Do We Need the Dialectic?
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The discussion on other threads suggests that we may need a separate one on this. It's been discussed before of course. "Do We Need the Dialectic?" was the title of a series of article in Forum, the Socialist Party's internal discussion journal, in 1956.
These were introduced as:
Quote:The subject of dialectics has not received a great deal of attention in the Socialist Party. It may be thought it is of not much concern to us. Nevertheless, all sorts of ideas on the subject have flitted through the Party from time to time. We may not accept Engels's Dialectics of Nature or Anti-Duhring, but at least we have never rejected them. The following article and later ones are an attempt to stimulate discussion on these lines. They may not be the whole truth or even truth at all, but they may serve to clarify issues that are badly in need of clarification.The author (E.W.)'s conclusion was:
Quote:The fundamental error of Engels was to take the contradictions involved in the thinking process and transfer them to physical processes. Had he, like Hegel, made them part of the development of God, he would at least have been consistent, if no less mystical. To offer them as a universal law governing all phenomena is sheer mythology.Engels has been taken over by the Communists, and Anti-Duhring and The Dialectics of Nature are their text books. To what extent this is so, one discovers only by reading Haldane's blurb in the preface to Dialectics of Nature, where he claims that Engels anticipated many important scientific developments. My own view is that Engels’s materialism, embroidered as it was with dialectical fripperies, was metaphysical. It was Lenin and those who followed him who closely associated themselves with Engels’s views in the mistaken belief that they were interpreting Marxist materialism.
I could cry with gratitude, ALB, at both reading the mysterious E. W.'s opinion of Engels' travesty of Marx's views, and your posting of it! tears of joy, I assure you!
I wasn't necessarily agreeing with E.W. — Ted Willmott who, sad to say, ended up in the Labour Party. He also wrote a series of articles in the Socialist Standard in the 1950s on economic and philosophical matters (crises, Popper, Stratchey, etc) that can be found on this site under Publications/Socialist Standard/Archive). I was merely drawing attention to this views.This said, I do agree with his basic criticism of Engels on this point:
Quote:The fundamental error of Engels was to take the contradictions involved in the thinking process and transfer them to physical processes.This is not a rejection of "the dialectic" but of the attempt to see it as some sort of "law of nature". It is still valid as part of the thinking process (eg treating the world of phenomena as a whole, naming parts of it to understand it, etc).I don't think Engels can be blamed for having a go, even if he failed. He did follow very closely the scientific developments of his days and the Dialectics of Nature were notes he didn't publish himself. I don't think he advanced the same theory in Anti-Dühring, did he? I wouldn't criticise this work of his, especially not the part which was later published as Socialism, Utopian and Scientific, still a good introduction to "Marxism".Actually, I'm quite an Engels fan as he wrote simply and is easier to follow than Marx. He just made a mistake here in trying to discover "the laws of dialectics" in nature.
EW were the initials used by the writer Ted Wilmott and as I am someone who has not yet understood the point of dialectics, I have to say it seems like a pretty convincing case against dialectics.
ALB wrote:I don't think Engels can be blamed for having a go, even if he failed. He did follow very closely the scientific developments of his days…Well, he could have ignored 'the scientific developments of his days', which were clouded in a positivist mystique that he, having no philosophical training (unlike Marx), was unable to disperse with a proletarian philosophical basis, 'the philosophical developments of his youth', which he either never understood or forgot as he got older and became mightily impressed by 'positivistic science' (as were almost all other thinkers) – [by his youth, here I'm referring to Marx's Theses on Feuerbach].Carr’s What is History? describes how this positivist influence even penetrated into historiography, with von Ranke's advice 'simply to show how it happened', just like ‘scientists’ were [allegedly] doing. Of course, von Ranke was a conservative bastard, as Schaff relates
Charles Beard, quoted by Schaff, p. 92, wrote:Ranke who, in disregarding stubbornly social and economic interests in history, avoided successfully any historical works infringing the conservative interests of Europe of his times, may correctly characterised as one of the most ‘partisan’ historians which the 19th century produced.This could apply to scientists, too, who are ‘partisan’, because ‘partisanship’ is unavoidable for humans.Anyway, Engels can be blamed, he was out of his depth, and his failure adversely affects the Communist movement still, today.As the proletarian Jim Royle would so aptly put it: ‘Dialectics? My arse!’
I think you are being too harsh on Engels. His writings on history such as The Peasant War in Germany and The Origin of the Family don't betray any influence of the dreaded "positivism". In fact, we quote from them all the time.And his The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man is not bad for its time.I'm not convinced either that Marx had a different understanding of the scientific developments of his day than Engels. They frequently discussed these in their correspondence and I don't think there is any evidence of Marx telling Engels that his approach was wrong (even if it was).As to what Ricky Tomlinson (of the Scargill Labour Party) should have said, it was "Dialectics of Nature? My Arse!" rather than all dialectics.
ALB wrote:I think you are being too harsh on Engels. His writings on history such as The Peasant War in Germany and The Origin of the Family don't betray any influence of the dreaded "positivism". In fact, we quote from them all the time.And his The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man is not bad for its time.Well, I haven't been 'too harsh on Engels' where he's been writing about issues other than the 'philosophy of science'.That's the issue I'm 'harsh' on Engels, and it's difficult to be 'too' harsh on his nonsense on this issue.
ALB wrote:I'm not convinced either that Marx had a different understanding of the scientific developments of his day than Engels. They frequently discussed these in their correspondence and I don't think there is any evidence of Marx telling Engels that his approach was wrong (even if it was).But Marx had the sense to keep his mouth shut, if he had developed any leanings towards positivism (perhaps it is possible to argue he erroneously had?). He never told Engels his approach was right, either. Even chapter 2.10 of Anti-Duhring, written by Marx, is about socio-economics, rather than 'science', isn't it?
ALB wrote:As to what Ricky Tomlinson (of the Scargill Labour Party) should have said, it was "Dialectics of Nature? My Arse!" rather than all dialectics.There's possibly something to this, ALB. I tried to have a discussion on LibCom about 'dialectics', and tried to develop a method in conjunction with others, but met with little success. Certainly, any talk of 'dialectics in nature' is complete bollocks. But I've always been open to being persuaded about dialectics in epistemology, if I could get someone to talk in plain English about it. It always returns to mystical words and phrases, which mean either nothing or everything. Even Chomsky doesn't understand 'dialectics', so what chance do I stand!
De r all esp. Adam,I agree with the notion that Engels' error was to take a theory of mental contradictions and apply them to physical processes.Unless he was being *extremely* subtle. But I doubt it.Marx adopted the skeptical approach. I have been thinking long and hard on how to explain this, because I want to write an article that might be of some use to the Party, in the near future. Hence also, Adam, why I've been so useless over the Anthropology issue – sorry, I wanted to squeeze my own article in.Look at it this way. When we talk about the world, what do we mean? We mean *our impressions of it*. That is all that we have. We are simply not talking about a world out there beyond the senses: we are talking about our shared experiences.That means that when we say "water turns into steam" we are not talking about a qualitative change in this extra sensory world. We are talking about a change in the way we perceive it. The world is not a bouncy castle: but our minds certainly are. We as a community have started using a different concept to refer to our experiences in this area.The creepy bit is where you realise that you are not standing outside of yourself while you are thinking. You can't analyse your thinking and get to a true, as opposed to false, consciousness. There are no external facts to cling onto – the stars are cold and silent, and without mercy. The world beyond the senses is without form – Without even the notion of formlessness, which you probably just conjured as grey and cloudy.Input from this world beyond the senses is entirely negative, and Darwinian in the widest sense. Humans build square pyramids in certain ways across the continents, not because of Atlanteans or some universal Fourness, but because when you stack bricks that's how they happen to fall, whether you're Egyptian, Sumerian, or Maya. And ultimately, the development of ideas comes not from reaching towards greater universal Truths but because holding stupid ideas gets you killed. We stand on top not of good ideas but bad ones, just as we are descended from those animals that a) survived basic physics and then b) died the least and reproduced the most. (OK, it's a bit more complicated than that). This also means that just as Darwin spoke not of evolution but descent with modification, so we should see our cultural development as a secular process in no way guided by time's arrow.this is irreligious criticism at its root – that we are the only gods that we no, and entirely finite. All the doings of gods are our doings, and where the world seems magic it imply means that we have not yet developed the concepts to explain a phenomenon. In other words, there is no meaning outside of the community of human minds, whether inherent in the environment or in the mind of a Creator. Meaning is a thing that we *manufacture* – and of which we are made.Oh, dialectics? Right. Where was I. Since what we are talking about is our concepts, that allows them to interact in a way they would not if they were of fixed, solid matter. There is no factory without the experience of labour inside it: a ship may be inert sat in the harbour but on a stormy night sea it becomes a fickle She: and so forth. A castle, set beside a house, makes that house a hut, not because we live in a bouncy castle but because our concepts of residences and of status are inextricably interlinked.This, of course, renders crude materialism obsolete. Control of the means of life is essential; but this is not just control of big and heavy things, and the relegation of light and flighty things to the philosopher's tower. So, while taking it all back from the capitalists is a good idea – you can't go wrong if you grab it all – it may be that more subtle approaches to revolution may pay dividends. In particular, disrupting the value that is socially attached to the objects of capitalist society. A society almost self-sufficient in values, not just a starving survivalist band, is possible within capitalism: the technology that has rendered our value exchange so malleable, information technology, is key to this. It is telling that capitalism has tried to minimise the intrusion of this new technology by treating its products *as if they were heavy* – charging a rate per item as if it was a physical product from a factory, a car or pat of butter; selling rights to a product only on purchase of a physical equivalent item (the academic publishing model): and so forth.That's about as far as I'd got, but expect an article at some point. Comradely regards, Simon W.
Morgenstern wrote:Marx adopted the skeptical approach. I have been thinking long and hard on how to explain this, because I want to write an article that might be of some use to the Party, in the near future.If I can be of any use in your attempt to write a ‘party article’, I’m keen to help. That doesn’t mean my particular contributions will be of any use, of course, but perhaps just exploring these issues between us all will help to clarify your thoughts, give you some useful insights and help you generate a better understanding, from which we’ll all benefit. Even if what I write only provides a negative for you, and you discard my thoughts, at least it will strengthen your chosen positives.
Morgenstern wrote:Look at it this way. When we talk about the world, what do we mean? We mean *our impressions of it*. That is all that we have. We are simply not talking about a world out there beyond the senses: we are talking about our shared experiences.Is it true that ‘all we have of the world is our impressions of it’? I’ve read a number of books by critical realists, who seem to be suggesting that we can go further in our knowledge of the world than just empirical experience. If I’ve misunderstood your point, and you don’t mean simple sensual experience, I apologise. Is it worth me developing this line of questioning, and me giving some quotes from the relevant authors, or have you already discounted this possibility, of the human mind going beyond simple experience? I’d hate to be condemned as an ‘idealist’, as I’m sure some are already desperate to label me. Perhaps you’ll give me some leeway to manoeuvre, because I don’t fully understand many of their arguments, and I’m keen to learn more myself.
Morgenstern wrote:This, of course, renders crude materialism obsolete.Hmmm… I think some would have you shot for daring to prefix the god ‘materialism’ with the denigratory ‘crude’. For myself, I think Marx’s materialism was of the ‘historical’ human sort, not the ‘dialectical’ wizardry of the Engelsian and Leninist ‘materialists’.One final thing:
Morgenstern wrote:We are simply not talking about a world out there beyond the senses: we are talking about our shared experiences.No, not ‘simply’, but we are ‘talking about a world out there beyond the senses’, aren’t we? A world that existed before our senses? That is, we are talking ‘complexly’ about a real world, with which we interact in manifold ways, not just through our senses, but through our minds, too, through society.Do we have any shared basis to at least continue a discussion?
Dear LBird, I think it might make things clearer if I added two things to my hypothesis:1) I used the word 'have' with respect to our ideas. This was a liberty, loose talk. What I mean is not that thoughts are something we *have* but something that we *are*. That was implied in the rest of what I wrote, I think.2) Individual identity, our sense of self, is one more thought passing through our heads rather than the sine qua non of existence that it is in private property society, We are all moments within a communicating whole.so,3) what we say about the world, we say about ourselves. this isn't saying anything idealistic – it is saying something *less*. Whereas in our current model we believe in the solidity of our thoughts as objects in space, and consider our existence within it as a divine mystery, instead I am saying that we start from what we are, and step no further than we are able – in our case, beyond the nervous system (though of course we have so arranged the world beyond the senses to reflect our thoughts, to make our environment a medium of communication). There is no divine – what we know, we know, and what we don't is simply beyond our purview. So your notion of going further in our knowledge of the world than empirical experience just won't wash here, because we are the world and the world *is* empirical experience. There's no magic US to which the empirical experience attaches. Our identity is in the experiences themselves. Comradely regards, Simon Wigley.
ALB wrote:The discussion on other threads suggests that we may need a separate one on this. It's been discussed before of course. "Do We Need the Dialectic?" was the title of a series of article in Forum, the Socialist Party's internal discussion journal, in 1956.It's been discussed before on this forum as well of course.http://www.worldsocialism.org/spgb/forum/general-discussion/rosa-lichenstein-and-anti-dialectics
Dear all, i think ithat the easiest thing is to first establish as a tautology that you don't know anything over and above received sense data. You don't know anything more than you could know, in other words.otherwise you are religious – you are saying that God, or a numinous world, plants information in your head unbidden. sound reasonable? Comradely regards, Simon W.
Morgenstern wrote:i think ithat the easiest thing is to first establish as a tautology that you don't know anything over and above received sense data.I don't think I agree with this assumption of yours, Morgenstern, if I understand what you're saying correctly.Do you wish to discuss it, or is it an axiom of yours, an a priori assumption which is beyond analysis? (we all have them, 'starting points', by the way, it's just that I think we should try to expose our axioms, rather than hide them, as does bourgeois science)
I understood Morgernstern to be making the basic point that all our knowledge is derived from the ever-changing world of experience and that anyone who claimed otherwise was an idealist, whether religious (more likely) or not.Anyway, does this (the quotes not the accompanying text and the silly idea that you can get something done about global warming by signing a petition) help restore Engels's reputation and show he wasn't completely out of his depth on scientific matters:http://links.org.au/node/3554
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