Do We Need the Dialectic?

[LBird]

Rosa Lichtenstein wrote:

Well, naturally, I don't think that Leninism is the problem. But, we are just going to have to disgree over that one, since, as I have said, I haven't come here to discuss Leninism with anti-Leninists.

I find this a very odd standpoint for you to take, Rosa, since you are actively strengthening us anti-Leninists! We can but thank you, anyway!More fundamentally, though, I disagree with your idea that thought can't be applied 'aprioristically'. I think that this is exactly what science does, when humans employ an aprioristic theory to select (what they consider relevant, according to the theory) from the 'object'. This selection from the object (an 'abstraction') is then used to build a hypothesis which clearly then must be tested empirically: ie. the unity of theory and practice.Since I think that this method covers both Marx and the latest (and later!) bourgeois philosophers of science, I would think that discussing just where these 'aprioristic theories of science' originate would be of great value for workers. I suspect that we'll soon uncover the bullshitters.Can't we tempt you to indulge us?

[Rosa Lichtenstein]

LB:

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More fundamentally, though, I disagree with your idea that thought can't be applied 'aprioristically'. I think that this is exactly what science does, when humans employ an aprioristic theory to select (what they consider relevant, according to the theory) from the 'object'. This selection from the object (an 'abstraction') is then used to build a hypothesis which clearly then must be tested empirically: ie. the unity of theory and practice.

Certainly, scientists might indeed appear to do this, but, as I have pointed out, that is because, even here, the ideas of the ruling-class rule.But it isn't what scientists actually do (as opposed to what they might think they do). As I have explained eslewhere, in response to the objection that my analysis of philosophy (as unmitigated non-sense) self-destructs, since my ideas must be non-sense too![Once again: the links I have used below won't work properly if you are using Internet Explorer 10, unless you switch to 'Compatibility View' (in the Tools Menu).]

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It could be objected that the propositions advanced in this Essay — such as "They (i.e., metaphysical propositions) are non-sensical" — are self-refuting, too, since they aren't empirical and yet they are also supposed to be true. If so, they can't be false, but must be non-sensical themselves.This objection is based on the idea that there are only two uses of the indicative mood: fact-stating and philosophical thesis-mongering. The conclusion seems to be that I am either stating facts — which could thus be false –, or I am advancing a (supposedly true) philosophical thesis of my own about language, etc. If the latter, then what I have to say is no less non-sensical — in which case, I have only succeeded in refuting myself!But, there are other uses of the indicative mood, one of which features in the formulation of scientific theories, which, in general, do not state facts, but express rules we use to make sense of the world. [And rules aren't the sort of thing that can be true or false, only useful or useless, effective or ineffective, practical or impractical, etc.]So, when Newton, for example, tells us that the rate of change of momentum is proportional to the applied force, he isn't stating a fact (otherwise it could be false, but if that were so, its falsehood would change the meaning of 'force', and it would thus be about something other than the subject of Newton's Second Law!), but proposing/establishing a rule that can be used to study acceleration, among other things.[Of course, he might not have seen things this way, but that doesn't affect the point being made. Recall the comments made at the top of this page: This Essay "tackles issues that have sailed right over the heads of some of the greatest minds in history…." I will say more about why such 'Laws' are in effect rules in Essay Thirteen Part Two. (Incidentally, this approach to scientific 'Laws' helps account for the odd fact that they all appear to tell lies about nature — this links to a PDF. [On this, see Cartwright (1983).] Why that is so will also be examined in the aforementioned Essay.) ]I use the indicative mood in the same way — as part of interpretative and/or elucidatory rules –, except, in this case, I do so only in order to show that philosophical theses themselves are non-sensical, and incoherent.Someone might refer us to Wittgenstein's notorious statement:

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"6.54: My propositions [Sätze — sentences, RL] serve as elucidations in the following way: Anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical [unsinnig], when he has used them — as steps — to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)"He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright." [Wittgenstein (1972), p.151.]

And then claim (as many have) that he only succeeded in refuting himself.As I explained earlier, in place of "nonsense" I prefer "non-sense" [on this word see the end of this post, where I also explain "sense"], and that is clearly what Wittgenstein also intended; that is, he was referring to propositions (sentences) which are incapable of expressing a sense (Sinn). [He pointedly contrasts Unsinnig (non-sense) with Sinnloss (senseless) sentences.]So, Wittgenstein's own Unsinnig sentences [Sätze] — not those of the metaphysicians he is criticising — express rules ("elucidations") in propositional (sentential) form (that is, they use the indicative mood, by-and-large). He employed these "elucidations" in an endeavour make it clear how our actual sentences express a sense (Sinn), or fail to express a sense (Sinnloss) –, or worse, can't express a sense (Unsinnig). Once that has been done, or once we see what Wittgenstein was trying to do, we no longer need these rules and can "throw them away".Now rules, as I pointed out earlier, can't express a sense (they are Unsinnig), but that doesn't prevent us from understanding them (which we plainly do once we see they aren't like empirical propositions or metaphysical pseudo-propositions, but are "elucidations" — i.e., that they aren't incoherent non-sense). In that case, Wittgenstein was outlining, or proposing a set of interpretative rules that sought to make his analysis of language clear.Again, when Newton, for example, informs us that the rate of change of momentum is proportional to the impressed force, he is telling us how he intends to use certain words, and how he proposes to make sense of nature by means of them. His laws elucidate his physics, and as such are rules.But, why "throw them away"? Well, consider someone who is trying to teach a novice how to play chess, how the pieces move, how they can capture other pieces, etc., etc. In doing this, they will explain the rules of chess in the indicative mood: "The Queen moves like this, or this…". Of course, the rules can also be expressed in the imperative mood, too: "Move your Rook like this…", "The King has to move this way…", but this isn't absolutely essential. In addition, the rules of the game can be taught by practical demonstration — by simply playing! Novices can even learn by just watching others play, asking the odd question or two.The rules of chess are Unsinnig, too, since they can't be false. "The Bishop doesn't move diagonally", isn't an alternative rule for the Bishop in chess, since the way that piece moves defines what the word "Bishop" means in that game. The rules elucidate how that word is used and how that piece behaves. If a 'Bishop' were to move (legitimately) in any other way, it would be part of an alternative game, not chess!Some might want to argue that "The Bishop moves like this…" is in fact true, but if that were the case, "The Bishop moves like this…" would be descriptive not prescriptive, making this an assertion which could be true or which could be false. But, anyone who now claimed that such rules were descriptive would have no answer to someone who retorted "Well, I move it any way I like!" — other than an appeal to tradition, to how the game has been played in the past. So, in order to proscribe the antics of such maverick chess players, "The Bishop moves like this…", and sentences like it, would have to be viewed prescriptively, and thus as rules, not descriptions.Of course, "The Bishop moves like this…" is a correct (or true) description of, or assertion about, a rule in chess, in the sense that anyone who used it would be speaking truly about the rules themselves, but the prescriptive nature of this rule doesn't depend on such true reports, but on the application of that rule, a rule which defines how certain pieces must move. Once we have grasped these rules we can in effect "throw them away" (unless, of course, we have to explain them to someone else, or appeal to them to settle a dispute, etc.). How many times do you have to say to yourself once you have mastered the rules of chess: "The Rook moves like this, the Pawns like that…"?Every single Wittgenstein commentator misses these simple points, and they then struggle to comprehend the Tractatus! Now, I'm not suggesting Wittgenstein was crystal clear about this, but it is the only way, it seems to me, to make the Tractatus comprehensible, so that (1) It doesn't self-destruct, or (2) It doesn't change into something different as a result of the rather wild interpretations developed by, for example, the 'New Wittgensteinians'. [On this, see Crary and Read (2000), Read and Lavery (2011).]But, even if it could be shown that Wittgenstein didn't hold this view, it certainly represents my view, and my attempt to repair the Tractatus.

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Incidentally, it is worth pointing out that (in the above) "non-sense" is not the same as "nonsense". The latter expression has various meanings ranging from the patently false (such as "Karl Marx was a shape-shifting lizard") to plain gibberish (such as "783&£$750 ow2jmn 34y4&$ 6y3n3& 8FT34n")."Non-sense", as it is being used here, characterises indicative sentences that turn out to be incapable of expressing a sense no matter what we try to do with them ("sense" is explained below) — that is, they are incapable of being true and they are incapable of being false. In Metaphysics, as we have seen, the indicative/fact-stating mood has plainly been mis-used and/or mis-applied. So, when sentences like these are employed to state supposedly 'fundamental truths' about reality, they seriously misfire since they can't possibly do this. [Later sections of this Essay will explain why that is so.]Hence, non-sensical sentences are neither patently false nor plain gibberish. [However, there are different sorts of non-sense. More about this later.]Finally, the word "sense" is being used in the following way: it expresses what we understand to be the case for the proposition in question to be true or what we understand to be the case for the proposition in question to be false, even if we do not know whether it is actually true or whether it is actually false, and may never do so.T1: Tony Blair owns a copy of Das Kapital.For example, everyone (who knows English, who knows who Tony Blair is, and that Das Kapital is a book) will understand T1 upon hearing or reading it. They grasp its sense –, that is, they understand what (certain parts of) the world would have to be like for it to be true and what (certain parts of) the world would have to be like for it to be false.

The above was taken from one of my essays (where several of the things I appear to take for granted are explained and substantiated — and where the references I have used can also be accessed).http://anti-dialectics.co.uk/page%2012_01.htmSo, when scientists misconstrue the rules they use to understand the world as fundamental truths about it, they are indulging in metaphysics. And this isn't surprising, since they too had been educated to believe that this is what they should be doing.Hence, it isn't just Marxists who have been bamboozled in this way.[Incidentally, this is what it means to take Marx seriously when he said the ideas of the ruling-class always rule.]

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[LBird]

Rosa Lichtenstein wrote:

So, when scientists misconstrue the rules they use to understand the world as fundamental truths about it, they are indulging in metaphysics. And this isn't surprising, since they too had been educated to believe that this is what they should be doing.Hence, it isn't just Marxists who have been bamboozled in this way.

[my bold]But… have all 'Marxists been bamboozled in this way'?

Anton Pannekoek, Lenin as Philosopher wrote:

Hence Historical Materialism looks upon the works of science, the concepts, substances, natural Laws, and forces, although formed out of the stuff of nature, primarily as the creations of the mental Labour of man. Middle-class materialism, on the other hand, from the point of view of the scientific investigator, sees all this as an element of nature itself which has been discovered and brought to light by science. Natural scientists consider the immutable substances, matter, energy, electricity, gravity, the Law of entropy, etc., as the basic elements of the world, as the reality that has to be discovered. From the viewpoint of Historical Materialism they are products which creative mental activity forms out of the substance of natural phenomena.

http://www.marxists.org/archive/pannekoe/1938/lenin/ch02.htmIsn't Pannekoek here contrasting supposed "scientists' fundamental truths" with Historical Materialism?That is, he wasn't 'bamboozled'. Isn't this method (HM) the one we should encourage Communist scientists to adopt?

[Anonymous]

The idea about the ambivalence of Lenin was taken from his philosophical notebook,( included on volume 38 CW )  which were notes that he took when he was reading Hegel Science of Logic, and Dunayeskaya came to the conclusion that without reading Hegel logic it was impossible to understand Marx Capital.My personal opinion is that we do not need to read and understand Hegel science of logic to be able to understand Das Capital because I read volume one of capital was I was very young and I had  not read Hegel yet, but In some way I understood CapitalThe other wrong conception creeated by Dunayeskya  is that Marx came to the conclusion that capitalism can be skipped in order to establish socialism, when he was taking notes from the mode of production of Asia, Africa and the world Arab which are called his anthropolical ( or ethnological, or ehtnographical  notebooks  )  notebook. This is the recopilation made by Kraderhttp://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1881/ethnographical-notebooks/notebooks.pdfI don't think capitalism can be establish on an economical backward society, and Russia is a living proof of that affirmation, the Bolshevick looked  for thousand of ways in order to justify their coup d'tat, but the at the end they were forced to build a society based on state capitalism, and I do not think that Marx changed his mind either, he was just taking notes on the mode of production that was developed in others countires outisde of Europe

[DJP]

ALB wrote:

Do you think it is possible to understand Marx's Capital without first having mastered Hegel's Logic? Hopefully, the answer will be "no", but what if it's "yes"?

I could ask that I'm not sure what he would answer though if it is "yes" I wouldn't be that surprised, he is a devotee of Dunayevskaya after all…

[DJP]

LBird wrote:

This lends some credence, I think, to my suggestion that 'dialectics' would best be seen as Marx's early attempt to employ what we now would call 'critical realism'.

In the book isn't Ollman at least partially in agreement with this?

[Anonymous]

There is a cult around Raya Dunayevskaya

[ALB]

Rosa Lichtenstein wrote:

the very worst books ever to have been written by a leading socialist

A short list has been drawn up for this prize. The following books have been retained (in the category of those calling themselves Marxists):Lenin, The State and RevolutionTrotsky, Terrorism and CommunismStalin, Principles of LeninismThe jury is still out. The winner will be announced in due course

[Anonymous]

In the list we should add: What is to be done ?,  Imperialism higher state of capitalism, Materialism and Empirocriticism, The National and Colonial Question, Lenin instead of being  called a Marxist should have been called the perfect theoretician of bourgeois nationalism.All the Communist Parties attached to the Third International were/are nationalist parties of the countries where they are  located.In the list we should include  the Book on the contradiction written by Mao Tse Tung, but first we must read Confucius. Several years ago a Leninist party   made a call to go to the streets to protest because a tenant was going to be evicted by a landlord, those claims can be handle by the Department of Landlord and Tenant of a municipality. The main purpose of a socialist-communist party is to educate and propagate socialism, but they can not do that because first they must be educated on what socialism really is.Some Trotskyists groups were asking for the nationalization of the Budweiser, and to provide political support to Saddam Hussein because he was an anti-imperialist  PS I don't think Vladimir Lenin can be called a leading socialist, even more, socialists do not have leaders. Marx himself did not want to be called a Marxist. It sounds like Fidel Castro as leader of the Cuban peoples and leader and commander  of the Cuban revolution

[Anonymous]

Marx's letter to Engels : "My view is that Dietzgen would do best if he condensed his ideas into 2 printed sheets and had them printed in his name as a tanner. If he publishes them at the intended length, he will make a fool of himself because of the lack of dialectical development and the running in circles." As he put it in a later letter (11-8068), "it is his bad luck that it was precisely Hegel that he did not study." It looks like  Marx never abandoned Hegel completely. 

[Anonymous]

DJP wrote:

ALB wrote:

Do you think it is possible to understand Marx's Capital without first having mastered Hegel's Logic? Hopefully, the answer will be "no", but what if it's "yes"?

I could ask that I'm not sure what he would answer though if it is "yes" I wouldn't be that surprised, he is a devotee of Dunayevskaya after all…

I think Peter Hudis is taking part of her ideas into a much better direction. 

[LBird]

DJP wrote:

LBird wrote:

This lends some credence, I think, to my suggestion that 'dialectics' would best be seen as Marx's early attempt to employ what we now would call 'critical realism'.

In the book isn't Ollman at least partially in agreement with this?

Well, he devotes chapter 10 to it, but I have my differences with him about 'dialectics' and 'critical realism'.Plus, more worringly,

Bertell Ollman, p. 158, wrote:

Socialism's sudden loss of credibility as a viable alternative to capitalism, however, a loss largely due to the collapse of the Sovier Union…

Anyone who thinks that the Soviet Union was any sort of 'socialism' casts doubt on their own philosophical method. If his version of 'dialectics' can't tell him that workers were exploited by the S.U., what use is it?

[Anonymous]

 Anyone who thinks that the Soviet Union was any sort of 'socialism' casts doubt on their own philosophical method. If his version of 'dialectics' can't tell him that workers were exploited by the S.U., what use is it?  Any person,  any organization, or any analysis departing from the Soviet and the Bolshevik experience is going to end with wrong conclusions. The blind can not guide the blind

[Anonymous]

http://www.internationalmarxisthumanist.org/articles/hegel-in-10-minutes-by-david-black This is an article published by the  International Marxist Humanist Organization about Hegel

[Anonymous]

mcolome1 wrote:

Marx's letter to Engels : "My view is that Dietzgen would do best if he condensed his ideas into 2 printed sheets and had them printed in his name as a tanner. If he publishes them at the intended length, he will make a fool of himself because of the lack of dialectical development and the running in circles." As he put it in a later letter (11-8068), "it is his bad luck that it was precisely Hegel that he did not study." It looks like  Marx never abandoned Hegel completely. 

 I have looked in all the collected works of Marx in three different languages,  and  I have not found any  expression of Marx calling Dietzgen 'our philosopher". I have also consulted with others peoples and they have not found such expression. The opinion of some of them is, if  in case that Marx used such expression he was only using  some type of sarcasm. I looks like everything come from his own son and in some part from Engels. The thing is that Marx never used the expression: Dialectical Materialism

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