The trade war hots up
One of the myths in the economic textbooks is that the purpose of trade is to provide everyone amicably with the things he wants at the lowest possible prices, and that as restrictions on trade, whether in the form of protective tariffs and quotas on imports, or subsidies on exports, or of unstable currencies, prevent goods from being produced where and by whom they can be turned out most cheaply it is the duty of all ‘good governments’ to favour freedom of trade.
The myth was given official approval some thirty years ago with the establishment under United Nations auspices of the International Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (G.A.T.T.), through which the nations were to co-operate to their mutual advantage in securing currency stability, promoting trade and employment and working towards the removal of all trade barriers.
The reality is nothing like this. Trade is a war in which capitalists, alone or associated groups, try to turn their products into cash at maximum profit, and to this end seek to capture markets from rivals by any means that will serve, including government action to protect home markets, subsidised exports and putting pressure on rival governments.
Outside the Russian and Chinese blocs (which have their own systems of trade imperialism) nearly all governments pay lip-service to free trade, but it is a principle they support or reject in practice just as their changing needs require.
Marx was pointing out more than a century ago that the free-traders of one generation become the protectionists of the next. The classic example was the mid-nineteenth century English manufacturers to whom free trade was a religion. They had been protectionist in the eighteenth century, against the free-trade landed interests, but when developed British industry had the world at its feet their slogan was free-trade, with its accompaniment of cheap imported food which meant lower wages and higher profits. It was the landed interest which then became protectionist.
Later on, when British industry was successfully challenged by foreign rivals, the manufacturers reverted to protection.
After World War II it was American exports which were penetrating into world markets, and the dominant sections of American industry and food production wanted to impose free trade on the rest of the world. But, following the re-emergence of powerful industries in Europe and the spectacular expansion of Japan with its cheap ship building and steel production and the flooding of the American and other markets with cheap textiles, motor cycles, cars, cameras, TV sets etc., the protectionist interests in USA increased their influence on American trade and currency policy. Hence the Nixon move of imposing a ten per cent surcharge on imports, to be used as a means of putting pressure on other countries, particularly Japan, into up-valuing their currency in terms of dollars. This enabled America to get the results flowing from a dollar devaluation while technically avoiding direct devaluation (but also with suspension of the already much restricted convertibility of dollars into gold at $35 an ounce).
Simply as an arithmetic calculation, if the Japanese Yen is up-valued by say ten per cent, this would enable Japanese importers of American goods to get them nine per cent cheaper and would force American importers of Japanese goods to pay ten per cent more for them, thus stimulating American exports and discouraging imports. In practice the effect is likely to be modified by both buyers and sellers being willing to adjust their prices, even at the cost of lowered profit margins. The same applies to the ten per cent surcharge on American imports which in any event is likely to be a temporary measure.
The Nixon move was received with cries of rage from the affected capitalist groups, with charges and counter charges of ‘selfishness’, ‘bad faith’, ‘callous disregard of world interests’ and so on.
There are seventy seven countries which are members of G.A.T.T. but they found that when it came to vital question of American interests their numbers did not count for much. A typical bitter comment was published in the Evening Standard 20 August): –
“Now G.A.T.T. finds who calls the tune. Today it is the turn of G.A.T.T. to find that when the pinching starts to hurt the boss, suddenly all the rules are changed. These last few days very eminent economic set-ups like the International Monetary Fund and the Common Market Commission have been waking up to the fact that it is the U.S. government and not they who call the tune when world monetary problems get too close to home.”
Doubtless very true, but it is only a repetition of what every government has tried to do from time to time. A case in point was the sudden decision of the Wilson government in November 1964 to slam a fifteen per cent surcharge on all manufactured and semi-manufactured imports. (Later reduced to ten per cent and abolished in 1966). This was received with similar howls of rage. It was strongly denounced in G.A.T.T., in the European Free Trade Association, the Council of Europe, and the Common Market. The British government was condemned for lack of consultation, even with its E.F.T.A. partners, charged with breaking G.A.T.T. rules and with action contrary to the spirit of international co-operation. A Swiss spokesman at E.F.T.A. asked what was the use of making international agreements when the British government could so flagrantly violate them.
As usual the economic ‘experts’ are all at sixes and sevens in their efforts to assess the Nixon move and its consequences. At one extreme was Joe Rogaly in the Financial Times (1 September) and at the other Nigel Lawson in The Times of the same date. Rogaly sees hope that the road will be open ‘to a long term future’ in which there were no balance of payments crises and in which each nation produced the goods that it was best at producing, thus increasing the efficiency of the world as a whole and raising the general prosperity of us all’.
Nigel Lawson regards it as a disaster.
“in the course of an essentially domestic economic initiative designed to secure his re-election next year . . . the President gratuitously, and almost as an aside, gave the world a bloody nose — and the commentators, nearly to a man, squealed with delight. At one blow Mr. Nixon has destroyed the international monetary order on which the post-war prosperity of the West has been based and created the biggest threat to world trade since the thirties and everyone marvels at his sagacity.”
Lawson is wrong in thinking that if things get worse it will simply be the fault of the American government. Nixon was responding to a hotting up of the trade war which was already taking place and was affecting in greater or less degree all the capitalist world. While capitalism lasts there is no contracting out of its evil effects.
H.