Determinism
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Quote:“The lesson to be learned is that there is no simple way out of capitalism by leaving the system to collapse on its own accord. Until a sufficient number of workers are prepared to organise politically for the conscious purpose of ending capitalism, that system will stagger on indefinitely from one crisis to another”.
From Why Capitalism Will Not Collapse, the pamphlet by Edgar Harcastle published by the Socialist Party.
Quotes from the forum Pessimism topic
Quote:I appreciate the sentiment but I really don't think you're suggested anything that is that original or would be particularly effective. Of the problems the Socilaist Party face one isn't a lack of people offering opinions on what they think other people should be doing….
Our problem is essentially an educational one, to do with changing the boundaries of what ordinary people think is possible or desirable. It takes longer to do this then it does to take a walk around Clapham Common.
Historical materialism is determinist. The econimic base of capitalism is causing poverty, war, crime etc. Marx used the term base and superstructure as an analytical tool If HM is not determinist then why do workers need to remove the economic base of capitalism? It is not fatalistic.It is the way some 'marxists' and Marx's opponents have twisted 'determinism'. It is precisely because of determinism that workers will recognise the need to act and remove the economic base that is determining our future.
Workers do not need to remove the economic base of capitalism and do not recognise the economic base that is determining their future. It is in their interest to do so, but they do not NEED to do so.
jondwhite wrote:but they do not NEED to do so.No they don't. Anymore than a child needs to stop putting his or her hand in a flame. But unless the workers act, their pain will remain a constant reminder. All because of the existence of determinism.
Determinism : Every event has a cause.Indeterminism : Events just happen at random without a prior cause.Fatalism: What will be will be regardless of what we do.Economic Determinism : It is only economic factors that effect what happenTechnological Determinism : It is only technological factors that effect what happenIt is a common mistake to confuse determinism with fatalism. Economic determinism is not the same thing as determinism. Marx was not really an "economic determinist" (though he is sometimes crudely depicted as being one) since he also held the importance of political struggles (as we do) but he could be refered to as a 'determinist' I think. The quote from Hardy isn't about determinism but about those who thought that Capitalism would automatically collapse because automation would remove human labour from the production process.The quote from me was a moan coupled with a comment about power and ideology.Follow up question: Is free will compatible with determinism?
Vin wrote:Historical materialism is determinist. The econimic base of capitalism is causing poverty, war, crime etc. Marx used the term base and superstructure as an analytical tool If HM is not determinist then why do workers need to remove the economic base of capitalism? It is not fatalistic.It is the way some 'marxists' and Marx's opponents have twisted 'determinism'. It is precisely because of determinism that workers will recognise the need to act and remove the economic base that is determining our future.(my bold)Vin,Any chance you can expand on what you mean by the bit I've highlighted? It sounds a bit as if socialism is inevitable, which is why I believe JDW set up this thread.As far as I can tell the industrial productive forces necessary for socialism have been in position for a good few decades. The only thing missing is the socialist conciousness of our class. Will this just happen one day regardless of socialists "making socialists"? This is why the following quote caught my attention.
Quote:5) It would not move socialism one step nearer, nor improve the class struggle, objective conditions and class relations outweigh anythign we could add to the fightSocialistPunk wrote:Vin wrote:. It is precisely because of determinism that workers will recognise the need to act and remove the economic base that is determining our future.Vin,Any chance you can expand on what you mean by the bit I've highlighted? It sounds a bit as if socialism is inevitable, which is why I believe JDW set up this thread.
SP. No where have I ever suggested socialism is inevitable. I am pointing out that the consequences of capitalism are inevitable. An argument often twisted to distort Marx.NB but I can see how the sentence you highligh needs punctuation.
I think there is a distinction to be made between teleological determinism (fatalism) and mechanical determinism. Marx explicitly rejected the former in the German Ideology when he dismissed as a "speculative distortion" the idea that "later history is the goal of earlier history". However, teleological or goal directed behaviour, while it might not operate at a social level, does certainly operate at the individual level in the sense that the individual selects a goal and strives to realise it. We are in that sense goal directed Mechanical determinism is, in a way, the opposite of teleological determinism for here the past determines the future rather than the future, the past. Science in its classical form is predicated on mechanical determinism. It deals with cause and effect. As David Hume put it "the cause must be prior to the effect" meaning the past determines the future Now clearly cause and effect relationships exist in abundance all around us and are discoverable through the application of scientific methodology in the identification of such causal connections. The question is how valid is it to transfer such an approach to the question of the transformation of society itself? To what extent is this possible? This touches on why I have serious reservations about the term "scientific socialism" which implies a mechanical determinist ourlook and by extension rules out the question of human choice and volition. This was no better summed up than by Kautsky's absurd and sweeping statement that the materialist conception of history has "completely deposed the moral ideal as the directing factor of social revolution". Now morality necessarily implies the ability to choose and, in rejecting a role for morality in the "social revolution" Kautsky was in effect arguing for a completely mechanical determinist approach to society which the very term "scientific socialism" seems to denote. It is to be noted that the SPGB.s view on morality is not dissimilar to that of Kautsky's. As I understand it, the Party's current position is that the case for socialism does not involve a moral aspect at all but is purely and simply a matter iof working class interests. Personally I think this argument is fatally flawed by an internal contradiction for how can you identify with the welfare and wellbeing of other members of the working class without this involving a moral aspect. To argue as I have heard some members do, that socialism is a matter of "self interest" is actually to endorse Adam Smith's atomistic view of the world in which the individual is driven by nothing other than his or her self interest.. It is actually an anti socialist position. Point is that all these different ideas hang together. The veneration of "scientific socialism" goes with a mechanical determinist outlook which goes with a rejection of choice and human creativity which goes with a rejection of any role for morality in the movement towards socialism. Within this resolutely black-or-white view of the world there is no prospect of envisaging mechanical determinism coexisting in a fruitful partnership with the human faculty of choosing and creating some new that breaks with the past rather than being determined by the past. A revolution. I think this is part of the problem with the Party . The dead hand of Kautsky still guides its thinking in many ways
robbo203 wrote:Point is that all these different ideas hang together. The veneration of "scientific socialism" goes with a mechanical determinist outlook which goes with a rejection of choice and human creativity which goes with a rejection of any role for morality in the movement towards socialism. Within this resolutely black-or-white view of the world there is no prospect of envisaging mechanical determinism coexisting in a fruitful partnership with the human faculty of choosing and creating some new that breaks with the past rather than being determined by the past. A revolution.No, we make the chioces we are determined to make, the meatbots make choices according to our programming, and that involves altering our programming.The notion of free will is incompatible with thermodynamics, since it implies causeless events, but that doesn't mean there is no will nor volition, only to recognise that volition is a part of the world and we are mere epiphenomena of a nuclear reaction in a star.Put another way, I am an illusion, but my illusiary nature is a product of my determinations and the vector by which they manifest. 'Thinking for myself' is thus the truest way of enslaving myself to the world about me. What is rational is actual, and what is actual is rational: the only true freedom would be in random meaningless action.
robbo203 wrote:To argue as I have heard some members do, that socialism is a matter of "self interest" is actually to endorse Adam Smith's atomistic view of the world in which the individual is driven by nothing other than his or her self interest.Not wishing to sidetrack or derail this thread but isn't it curious, given what you call his "atomistic view of the world", that Smith, in his "Theory of Moral Sentiments", should begin with the following asssertion:
Quote:How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortunes of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner. That we often derive sorrow from the sorrows of others, is a matter of fact too obvious to require any instances to prove it; for this sentiment, like all the other original passions of human nature, is by no means confined to the virtuous or the humane, though they perhaps may feel it with the most exquisite sensibility. The greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society, is not altogether without it.In this work Smith defines sympathy as the effect that is produced when we imagine that another person’s circumstances are our own circumstances, and find their reaction to the circumstances to be reasonable. In so doing, we respond by experiencing a smaller-scale version of their feelings, even though we do not share the circumstances that incited their response. Smith refers to this also as ‘fellow-feeling'. He asserts that sympathy is part of 'human nature', and thus is not an expression of virtue, but is rather a passion that is exhibited by humanity.
Young Master Smeet wrote:The notion of free will is incompatible with thermodynamics, since it implies causeless events […] the only true freedom would be in random meaningless action.If 'free will' means the ability to break free from the casual laws of the universe and makes choices regardless of ones past, desires and inclinations then yes there is no such thing. But then the question is, if this where what 'free will' entails would we want such a thing anyhow? What's the freedom in randomly flapping about like a butterfly from one situation to another without any reason for our action?When we consider what people really mean when they talk about "free will" are they really talking about some proposed freedom from the laws of physics? For the most part it turns out that they are referring to nothing more than the capacity to regulate our behaviour and to act freely, without coercion, according to our desires, beliefs and values. I think this is the only meaningful way to go. Defining 'free will' in this second way might not be as magical as the first but it does allow us to about 'free will' and lets us avoid the silliness of thinking that our thoughts play no casual role in world (what is called 'epiphenominalism).Here's a link to a video by Julian Baggini, who wrote a rather excellent book called "Freedom Regained"https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oHJAr1bH2s0
gnome wrote:robbo203 wrote:To argue as I have heard some members do, that socialism is a matter of "self interest" is actually to endorse Adam Smith's atomistic view of the world in which the individual is driven by nothing other than his or her self interest.Not wishing to sidetrack or derail this thread but isn't it curious, given what you call his "atomistic view of the world", that Smith, in his "Theory of Moral Sentiments", should begin with the following assertion:
Yes this is true. There is a certain incongruity in Smith's works- that is between his earlier and his later works. Theory of Moral Sentiments was written prior to the Wealth of Nations and if I remember correctly I think the catalyst for this change in outlook was Smith's reading of Bernard de Mandeville's "Fable of the Bees" which shocked public opinion with the suggestion that private vices could generate public virtues. Smith was initially appalled at the thought but seemed to have found it irresistible in the end Louis Dumont in his book from Mandeville to Marx which is about the history of individualist thought deals with this subject in some depth. Dumont, interestingly, also contends that there is strong streak of individualistic thought in Marx. I am reminded of this whenever a party member asserts that the case for socialism is not about morality at all but rather what is in our "self interest". He or she is unwittingly projecting the atomistic thinking that underlies Smith's metaphor of the market's invisible hand
Young Master Smeet wrote:No, we make the chioces we are determined to make, the meatbots make choices according to our programming, and that involves altering our programming.The notion of free will is incompatible with thermodynamics, since it implies causeless events, but that doesn't mean there is no will nor volition, only to recognise that volition is a part of the world and we are mere epiphenomena of a nuclear reaction in a star.Put another way, I am an illusion, but my illusiary nature is a product of my determinations and the vector by which they manifest. 'Thinking for myself' is thus the truest way of enslaving myself to the world about me. What is rational is actual, and what is actual is rational: the only true freedom would be in random meaningless action.Well no YMS I can't really go along with this. You talk of "causeless events" as if to rule such a thing out of the question. Everything that exists must have a cause. But must it? The principle of indeterminism is somethimng that is pretty much well established in physics and when we are talking about physics these days we are talking about some pretty weird stuff, stuff that seems far removed from the mechanical determinism of traditional Newtoniam physics . Like the theory of "entanglement", for example, which I still cant quite get my head around It strikes me as a little odd that a hardline materialst like your good self would rule out indeterminism. Afterall if everything must have a cause then what "caused" matter. God? .As I see it, determinism and indeterminism coexist as a kind of yin/yang of the cosmos Mechanical determinism is valid up to a point in the same sense that Newtonian physics is valid up to a point – that is up to the point at which Einsteinian physics kicks in I have a problem with this mechanistic cause-and-effect approach to understanding reality for precisely that reason, To refer to Hume again – to posit something as the cause of an effect is to assert that the former is prior to the latter. But the logic of that is "physical reductionism" which rules out downward causation (since how can there be downward causation if all causation is one way in the strict temporal sequence that Hume suggested). Yet , higher levels of reality though dependent or supervening on lower levels, can nevertheless influence the latter . Mind-brain interactions being a cause in point (e.g. the placebo effect). We can also apply this to the relation between individuals and society. Durkheim made the comment that "social facts" are "sui generis" and cannot be reduced to the mere biological or psychological facts pertaining to individuals – even though society cannot exist without individuals as its constituent members. However mechanical determinism would forbid us to even talk about of "society" as a causal influence. Is that compatible with a socialist perspective? This is why I am wary of the kind of one way causation implicit in the model of mechanical determinism – "one way" for the reason Hume gave that causes necessarily precede effects in a strict temporal sense, All this ties up with the question of free will and by extension moral choices. As John Horgan has noted to argue that all our choices have prior causes and are therefore determined and not free, but "caused", is to entirely miss the point, The point is what "causes" them? To reduce an explanation as to why Joe Bloggs has chosen not to kill a stranger for his money, to the gyrations of subatomic particles, or perhaps not even that, (which is what physical reductionism boils down to really) just seems to me utterly absurd. Meaning threre are definite limits to mechanical determinsm itself. It is useful for explaining bits of reality but not reality in its entirety
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