Hegel the historical process is mystical. With Schaff it is, like Popper, iterative reflection.ReflectionSchaff’s reflection relies on prior recognition of external individual objects that are the source of our sensual impressions [1 and 2].Consequently, his reflection process must either superimpose itself upon naive realism in order to extinguish it, or else his reflection process must embrace naive realism, and acknowledge that it perpetually reproduces naive realism anew as a product that is simultaneously the starting point for the next iteration of the reflection process proper to criticize.I imagine that Schaff implies the latter. But where does that leave the individual object’s prior recognized materiality [1 and 2] if criticism extinguishes the object’s external existence independent of mind.How can concrete dependent-on-mind reflection continually spirit away or reconstitute an external object whose existence is already prior recognized as independent-of-mind?But scientific discussion, when carried on at Schaff’s abstract philosophical level of commentary on, and objectification of, Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach spirits materialism away.I will continue discussing Schaffian reflection at the practical level, as exemplified in the mature Marx’s actual scientific practice in Capital, and the comprehension of that practice [Thesis VIII].To be continued…
twc wrote:Schaff implicitly makes the object of cognition individual [he does so unconsciously, falling for naive practice] — in line with naive realism.twc, can you point me to the page where Schaff states the 'object of cognition' is 'individual', rather than 'universal'? I'm reading through it again, but it would be quicker if you could help me.
twc wrote:Existence Independent of Mind?Schaff, by prior recognizing the existence of individual objects independent of mind — a result rather than a starting point of a theory of cognition — has assumed the objective independent-of-mind existence of the individual object as an article of faith for each and every cognized object out there. Did he consciously intend to do that?Isn't this assumption (existence independent of mind) the basis of all forms of 'realism'?Without this 'assumption' (and I agree it is an assumption), aren't we forced back upon the contrary assumption that there is nothing outside of the mind of the social subject? That is, there is nothing pre-existing the questions of the social subject?Thanks for reading Schaff critically. I've got one or two differences with him, myself.
DJP wrote:I'm trying to look this Schaff up online. Is the main book called "Language and Cognition"?No, the book I'm referencing is:Adam Schaff (1976) History and Truth Pergamon Press, Oxford ISBN 0080205798http://www.amazon.com/dp/0080205798Hope you can get a copy.
LBird wrote:can you point me to the page where Schaff states the 'object of cognition' is 'individual', rather than 'universal'?I needed a return visit to the library in order to respond with page references…Schaff states that the subject of cognition is the universal subject — sensuously-active society.Schaff makes no such statement about the object of cognition, and so his position on the object of cognition must be inferred from the attributes he assigns it.As we know, critical realism relies upon prior recognition of the object of cognition existing “outside of any perceiving mind and independently of it” [1]. [In passing, Schaff’s perceiving mind is none other than the dreaded individual subject, which we had every right to assume critical realism took no prior recognition of. Schaff is not a consistently systematic thinker.]Prior recognition of the object’s existence outside the individual subject excludes Schaff’s object being the universal object.This is because all individual subjects are objects for each other, and are prior recognized as being dependent components of the universal subject. This is also because the universal subject is a component of the universal object — exists within it — and so is not independent of the object of cognition.That leaves us, as we arrived at previously, with the naive-realist object — refined by critical-realist reflection — as Schaff’s object of cognition.QuotesThe following indicate missed opportunities for Schaff to declare the object universal if he wanted to. He was clearly unconcerned to do so. Consequently we must assume that his object is just any old object of cognition.[p. 63] — objective cognition possesses “general and not only individual value (as opposed to the subjective)”. Here Schaff describes objectivity, and not the object.Schaff largely ignores the general, and concentrates on the subjective, i.e. he focusses on the subject, not the object. [For Marx, who starts from the universal object, cognition is always universal and individual.][p. 71] — “the cognition of a given object … is composed of many judgements; it is a process.”Here Schaff describes cognition as a process, and not the object.[p. 72] — “The object of cognition is infinite; this assertion pertains to the object, both in the sense of total reality and of its fragments. For total reality, just like its fragments, are infinite when it comes to the quantity of their correlations and also their mutations in time. Therefore, the cognition of such an infinite object must also be infinite, must be an infinite process of accumulating partial truths.” .Here Schaff describes the object of cognition as either individual or general.I wonder if these quotes are as close as Schaff ever approached to acknowledging the centrality of the universal object.[Apologies for earlier mis-posting my library notes — now thankfully expunged — upon my being ejected from the library.]
twc, thanks for your efforts to further analyse Schaff’s ideas. I appreciate that you say that Schaff only implies that ‘the object is individual’, so I don’t expect any ‘key’ quote.Before I go any further, though, I have to ask you to clarify what you consider to be your position (and Marx’s) on ‘the object’. I don’t fully understand the point you’re making, and rather than assume, I’d rather get you to make it plain.What do you mean by ‘universal object’, when compared and contrasted with ‘individual object’?If the concept of the ‘universal object’ implies that the ‘object of cognition’ can only be ‘everything’, then I disagree. A pre-selection must take place from ‘everything’, and this ‘selection’ is based upon parameters supplied by pre-existing theory.
twc wrote:Prior recognition of the object’s existence outside the individual subject excludes Schaff’s object being the universal object.But ‘prior recognition of the object’s existence outside the individual subject’ is the basis of all forms of ‘realism’, isn’t it? Aren’t you a ‘realist’?
twc wrote:This is because all individual subjects are objects for each other, and are prior recognized as being dependent components of the universal subject. This is also because the universal subject is a component of the universal object — exists within it — and so is not independent of the object of cognition.Here, you appear to deny the separateness of the entities of ‘object’ and ‘subject’. Have I understood you correctly? Again, this would undermine any tripartite theory of cognition, not just Schaff’s version.
twc wrote:In passing, Schaff’s perceiving mind is none other than the dreaded individual subject,…I have to disagree with you about Schaff’s ‘subject’ being ‘individual’: he makes it very clear in numerous places that for him the ‘subject’ is ‘social’, even going so far as to quote Marx’s ‘the ensemble of social relations’ on page 55, and using the term ‘social individual’.Can you confirm that you consider yourself a ‘critical realist’? If you don’t, we’d have to have more discussion on that issue, because I’m assuming that anyone following Marx and Pannekoek is a ‘critical realist’. If I’m mistaken in my assumption, then that needs clearing up.
"In practice it is of secondary importance whether theories and hypotheses are correct so long as they lead us to results that are in accordance with the facts." W. Rucker Opening Address at the Natural Science Congress in Glasgow, 1901.Quoted by Paul Lafargue http://www.marxists.org/history/usa/pubs/newreview/1913/v1n13-mar-29-1913.pdf I thought i would throw that in to stir the pot.
alanjjohnstone wrote:"In practice it is of secondary importance whether theories and hypotheses are correct so long as they lead us to results that are in accordance with the facts." W. Rucker Opening Address at the Natural Science Congress in Glasgow, 1901.Quoted by Paul Lafargue http://www.marxists.org/history/usa/pubs/newreview/1913/v1n13-mar-29-1913.pdf I thought i would throw that in to stir the pot.It's from 1901, ajj! That's even before Einstein's Special Theory of 1905! There's been a lot of 'scientific' and 'philosophical' water under the bridge, since then. We now know that 'facts' are selected according to the 'theories and hypotheses'. There is no pre-existing set of 'facts' against which 'theories and hypotheses' are simply measured for 'accordance'. Remember Pannekoek? To paraphrase, 'Facts of science are socially constructed'.
alanjjohnstone wrote:"In practice it is of secondary importance whether theories and hypotheses are correct so long as they lead us to results that are in accordance with the facts."Sounds like something that would be compatible with an instrumentalist perspective.Instrumentalism claims that it may be possible to have a theory based on an entirely false ontology yet still be able to explain and predict the real world. For example I could construct a theory of physics where everything is based on the actions of little invisible men moving things around that could tie in with empirical observations and be used to make accurate predictions. Or it would be possible to have a theory and not actually know what the 'things' are – quantum mechanics is based upon mathematical formulas which have good predictive validity but are hard to translate into a language of 'things'.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instrumentalism
DJP wrote:Sounds like something that would be compatible with an instrumentalist perspective.Yeah, all Communists should be wary of any ‘non-realist’ philosophies of science.
Wikipedia wrote:Instrumentalism avoids the debate between anti-realism and philosophical or scientific realism. It may be better characterized as non-realism. Instrumentalism shifts the basis of evaluation away from whether or not phenomena observed actually exist, and towards an analysis of whether the results and evaluation fit with observed phenomena.[my bold]‘Observed phenomena’ as the basis of our explanations leaves us unable to explain any ‘non-observable reality’. That is, the vast majority of the 'existing' natural world! We should leave this discussion, though, until we get up to dealing with the ‘object’. We have to firstly get some agreement on ‘knowledge’ and the ‘subject’.
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