The Long Awaited Materialism thread
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So, while my mood lasts.
Now, as an averagely intelligent lay-person, I don't have life enough nor time to go burrowing deep into the philosophy of science: I am aware of the topic, as much as I am aware of the outlines of the broad topics of the produce fo scientific endeavours. As to the philosophy of science, I normally stop at pragmatics, because what works, seems to work. Science as it stands seems effective.
Anyway, whilst I'm sure in terms of nuance and future debates there may be scope for improvement, as far as I can see, the below from Fred seems to be good enough for a work-a-day understanding of materialism and science:
Freddy wrote:Again, our agnostic admits that all our knowledge is based upon the information imparted to us by our senses. But, he adds, how do we know that our senses give us correct representations of the objects we perceive through them? And he proceeds to inform us that, whenever we speak of objects, or their qualities, of which he cannot know anything for certain, but merely the impressions which they have produced on his senses. Now, this line of reasoning seems undoubtedly hard to beat by mere argumentation. But before there was argumentation, there was action. Im Anfang war die That. [from Goethe's Faust: "In the beginning was the deed."] And human action had solved the difficulty long before human ingenuity invented it. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. From the moment we turn to our own use these objects, according to the qualities we perceive in them, we put to an infallible test the correctness or otherwise of our sense-perception. If these perceptions have been wrong, then our estimate of the use to which an object can be turned must also be wrong, and our attempt must fail. But, if we succeed in accomplishing our aim, if we find that the object does agree with our idea of it, and does answer the purpose we intended it for, then that is proof positive that our perceptions of it and of its qualities, so far, agree with reality outside ourselves. And, whenever we find ourselves face-to-face with a failure, then we generally are not long in making out the cause that made us fail; we find that the perception upon which we acted was either incomplete and superficial, or combined with the results of other perceptions in a way not warranted by them — what we call defective reasoning. So long as we take care to train our senses properly, and to keep our action within the limits prescribed by perceptions properly made and properly used, so long as we shall find that the result of our action proves the conformity of our perceptions with the objective nature of the things perceived. Not in one single instance, so far, have we been led to the conclusion that our sense-perception, scientifically controlled, induce in our minds ideas respecting the outer world that are, by their very nature, at variance with reality, or that there is an inherent incompatibility between the outer world and our sense-perceptions of it.So the matter that thinks, that is within the the symmetrical universe it contemplates acts upon it. That does for me.
Personally, the keystone of materialism is the laws of thermodynamics, that matter/energy cannot be created or destroyed: even if that principle has to be taken as as unprovable in itself.
Young Master Smeet wrote:As to the philosophy of science, I normally stop at pragmatics, because what works, seems to work. Science as it stands seems effective.That seems pretty clear, YMS: your ideological approach to science is 'Pragmatism'.Should we discuss the difference between Pragmatism and Marxism?
YMS wrote:So the matter that thinks…Could you tell me what 'matter' is, YMS? Within your ideology, of course! I would think that for pragmatists, 'matter' is something 'tangible', but I might be wrong.
LBird, I said "I normally stop at Pragmatism", normally it is sufficient to live with that.Everythign is matter, there is no-thing outside or beyond matter.
Young Master Smeet wrote:Freddy wrote:From the moment we turn to our own use these objects, according to the qualities we perceive in them, we put to an infallible test the correctness or otherwise of our sense-perception. If these perceptions have been wrong, then our estimate of the use to which an object can be turned must also be wrong, and our attempt must fail.[my bold]YMS, can you see the contradiction in what Fred is saying, later in the passage.
Young Master Smeet wrote:Freddy wrote:But, if we succeed in accomplishing our aim, if we find that the object does agree with our idea of it, and does answer the purpose we intended it for, then that is proof positive that our perceptions of it and of its qualities, so far, agree with reality outside ourselves.
[my bold]Fred uses the terms 'must' and 'positive', but these are logically undermined by 'so far'.Either 'knowledge is positive' (and is the same as reality, a 'copy' or 'reflection') or 'knowledge is historical' (and is produced by humans, creatively, actively, and thus might be wrong).That is, 'so far' as it works, it is 'knowledge'. But… what 'works' for one society, doesn't 'work' for another. This is why Marx would be loathe to use 'must' and 'positive', because he argued for the social and historical nature of human knowledge. Indeed, he even thought our 'senses' to be social and historical, rather than biologically-fixed, and thus our senses wouldn't produce the same perception for any individual in time.Fred was a positivist, but Charlie wasn't. Or, more correctly, Fred seems to have been both, because of the confusion within his works: he was a poor philosopher, and didn't seem to realise the implications of many of the statements that he made. Charlie was a trained philosopher, but Fred was an amatuer, and it showed (and, indeed, still shows, in his works).
Young Master Smeet wrote:LBird, I said "I normally stop at Pragmatism", normally it is sufficient to live with that.Everythign is matter, there is no-thing outside or beyond matter.But is 'sufficient' a scientific measure? Many societies had 'sufficient' knowledge to work pragmatically, but it involved gods. How do you scientifically justify 'normal'? Isn't 'normal' a social judgement?As to 'matter', if it's 'everything', is it also a 'ghost'? Isn't that just an idea, with no 'material' content? But if humans thoughts are real, they must be outside 'everything', because only 'matter' gives 'thingness'.Does this mean consciousness is separate from 'matter'. Is this a Cartesian duallist philosophical approach?
"Everythign is matter, there is no-thing outside or beyond matter." I think Hobbes said it all, a long time ago. 'mind' is 'internal motion'.
I think you're working slightly hard to drive a wedge between Charlie and Freddy, given Fred acknowledges the contingency of knowledge himself.I think what this discussion needs is a bit of "For whomness" — science for Joe Schmoe on the street is one thing, for the working scientist another, and for the philosopher of science another, their objects (and objectives) are different, given the massive body of scientific ideas we cannot see them accurately and see them whole (to be slightly Heisenbergian).I agree that religion was scientific, in as far as it was part of the practice of tryign to understand and control the world with the means then available.Consciousness is material, the precise opposite of cartesian dualism, I don't know where on Earth you got that.
LBird wrote:As to 'matter', if it's 'everything', is it also a 'ghost'? Isn't that just an idea, with no 'material' content? But if humans thoughts are real, they must be outside 'everything', because only 'matter' gives 'thingness'.Well we're into philosophy of mind here…If we are to presume mind-brain identity then the concept 'ghost' or 'father christmas' are just the result of a certain configuration of grey matter inside the brain.That does lead us to the 'hard problem' of physicalism, the problem of 'intentionality' or 'aboutness' but compared to the other alternatives dualism (mental and physical as separate 'substances') or idealism (it's all mental) it really is the only game in town.You'll get better answers to these questions if you logged into a philosophy forum..
DJP wrote:If we are to presume mind-brain identity then the concept 'ghost' or 'father christmas' are just the result of a certain configuration of grey matter inside the brain.[my bold]To hold that opinion, DJP, is fair enough. But it's an individualist explanation, and so is likely to be anathema to Communists.The opposite viewpoint, that the mind is social, suggests that the mind lies in relationships between 'brains'.That is "the concept 'ghost' or 'father christmas' are just the result of a certain configuration of relationships outside the brain".This is a social and historical view of concepts, not a 'grey matter', mechanical materialist, view of concepts.One way of picturing this difference between us, is to ask which ears does the mind lie between, when given a photo of the two of us together.On the photo, you'd put an 'x' between your ears, and another between my ears. Our faces would each have an 'x' on them. Whereas, I'd place a single 'x' between our two nearest ears, in the middle of the photo.
DJP wrote:You'll get better answers to these questions if you logged into a philosophy forum..But I'm a Communist, and the answer to this question concerns Communists. After all, 'philosophers' have only interpreted the world…
LBird wrote:To hold that opinion, DJP, is fair enough. But it's an individualist explanation, and so is likely to be anathema to Communists.No it's a brief shorthand answer which you've read too much into.
LBird wrote:The opposite viewpoint, that the mind is social, suggests that the mind lies in relationships between 'brains'.That is "the concept 'ghost' or 'father christmas' are just the result of a certain configuration of relationships outside the brain"."Meaning aint all in the head", as Putman said and I agree. Read Wittgenstiens 'private language argument'. This is all pretty much mainstream stuff these days….I'd put it this way though "The meaning of words and concepts like 'ghost' or 'father christmas' are the result of certain relationships between brains"I don't see how meaning or concepts can exist outside brains.
LBird wrote:Whereas, I'd place a single 'x' between our two nearest ears, in the middle of the photo.Wouldn't that entail you having to explain how consciousness could exist free floating in space?
DJP wrote:I'd put it this way though "The meaning of words and concepts like 'ghost' or 'father christmas' are the result of certain relationships between brains"I don't see how meaning or concepts can exist outside brains.Surely 'between' means a 'relationship'?How can a relationship exist inside the components?
DJP wrote:Wouldn't that entail you having to explain how consciousness could exist free floating in space?Only if I was a reductionist, and reduced structures to their components. I'm not a reductionist, DJP.I think structures have emergent properties. I've been through this before, though, so I won't labour the point with you, now.
Young Master Smeet wrote:Everythign is matter, there is no-thing outside or beyond matter.Perhaps I can illustrate the problem, YMS.
Marx, Capital, p. 138, wrote:Not an atom of matter enters into the objectivity of commodities as values.[my bold]From this, I have to ask, do you think Marx is wrong? He clearly thinks 'value' has some sort of 'objectivity', but also that it isn't 'matter'.Or do you think 'value' doesn't exist, because 'there is no-thing outside or beyond matter'? Marx clearly thinks 'value' is 'outside' of 'matter'.
LBird wrote:Only if I was a reductionist, and reduced structures to their components. I'm not a reductionist, DJP.I think structures have emergent properties. I've been through this before, though, so I won't labour the point with you, now.OK that's all well and good. But, as far as theories of mind go, emergence and supervenience inherits rather than supersede the problems of reductionism.
DJP wrote:LBird wrote:Only if I was a reductionist, and reduced structures to their components. I'm not a reductionist, DJP.I think structures have emergent properties. I've been through this before, though, so I won't labour the point with you, now.OK that's all well and good. But, as far as theories of mind go, emergence and supervenience inherits rather than supersede the problems of reductionism.
Could you explain further what you mean, DJP? What are the 'problems of reductionism' to which you refer?And can you tell me which ideological approach you're using to understand these issues? For example, are you a reductionist or a critical realist, or something else?
LBird wrote:Or do you think 'value' doesn't exist, because 'there is no-thing outside or beyond matter'? Marx clearly thinks 'value' is 'outside' of 'matter'.Does he? Without getting out and dusting down my copy of capital I think Marx refers to 'Value' as a relationship between people expressed as a relationship between things. The relationship is in all our heads and has a material existence within our grey matter.
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