Pannekoek’s theory of science

[LBird]

DJP wrote:

LBird as far as I can work out the only thing we are disagreeing with is your adherence to a cultural relativist definition of 'truth'.

Well, I don't think that saying that 'society plays a part in generating scientific truth' is 'cultural relativism'.Perhaps if you outline, using Schaff's tripartite theory of cognition of 'subject, object and knowledge', what you consider the 'cultural relativist' position, and what you consider to be your differing position.I can try to express what I consider to be Marx's position, again, if you want.Of course, you can also disagree with my characterisation of Marx's position, but then I would expect you to outline what you consider to be Marx's (and Pannekoek's, if you think they agree, as I do) stance on this issue.Since the rest of your post continues with your assumption of my 'cultural relativism', we should sort out that issue before continuing with the rest. Your worries of 'anti-communism' are worries that I too share.

DJP wrote:

I'll try and give a better reply to some points raised later.

Thanks for your efforts, so far. But if you don't agree with Schaff, you should make this clear, and we can discuss Schaff's ideas, and I can try to give more quotes and better explanations, to try to help.

DJP wrote:

I too share an interest in philosophy of science and epistemology (theory of knowledge)…

These attempts of mine don't mean that I'm right, but it is also a subject that I find fascinating, and Schaff's model is the best I've come across yet, which I consider makes it easier to understand some difficult readings by authors who aren't always very clear themselves.And I mean you, Charlie…

[twc]

LBird wrote:

Science is not the passive discovery of the really existing external world (reality, the object), but the production by society of knowledge, through the active interaction of the human subject with the object. Truth is not identical with, or a reflection of, the object. The ‘truth’ is a social product, based upon human praxis with reality.'Truth' is an attribute of 'knowledge', not the 'object'. If it's an attribute of 'object', then 'truth' can't have a history or be a social product (and thus, humans being fallible, 'true' can be shown to be 'false'). What's 'true scientific knowledge' can change. The history of science is littered with 'truth' changing. This can only be so if 'truth' is a human product.

These two statements by LBird are correct. They refute the positivism expressed by many participants.LBird, you are right to point out to those who consider truth to be nothing but the identity of our conception of an external object with that actual external object itself because, for us, there is no external object beyond our appearance–reality conception of it that we are able to compare our conception of it with.That’s why [Thesis II] “Man must prove the truth — i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice”.That boils down to why we need science to resolve our immediate and our consciously mediated conceptions of the world. Why we need science so that we may reliably comprehend our consciousness’s [this-sided] immediate appearance in terms of our consciousness’s [this-sided] mediated reality.You see our consciousness has this dual character. The interpenetration of this-sided immediate experience and this-sided mediated reality remains a mystifying dual for a tripartite model of consciousness.That mystery is precisely why I must appear to you to be “rabbiting on” about something extraneous to your tripartite model: base–superstructure determinism. Your tripartite model leaves no room for immediate appearance, but philosophically has only room for knowledge [presumably you mean by knowledge, not facts, but abstract conceptions — our conception of reality].Base–superstructure determinism is our essential mediating mechanism for grasping immediate appearance. And, as you well know, that’s precisely why we need science.You unfortunately mistake scientific determinism for “bourgeois” nonsense. But it’s inescapable if our this-sidedness does not give us immediate reality. Our mediated reality must then have to give us our conceived reality of immediacy. The issue of what comes first — theory or practice — is not as clear cut [or as bourgeois versus proletarian] as you imagine.To now reconsider your quoted post above from the standpoint of young Marx when he still held your current position. In his Dissertation on the Greek Atomists, he famously said against Kant’s distinction between conception and actuality:

Marx wrote:

If somebody imagines that he has 100 talers, if this concept is not for him an arbitrary, subjective one, if he believes in it, then these 100 imagined talers have for him the same value as 100 real ones. For instance, he will incur debts on the strength of his imagination, his imagination will work, in the same way as all humanity has incurred debts on its gods.

I have not been attacking you, personally. But, please check the personal epithets you once flung at members of this forum from a confident bastion of assumed superiority.Now that you’ve survived your baptism of fire, I suggest you marshal your arguments in future not by authority alone, but in a clear reasoned manner. It is the process and not the principle alone that proves anything.Also please answer the objections of those who take the time to follow your own arguments, but are unwilling to be dragooned into dancing to your tune until you prove yourself worthy of the subject.I’ve now tracked your lively discussions on the web, and I do not doubt your genuineness and enthusiasm for what you conceive socialism to be. That indeed is something precious.Consequently, you must comprehend why I swiftly moved to ward off any contamination of your posts by perceived pseudo science. I would expect you to so honour and protect your intellectual heroes [Marx, Dietzgen, Pannekoek].You have chosen not to unequivocally distance yourself from such contamination, and that sadly diminishes your current scientific [or, for you, proletarian] integrity in my estimation. But we all learn.

[LBird]

twc, since you seem to have re-thought your method of 'personal attacks' upon me, I'll now engage with you.

twc wrote:

I have not been attacking you, personally.

Well, I beg to differ, but I'll leave bygones to be bygones, and leave the historical record of two threads to answer.

twc wrote:

But, please check the personal epithets you once flung at members of this forum from a confident bastion of assumed superiority.

‘Superiority’?

LBird, post #31, wrote:

These attempts of mine don't mean that I'm right…

… and I’ve apologised for being ‘touchy’, and I’ve read, listened to, requested an email copy, and bought a book, on various recommendations of other posters. Surely the sign of ‘inferiority’, in that I didn’t know what those posters did. But I’m trying to get up to speed.What’s more, I, unlike others, have clearly given signposts to my ideological biases and thinkers I consider can teach me something.There’s nothing ‘superior’ in my approach, just a thirst for learning. I’m actually looking to be corrected, if someone can point me to, for example, some work that overrules Schaff’s model. I just haven’t found one yet, either here, in a book, or from pub discussions. But I’m open to it.

twc wrote:

Why we need science so that we may reliably comprehend our consciousness’s [this-sided] immediate appearance in terms of our consciousness’s [this-sided] mediated reality.You see our consciousness has this dual character. The interpenetration of this-sided immediate experience and this-sided mediated reality remains a mystifying dual for a tripartite model of consciousness.

This is more like it!You’ll have to explain a bit more about this concept of ‘dual consciousness’. If you haven’t read Schaff, I can explain that a little further, to try to see if the ‘immediate’ and the ‘mediated’ division can be sustained, within this model.Over to you: what is ‘dual (immediate and mediated) consciousness’?[ps. We’ll have to leave the rest of your points till later; I presume they relate to the matter in hand, somehow]

[LBird]

Schaff, History and Truth, pp. 44-5, wrote:

Engels once warned the representatives of the natural sciences that the attempts to deny the role of philosophy in the natural sciences or even the elimination of philosophy from this field of research, in accord with the postulates of positivism, lead to falling into the embrace of the worst possible philosophy; a mixture of bits and pieces of school knowledge together with views current and fashionable in a given period on this subject. In fact, one cannot eliminate philosophy from these reflections and thus when expelled through the door it returns through the window.

[my bold]I just want to know the philosophical basis of other posters’ ideas of ‘science’. It’s not enough to say, ‘well, I think…’. Names and quotes of your ideological mentors, please, comrades! I’ve given mine. The scientific method requires openness about one’s biases, in the opinion of communists, and I agree.

[Anonymous]

The final final comment from Lyla tempted back one last time for now:In LBirds posts – amongst other things, we have examples of the following1) Trying to discredit what people have said by false insinuations.For example – suggesting that I have to cite influences before anything I say is valid. Citing influences is interesting but not necessary for a reasoned argument to express some truth. Actually I just got off a UFO, which is quite useful for a fresh perspective.  And for example – trying to changing meaning by adding words: ‘common usage’  (about words) nor ‘common sense’ (about which I took some time to explain what I mean)  do not mean ‘bourgeois common sense’.2) Avoidance of answering the questionFor example post 24 Where ALB asks about your “theory of truth” and how you distinguish between a “true” and a “wrong” statement.’    …………………..?*****************************Re. Observation and theory: It seems to me that the only sensible way to understand observation and theory is to see that they are in an ongoing interactive and developmental relationshipI meant that DJP was right in questioning you about what you said about truth, and in that ‘the only sensible use of the word ‘truth’ is to mean ‘in accord with reality’.It is essentially important to the philosophical and scientific process that at times (often in fact) we say if not ‘well [another word added by LBird]  I think…’ then  ‘I think’ or ‘I believe’ or  ‘it seems to me’. And I think that LBird needs to more often use this form rather than driving ahead with a statement as if it is a fact when there is no or insufficient proof/reasoning process.  Actually I don’t think that I agree with some of twc’s philosophy either – but I don’t have time to go into that now.

[ALB]

LBird wrote:

Can you provide email copies of this bulletin (and any earlier relevant ones)? Or publish it on this site, which would be best.

It's 19 pages and over 6000 words long and done using old-fashioned technology (roneoed from a stencil, but at least the pages are A4 not foolscap), but it's not proving too difficult to scan. In the meantime here's some extracts to give an idea of the argument developed in it (I see it's not a simple Education Bulletin but an "Education & Discussion" one):

Quote:

Is Socialism Scientific?Hitherto the party has assumes the existence of a scientific method, routinely applied in the natural sciences, producing results which stand as the exemplars of objective knowledge.  In trying to answer the question heading above we have selected an example of this assumed method applied to a physical situation, then compared the results achieved with the application of party theory to the analysis of the capitalist system.  The inference drawn is that socialist knowledge bears direct comparison with scientific knowledge.This whole approach poses problems because it seems impossible to make clear the nature of "scientific method" and it makes the validity of the socialist case dependent upon the truth of the current scientific orthodoxy chosen as the base for comparison.

Quote:

If, like Karl Popper, you are a fallibilist (someone who believes that scientists spend their time in laboratories making inspired conjectures and setting up experiments aimed at refuting them) then the socialist revolution for you can be considered as an attempt to refute the theory of the SPGB. (…).The fallibilist argument above has been used by the party since before the first world war. It is a useful rhetorical device, but it commits us to the view that science operates as Popper says. Whereas the history of science, in episodes like the rise of non-Euclidean geometry, continental drift and quantum theories, suggests that science is carried out in quite a different fashion. On this other view the scientific community is split at times into warring factions, many members of which would sooner die than admit any of their opponents claims.The alternative to Popper is that of T.S.Kuhn, who points to the function of dogma in sciences which move from one tenaciously held exemplary theory and achievement, like that of Newton's Principia, to another, like Einsteinian relativistic mechanics.

Quote:

Is science Social?Frequently when one makes a person doubt their implicit belief in the way knowledge is constructed, that person is struck with epistemologic terror; being unable to imagine for some time any other ground for knowledge in a world where the foundations have been removed. While this an understandable response it is not necessary because the communities of scientists and non-scientists carry on; what is a practical matter is the business of society. Whereas questions about what constitutes sciemce or alternative epistemologies are theoretical or philosophical notions scientists and people in the world can operate just as they always did in complete ignorance of those notions. Unless they think about the matter, the social formation and institutions of capitalism in which they live, provide the day-to-day motivations for their actions. Hence the proud words in the programmatic introduction by Marx to his Critique of Political Economy,“The mode of production of material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines thsir existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness. (Quoted in Historical Materialism, SPGB pamphlet, p.60).The party has extended this viewpoint in various ways, applying it to modern capitalism and has found that the general character of the political and spiritual processes of the peoples of the world has been conditioned into uniformity by the world-wide expansion of the capitalist system. Why then should we reserve a privileged place for science? Why exempt physical science, one of the cultural products which capitalism finds most useful, from this analysis? What else can science be but the creation of social actors in definite historical circumstances?

Quote:

Radical Science?There is a long-standing row in some left-wing circles, which takes science as described above, in such matters as genetic population control (eugenics), IQ testing and the like; considering that science should be purged of these excresences or abuses, leaving a pure residue of truth. The aim of such a programme is the construction of a science which would be in harmony with a future socialist society. This hardly seems possible. For if you take eway the influence of capitalist society then, until socialism is created, that new science would need to be created in a vacuum. While we might agree that socialists, to some extent, can create personal relationships which escape the boundaries, scientific or otherwise, of this society; we cannot see the effectiveness of trying to convert the scientific community to the radical science position. For even were this to be done, they would still remain unsocialist. Worse still, the radical science position assumes that a science could exist in the form of a perfect objective knowledge; which was the common sense assumption of the first part of this bulletin from which we were unable to prove that the Walsby Society argument against socialism was wrong. So with this we have come full circle.

[LBird]

Lyla Byrne wrote:

‘the only sensible use of the word 'truth' is to mean 'in accord with reality'

But this is an ideological statement.'Truth' can't simply mean 'reality', because 'truth' changes, even when the 'object' doesn't. Science teaches us that.Where did you get your ideas from, Lyla?

LB wrote:

For example – suggesting that I have to cite influences before anything I say is valid.

This is an ideological statement. There are no un-influenced humans. We are social animals. Unless you expose your 'influences', we can't go any further.Plus, 'validity' is a social concept, not an individual one.I'd guess you're some sort of 'individualist', Lyla. I'm not. I'm a Communist and a Marxist. I don't hide my influences.[later edit]The reason for asking about whether you consider yourself an 'individual' or not (I don't, I'm a worker), is that, as I've already mentioned in passing and will re-visit at greater length, the 'subject' in the tripartite theory of cognition must be seen as a 'social individual', rather than the isolated bourgeois individual.Thus, anyone who employs the notion of 'the individual' will find they disagree with the argument that I will make about 'scientific method'. In short, the 'social individual' is a creation of a society, with all the baggage that entails, so if any poster wants to argue against the notion of the 'subject as social', they need to have a think now about which ideology they are employing against my ideological position.[end edit]

[LBird]

ALB wrote:

It's 19 pages and over 6000 words long and done using old-fashioned technology (roneoed from a stencil, but at least the pages are A4 not foolscap), but it's not proving too difficult to scan. In the meantime here's some extracts to give an idea of the argument developed in it…

Thanks for the 'heads-up', ALB.I'll have a read and see if I can orientate myself to it.

[DJP]

A nice and short but sweet podcast with some general background stuff from the rather good philosophy bites website:http://philosophybites.com/2009/01/david-papineau-on-scientific-realism.htmlNote I'm posting this because I think people will find it interesting not because I generally agree or disagree with it..

[LBird]

I’d like to make a post to hopefully help to clarify some of the differences between my position and that of some other posters. This is based upon Schaff, pp. 59-61. I’ve obviously truncated, summarised and re-worded what he says, to get to the point, for posters who haven’t got access to his book.The key difference seems to lie in our differing interpretations of what Schaff calls a ‘theory of reflection’. He points out that the ‘subjective-idealist’ model of cognition (the second one that he covers, on pp. 50-1) does not use a theory of reflection. We’re not interested in this model, either (it’s related to idealism and relativism). But the ‘contemplative-receptive’ m. of c. (his first, pp. 49-50), which we would identify with Feuerbach and positivism, and the ‘social-objective’ m. of c. (his third, pp. 51-3), which we would identify with Realism and Marxism, are both covered by Schaff’s theory of reflection.He spells out some similarities and differences between these two models of cognition, on pp. 60-1 (I’ll call these ‘Feuerbach’ and ‘Marx’, if it helps to simplify; please note, this is a didactic device, for those desperate to insist ‘Marx never said that!’).Similarities.1 object exists (outside of subject);2 object is origin of sensual experiences of subject;3 cognition is a relationship between subject and object;4 object is knowable.Differences.1 Feuerbach sees subject as mentally passive-receptive; Marx sees subject as mentally active;2 F. sees subject as individual; M. sees subject as social;3 F. sees subject as contemplative; M. sees subject as actively practical;4 F. sees knowledge as a faithful copy of object; M. sees knowledge as a process of mental reproduction of the object.This last point, difference 4, is where I think that our differences lie (thus, being a titchy thing, we have lots in common, comrades!).The form of ‘materialism’, that regards ‘object’ and ‘knowledge’ as identical, Schaff calls ‘naïve realism’. This position sees ‘knowability as a unique act’ producing a ‘perfect copy’ or ‘faithful image’ of the object.He contrasts this with ‘critical realism’, which regards ‘knowability as an infinite process’ which thus can’t produce a ‘perfect copy’, but it is an imperfect reproduction, a mental image, of the object. But as a mental image produced by the subject, it is able to be acted upon, by the subject: ‘it makes effective action possible’ (p. 61).To my mind, to leave Schaff behind, this ‘knowledge as a process’ is a dynamic form of social cognition, which fits, I think, with Pannekoek’s quote, provided earlier. Thus, ‘knowledge’ is not an ‘act of discovery’, as for bourgeois scientists, but on ongoing active human relationship with nature; ‘knowledge’ is a ‘social process’.I suspect that these differing views of the cognitive entity of ‘knowledge’ are at the heart or our differences. I’m a ‘critical realist’.DJP, is this issue related to your worries, expressed in post #30, about ‘cultural relativism’? The notion of the malleability of ‘knowledge’ can be seem as endorsing ‘cultural relativism’, I suppose, but I don’t think it does. After reading this post (and, even better if possible, having read Schaff’s argument in the original), what do you think?In effect, I’m asking, ‘do Marx, Pannekoek and Critical Realism lead us to cultural relativism?’.Hope this post helps, comrades.

[ALB]

LBird wrote:

In effect, I’m asking, ‘do Marx, Pannekoek and Critical Realism lead us to cultural relativism?’.

Or, more precisely, do they lead us to the view that before 1700 it was "true" that the Sun went round the Earth as this is what people then "knew" to be the case? For the record, I vote No. I think they would have done too.

[LBird]

ALB wrote:

Or, more precisely, do they lead us to the view that before 1700 it was "true" that the Sun went round the Earth as this is what people then "knew" to be the case?

You're still confusing 'the object' with 'knowledge', ALB. They are different entities. Don't my latest efforts help at all? Difference number 4 refers, I think. If what I've written so far hasn't helped, please ask for a better explanation.

[ALB]

LBird wrote:

You're still confusing 'the object' with 'knowledge', ALB. They are different entities. Don't my latest efforts help at all? Difference number 4 refers, I think. If what I've written so far hasn't helped, please ask for a better explanation.

I don't think I am. I do understand the point you are making here:

Quote:

4 F. sees knowledge as a faithful copy of object; M. sees knowledge as a process of mental reproduction of the object.

I do understand the difference between what people observe/experience and how they interpret this. Before 1700, just as now, people observed a hot disc moving across the sky from East to West (and various changes in the sky at night). (Of course, the "Sun" is also already a mental construct, an abstraction from the ever-changing world of phenomena = "reality"). Before 1700 the assumption that the Sun went round the Earth was enough for their practical needs (when to go to sleep, when to get up, when to plant crops, etc). That the Sun went round the Earth was their "mental reproduction" of what they observed (and which we still do), but, surely, the theory of "knowledge as a process of mental reproduction of the object" allows for inaccurate or wrong "mental reproductions"? So, why can't we say that the pre-1700 mental reproduction of the same phenomena that we observe today was wrong? Isn't saying that the theory that the Sun goes round the Earth was "true" before 1700 because this was adequate for living and production then an example of "cultural relativism"?

[LBird]

ALB wrote:

That the Sun went round the Earth was their "mental reproduction" of what they observed (and which we still do), but, surely, the theory of "knowledge as a process of mental reproduction of the object" allows for inaccurate or wrong "mental reproductions"? So, why can't we say that the pre-1700 mental reproduction of the same phenomena that we observe today was wrong?

Of course, we can.The "pre-1700 mental reproduction" is "wrong", from the stance of "2013 mental reproduction".But this presents a philosophical problem. If 'we' know our 'mental reproduction' is 'true' to us, and is different from 'their' 'mental reproduction' which was 'true' to them……what's to prevent a future 'mental reproduction' from doing the same thing?Unless one clings to the 'scientific discovery' model of 'truth' as a one-off 'act of discovery' (that Pannekoek denies), then we have to separate 'truth' (a social creation) from 'object' (the 'real' sun/earth relationship, 'out there').Thus, we can account for changes in 'truth', whilst holding on to a 'realist' scientific method, which relates to an 'object' which can be later interrogated again.Naive Realism (positivist science?) versus Critical Realism (Marx and Pannekoek?).

[ALB]

As I think I've suggested before, perhaps we should abandon the word "truth" and just stick to "knowledge". i can't see any problem with saying that knowledge changes, even becomes more adequate over time.

[Author]

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